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Introduction: Not Another 
Book about Interdisciplinarity
Abstract: In the introduction, we introduce our monograph, 
Rethinking Interdisciplinarity, as a report from the 
interdisciplinary field – and an account of our own attempts 
to work and live across the social sciences and neurosciences. 
The introduction sets out the core goal of the volume, which 
is to give a sense, beyond bland encouragements, of what 
actually goes into, and what goes on in, interdisciplinary 
projects. The introduction sets out the core reasons that 
we have pursued interdisciplinary research, with our 
collaborators, across the neurosciences and social sciences – 
but it also establishes our view that interdisciplinarity is 
nonetheless a problem, or a set of problems, to be analysed in 
its own right.
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A few years ago, we were at an interdisciplinary workshop for research-
ers who were broadly interested in the intersections between the 
neurosciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. We had arrived, 
separately, at the workshop, as two social scientists (FC as a cultural 
and health geographer; DF as a sociologist) who had been working on 
projects that were more-or-less about some aspect of the neurosciences, 
psychology, or psychiatry – but who had also lately begun to suspect, 
quite independently of one another, that we might be able to make more 
interesting interventions by somehow collaborating with people in those 
sciences, rather than simply scrutinizing them, from the outside, as 
objects of historical, cultural, or sociological attention. We didn’t know 
one another at that point, and we found ourselves on the margins of the 
same group – where we fell into conversation about how we had come to 
be engaged with the life sciences, about our hopes for the meeting, and 
about our anxieties and excitement vis-à-vis actually doing something 
more experimentally interdisciplinary. Central to our conversation was 
a shared sense that the conventional theoretical assumptions and meth-
odological manoeuvres that we had each inherited from our own disci-
pline (geography and sociology, respectively), and which were supposed 
to help us understand the biosciences, were, in fact, quite inadequate to 
a moment in which those same sciences seemed ever more richly and 
capaciously social in both their orientation and their practice.
And so there we were, feeling somewhat at sea both socially and epis-
temologically, when one of the organizers of the meeting approached 
us, asking whether we were having a good conversation, and whether 
we could see any interdisciplinary opportunities. Uh, yes, we could! There 
were certainly all sorts of crossovers between our different geographical and 
sociological inheritances; we were sure that there were various ways in which 
we might develop an interdisciplinary collaboration. All seemed well. But 
then it became clear that we had not yet hooked up with any neurosci-
entists. We had thought, then, that because the two of us were from two 
distinct disciplines, that our incipient collaboration would already count 
as ‘interdisciplinary’. But it appeared that it was a bit of a problem: we 
were not, as it turned out, having an interdisciplinary conversation with 
one another at all. In fact, what ‘interdisciplinarity’ meant in this space, 
despite some loose talk, was actually something quite specific – and this 
specific thing did not include the coming together of a geographer and 
a sociologist. It essentially meant a neuroscientist plus some others. The 
implicit address to all those of us (philosophers, bioethicists, lawyers, 
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psychologists, social scientists) in the room who were not neuroscien-
tists was: find yourself a neuroscientist; design an experiment together; 
allow your own expertise to nuance some conceptual part of the design; 
and then get out of the way. This, it became increasingly clear as the 
workshop moved into its second, and then its third day, was the model 
of interdisciplinarity on offer.
Well, the two of us did, eventually, find a neuroscientist – and we 
ended up working together on methodological and substantive issues of 
interest to each of us. And so, maybe the organizer was right in adjudi-
cating how best to orient people towards putting together collaborative 
projects. Still, and albeit only in retrospect, this was an early clue that 
there was a lot more going on beneath the surface of these interdisci-
plinary attempts to bring together neuroscientists, social scientists, and 
humanities scholars than either of us had imagined. In fact, beneath 
the frictionless imaginary of equably co-labouring humanities scholars, 
scientists, and social scientists – each with her own, dedicated tasks to 
perform – heterogeneous organizations, individuals, and technologies 
were creating a very specific, and surprisingly powerful, intellectual 
space. This space, moreover, for all the talk about its openness and 
creativity, had some sharp edges – as well as what we increasingly came 
to identify as surprisingly conservative inheritances. Over the years that 
followed that workshop, we continued to work across the social sciences 
and neurosciences, separately and together, and usually with others too. 
This was not, at least initially, because we were interested in ‘interdisci-
plinarity’ in its own right. Rather, we were convinced, as many others 
have been before us (e.g. Rose 2013), that one could no longer talk about 
human social life, in all its complexity, contest, history, and nuance, as 
if that life were not also threaded through the biological propensities of 
an assemblage of human animals (as well as non-human animals, and 
indeed non-humans in general). And vice versa: that new, sophisticated, 
and nuanced tools for taking – and analysing – biological measures (it 
was measures of brain function that especially captured our attention) 
needed to be situated within thicker, more capacious attention to the 
‘social’ than was then on offer.
We came to believe, as we pursued this intuition, that the increas-
ingly formalized space of ‘interdisciplinarity’ between the life sciences, 
the social sciences, and the humanities, which we saw being assembled, 
was not necessarily a boon to attempts to think the ‘bio’ and the ‘social’ 
together. This space of interdisciplinary research on the mind and 
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brain was becoming, in fact, a significant problem in its own right. This 
volume is our attempt to think about that problem. We are interested, 
here, not so much in providing a theoretical analysis (we have done 
this elsewhere; see e.g. Fitzgerald and Callard 2015), nor in providing 
a history of the numerous efforts to create interdisciplinary domains or 
disciplines within and across the sciences, social sciences, and humani-
ties (see e.g. Graff 2015). Instead, we treat the emergence of this space – 
the space of ‘interdisciplinarity’ as it engages the neurosciences, social 
sciences, and humanities – as a historical and sociological artefact, an 
object that offers numerous openings as well as constraints. Working 
through our own memories, reflections, and feelings from the last five 
years or so, we ask: What is this space? What forms of practice and 
ethics does it call us towards? What holds it together? What have its 
various analysts not told us? How does it end up deadening and closing 
down possibilities, even as it abounds in affirmations of its innovative-
ness and creativity? And how, if it really is as problematic as we think 
it is, might it be reimagined and practised differently? What, we ask, 
would a delicate, difficult, transgressive, risky, playful, and genuinely 
experimental interdisciplinarity involving neuroscientists, social scien-
tists, and humanities scholars actually look like? And what, moreover, 
might it be able to achieve?
Interdisciplinarity is a term that everyone invokes and none under-
stands. We have lost track of the number of articles, broadsides, reports, 
and monographs that we have read that have variously defined, cham-
pioned, dissected, and excoriated interdisciplinarity. ‘Interdisciplinarity 
has come to be’, Andrew Barry and Georgina Born rightly note, in an 
unusually substantial analysis of the logics of interdisciplinarity, ‘at once 
a governmental demand, a reflexive orientation within the academy 
and an object of knowledge’ (Barry and Born 2013, 4). What follows 
springs from our deep dissatisfaction with much of what passes as 
‘interdisciplinarity’ – both in theory and practice. Its arguments are built 
from our immersion, over many years, in reading, writing about, and 
practising many forms of interdisciplinary research. Along the way, we 
have become increasingly irritated with the normative weight that that 
this prefix – inter- – has come to carry. A kind of transgression is appar-
ently achieved by working between one discipline and another – and yet 
fundamental assumptions (e.g. about what an experiment might be, 
about who does it, about how its objects are produced, and so on) are left 
quite unquestioned. We have been repeatedly struck by how profoundly 
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uninteresting – and how conservative – much self-described interdisci-
plinary scholarship and practice actually is.
We are committed to the view that the particular arena with which 
we’re concerned deserves better than much of the ‘interdisciplinary’ 
research that has taken place around it. That arena comprises minds, 
brains, bodies – as well as, crucially, their relations with what the 
neurologist and psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein described as an organism’s 
milieu (namely, ‘that part [of the world] that is adequate to it, that is, 
that allows for the described relationship between the organism and its 
environment’ (Goldstein 1995 [1934], 106)). There have been a number 
of overtures from ‘the neurosciences’ vis-à-vis the need to engage with 
‘the social sciences’ – and, simultaneously, many social scientists and 
humanities scholars who have engaged with neuroscientists. But there 
are strikingly few examples of research involving both neuroscientists 
and social scientists that have managed to avoid simply acceding to the 
epistemological and methodological demands of one half of the dyad. 
And this ‘interdisciplinary science’ is not going to disappear any time 
soon. So there are potent intellectual and practical reasons that underpin 
the arguments we make for new ways of thinking about and undertaking 
interdisciplinary research.
At the same time, we – in collaboration with many others – have, for 
a number of years, struggled to develop modes of thinking and practice 
that do something slightly different in that same space, without obviating 
the inequalities (see Chapter 6) and complex emotional demands (see 
Chapter 7) that characterize the terrain on which interdisciplinary social 
scientific and neuroscientific research takes place. Our book is also an 
attempt to make sense of those efforts for a broader audience: we want 
to present, for wider discussion, some of those modes of collaborative 
thinking and practice. And we want to be honest, for once, about what 
interdisciplinarity actually looks and feels like – certainly in terms of the 
often challenging day-to-day realities that people from all disciplinary 
backgrounds experience when they live ‘between’ disciplines, but also in 
terms of the modes and practices through which we, in collaboration 
with others from other disciplines, have been able to open up some 
interesting research directions and problems that address the ‘bio’ and 
the ‘social’ simultaneously (see Chapters 2 and 4). We hope that we 
might pique others’ curiosity, and even widen their potential repertoires, 
either as they enter this terrain for the first time, or as they persist with 
long-standing interdisciplinary collaborations.
 Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences
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We remain convinced that there are many more research questions 
in this problem-space to be burrowed into, and opened up. This is 
important not only for reasons of intrinsic interest, but because this 
terrain – comprising minds, brains, and their environments – encom-
passes many of the most pressing societal questions of our age. These 
include, but are not limited to: how to attend to mental distress and 
psychopathology as phenomena that bring the neurological, psycho-
logical, psychopharmacological, and sociological together in deeply 
complex ways; how to understand the ways in which particular social 
phenomena and social relations (such as poverty, urban living, familial 
dynamics, migratory patterns) are entangled with physiological and 
neurological differences; and how to unpick, and expand, the dense 
histories and debates that are built into the neurobiological and 
psychological models through which many people today understand 
themselves – through which, indeed, they have come to be under-
stood. We add the proviso that much of the book focuses more on 
how to conceptualize some of these problems, and how to design and 
analyse the means through which collaborative research across the 
social sciences and the neurosciences might best tackle them, than 
on reporting extensive outcomes of interdisciplinary research that we 
have (already) completed to advance those particular research areas. 
The book is, in many ways, a ‘report from the field’.
The modes of thinking and working that we consider in this volume 
have been strongly inflected by particular arrangements of institutions, 
funders, and cross-disciplinary debates. We are able to discuss, analyse, 
critique, and propose various configurations in this volume only because 
of the prior and contemporaneous labours of a significant number of 
individuals who have, for many years, been tinkering with, advocat-
ing, and bringing into being opportunities for collaboration across the 
mind and brain sciences. While this book does not present a history of 
interdisciplinary collaborations in this arena, we are very aware of the 
pioneers and fellow travellers whose endeavours have, to a significant 
extent, underpinned our own enquiries, and we provide some additional 
details about these people, organizations, and funders in Chapter 1. 
Together, these have characterized the space of early twenty-first century 
‘interdisciplinary’ research about the mind and brain. And so we also 
understand this volume as a set of reflections that will – in time – perhaps 
become part of the archive of a specific moment in the history of the 
human sciences.
Introduction
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Experimental entanglements
Some of you might well have been told, as we both have been variously 
told, by your mentors, supervisors, university, or research institute, 
that interdisciplinarity is the future. If you have received that message, 
it might well have generated a variety of emotions in you, and we are 
certainly not assuming that all of them will have been positive. But if 
everyone seems to be talking about interdisciplinarity, it’s far from clear 
how many are actually doing it, and, if so, to what effect. Accounts of 
what interdisciplinary projects are like in practice are still relatively 
few in number, and most people are still reticent about the quotidian 
experiences that characterize them. There are especially few accounts of 
occasions in which social scientists and humanities scholars have been 
experimenters alongside scientists (though see Lane et al. 2011 for an 
account of an experiment in which knowledge regarding flooding was 
co-produced across these domains; see also Rabinow and Bennett 2012).
Of course, the neurosciences are themselves already a profoundly 
interdisciplinary endeavour (which brings together biology, chemistry, 
physics, cognitive science, computer science, engineering, mathemat-
ics, neurology, genetics, and psychology) (Adelman 2010; Rose and 
Abi-Rached 2013). When one refers, then, to a neuroscientist, one might 
be referring to someone with a background in physics or mathematics 
or psychology or philosophy (to name just a few). When we talk about 
the neurosciences in this volume, we are largely referring to cognitive 
neuroscience (i.e. the field that addresses the relationship between 
mental/cognitive functions and the brain, often using different brain-
imaging techniques). There are also numerous ways of practising ‘inter-
disciplinarity’ (though we suggest that oftentimes what results is actually 
‘multidisciplinarity’) via the bringing together of researchers who share 
broadly similar epistemological starting points. (For example, health 
services research often involves clinical researchers, positivistic quantita-
tive and qualitative social scientists, health economists and statisticians; 
collaborative projects in the humanities and social scientists might 
involve historians, cultural studies scholars, and literary theorists.) But 
what we’re talking about here is what we believe to be a more fractious 
kind of interdisciplinarity. This is one that brings together epistemo-
logical and ontological domains – within and across the life sciences, 
interpretive social sciences (those that depart from positivistic social 
sciences in their commitment to some kind of hermeneutic analysis; see 
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Geertz 1973) and the humanities – that are often more profoundly split, 
one from the other, than the interdisciplinary configurations mentioned 
above. In making this claim, we are not forgetting the profound inter-
necine battles that have coursed within and across disciplinary sub-
fields, as well as between disciplines thought to be relatively similar to 
one another. (Some examples would include relations between social and 
biological anthropologists, or controversies between Continental and 
analytic philosophers.) We are also not forgetting that there has been a 
long tradition of natural scientists (e.g. those within biological psychia-
try) working alongside (mostly) positivist social scientists. Throughout 
this book, though, when we refer to ‘interdisciplinarity’, we are focused 
particularly on collaborations that bring together life scientists, interpre-
tive social scientists and humanities scholars.
Our inhabitation of that fractious space has led to our development 
of what we call ‘experimental entanglements’ – which is our name for 
approaching the densely patterned terrain of research on the mind and 
brain, as well as for the specific interventions (experimental in all senses 
of that word) that we carry out under its umbrella. We will not belabour 
the point here (it is belaboured in Fitzgerald and Callard 2015; Fitzgerald 
and Callard forthcoming), but ‘experimental entanglements’ depart from 
a logic of the ‘inter-’, which presumes that there are two kinds of preex-
isting things (e.g. the natural sciences and social sciences), which may or 
may not be integrated, and/or which may be integrated more or less well. 
If we are at all to make good on the current promise of interdisciplinar-
ity, we must stop pinioning people, dead-butterfly-like, into particular 
slots within disciplinary taxonomies – slots, moreover, that depend on 
intensely misunderstood histories of (in the broadest sense) scientific 
inquiry itself, as well as the various intellectual practices, motivations, 
and affects that have only lately been distributed around the arrange-
ments that today call themselves disciplines. Such pinioning also depends 
on a strikingly naive view of the actual things of the world; as if people 
had bits that were distinctively social, and bits that were distinctively 
natural – as if they were not, in fact, endlessly torqued concatenations of 
disposition and agency, both human and non-human, and vague, half-
glimpses of which we have only recently decided to encumber with the 
inadequate terms ‘biological’, ‘social’, ‘psychological’, and so on.
If this begins to look suspiciously like metaphysics, we stress that our 
concern is for the practical consequences that ensue when the ‘biological’ 
and ‘social’ are separated out, one from the other. To this we attribute, 
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for example, the ease with which the social sciences, humanities, and 
the arts come simply to contextualize or illustrate scientific research; or 
the bizarre separation of powers that sees something like ‘bioethics’ as a 
practice that might only comment on, and not produce, the ‘biosciences’. 
Our desire radically to depart from such an approach drives our inter-
est in experiment in all its guises. Experiment, as we have elaborated 
elsewhere (Fitzgerald and Callard 2015), has multiple genealogies. For 
us, experimental theatre and experimental poetry promise as much – in 
terms of methods, knowledges, modes of construing, and intervening in 
the world – as the rich legacy of experimentation in the natural sciences 
(Roepstorff and Frith 2012). Experiments, moreover, take place as much 
in the relationships that unfold between collaborators, in the interven-
tions that they choose to make in their respective fields, in the various 
ways that historical archives might be reopened, as much as they do in 
regular scientific protocols to produce new data (see e.g. Blackman 2014). 
We are not naïve about the profound differences between ‘experiment’ 
as it operates in the arts and as it has been conducted in the laboratory 
sciences. We acknowledge that the problem-spaces opened up within 
the pages of a novel offer different affordances from those character-
izing all manner of scientific experiments (see, in this respect, Waugh 
2015). Nonetheless, we think there is more work to be done to explore 
how different ways of being ‘experimental’ can open up new avenues 
through which to think and work collaboratively across distinct arenas 
of expertise.
Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences 
was written in a particular, and decidedly partial, mode. The book is 
not intended as a definitive account even of our own efforts at interac-
tion and collaboration. We know well that many will disagree with us. 
Still less do we wish this volume to be read as a grand statement about 
interdisciplinary work as such. Our desire to bring this account into the 
world is motivated precisely by our shared sense that the declarative 
mode is perhaps not well suited to the strange labours of collaboration. 
In the on-going, global ‘workshop’ of interdisciplinary thought, what 
follows is rather less a pronouncement from a stage – and rather more 
an odd, out-of-step, perhaps slightly querulous, contribution from the 
floor. In this regard, we see the book, too, as an experiment in scholarly 
production. The Pivot format is produced within a distinctive (rapid) 
temporal horizon, and offers a particular length (mid-way between 
the long journal article and the usual scholarly monograph). We, when 
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writing this volume, were interested in exploring what those constraints 
would do to our modes of argument, to the register of our writing, and 
to the kinds of material with which we engaged. The book works with, 
and mixes up, different kinds of ‘data’ and evidence, and employs diverse 
styles of argument. Our hope is that the volume functions as a provoca-
tion that carries a particular tone – one slightly different from the usual 
‘voice’ of a peer-reviewed journal article (from whichever discipline), or 
of a heavily footnoted research monograph. It emerged out of our own, 
various kinds of discomposure in relation to the interdisciplinary field 
of our enquiries. It might, in turn, effect discomposure in some of its 
readers. Rethinking interdisciplinarity, we contend, can’t avoid that risk.
The view from nowhere
This book is for anyone who has been urged to do something in an inter-
disciplinary way (whether that urge has come from external pressures, 
or seems to have come from within him or herself, somewhere) – and 
who has wondered, exactly, what this word ‘interdisciplinary’ entails. 
It is for anyone who has already been involved in an interdisciplinary 
project – who has experienced some unexpected bumps in the road, 
and who has been wondering how to understand those bumps, and 
work around them in the future. And it is for anyone, from any back-
ground, and at whatever career stage, who has some inkling that there 
is a perspective from another discipline that might really open one of 
their own projects, but who has no idea how to do something with a 
colleague from that discipline, and even less idea of what such a collabo-
ration might actually look like. As we have already noted, we will be 
especially concerned here with interactions between (interpretive) 
social scientists and neuroscientists, but the broader lessons and claims 
of the book should be as applicable to a researcher interested in inter-
disciplinary molecular genetics, or, indeed, a cognitive neuroscientist 
interested in working with a computational neuroscientist. Threaded 
through all the chapters, and for readers of all stripes, we have included 
a series of ‘Notes & Queries’ – a collection of short and frank answers to 
pragmatic questions, which will guide the reader through issues such as 
how one actually assembles an interdisciplinary team, gets involved in 
collaborative projects, manages the dynamics of interdisciplinary team 
interaction, and so on.
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One of the founding premises of this volume is that there is no ‘view 
from nowhere’ for conceptualizing, investigating, and writing about brains, 
minds, bodies, and their environments. Different modes of investigation 
carry with them different archival legacies, and conventions of thinking and 
writing. As any theorist of translation, or historian of science will know all 
too well, there is no straightforward, translucent ‘language’ through which 
any of us can present research findings, let alone arguments. As much as 
we want to trouble a model of disciplines in which each is confined to her 
own pen, let us stress that this book is written, unapologetically, by two 
authors who have been trained in different corners of the interpretive social 
sciences, and who ally themselves with social and cultural theory. Having 
spent significant amounts of time and resources training ourselves up in 
cognitive neuroscience, as well as working closely with neuroscientists, we 
consider ourselves to be – as social scientists go – relatively well versed 
in the neurosciences, and in the rhetorics through which those sciences 
move forward. We will do all we can to speak to, through, and with those 
rhetorics in what follows. Nonetheless, we do have particular networks 
of citations, modes of address, and means of presenting and analysing 
our interlocutors’ arguments and empirical materials. This will provoke 
discomfort in some of our readers and friends steeped in other, scientific 
traditions for writing, and thinking and reading. But this, in many ways, is 
a volume about learning to be discomfited.
How to ruin your career
‘Interdisciplinary Research: Why It’s Seen as a Risky Route’ runs the head-
line in The Guardian. The author, a doctoral student in the natural sciences, 
but one who crosses into several different areas, cogently sets out the 
reasons why being (or being seen to be) ‘interdisciplinary’ can mean facing 
‘an uncertain future’ (Byrne 2014). The problem, the student points out, is 
the mismatch between institutional eulogies for the interdisciplinary, and 
the antediluvian structures of advancement and prestige both within and 
outside those same departments – journals, funding councils, adjudications 
of teaching expertise – that split resolutely along disciplinary lines. ‘Trying 
to gain expertise and familiarity with the literature in multiple subject areas 
can be a discouraging and near-impossible task,’ she points out: ‘There’s a 
risk of ending up being an expert in nothing’ (Byrne 2014). Those most 
at risk from this mismatch, the author points out, are people at relatively 
 Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0003
early stages in their careers – who need to be able to demonstrate highly 
disciplined forms of value in order to secure a coveted permanent post.
We have come across – and indeed have ourselves voiced – many such fears 
in the past. And we take these concerns seriously. We would add to them our 
own career-related worries, which include the fear that one will be ignored 
or dismissed (not least if one’s publications are highly dispersed across a 
number of disciplinary journals and books). Particularly for junior people 
who are actively on the job market, there seems little premium in appearing 
deviant from the norm. For such researchers, there is a constant, nagging 
anxiety: by following my interests into some strange places; by publishing in 
journals that have little name recognition to senior people in my field; by 
seeking grants with those who are positioned significantly beyond my own 
discipline; by slowing down my usual rate of publication by dint of spending 
time developing strange collaborative research with researchers who need 
explanations of some of the key concepts and methods in my field; and in 
general by positioning myself as not just orthogonal to, but very much against, 
what looks like ‘normal science’ or ‘normal research’ – am I (without push-
ing to over-dramatize the situation) effectively ruining my career? Nor are 
we persuaded by the bureaucratic emollient that is usually spread over such 
concerns. The reality is that the markers of prestige in the academy, however 
much managers may wish them otherwise, remain suspicious of deviance.
But the thing is: we and our dispersed network of collaborators haven’t 
ruined our careers. Through this book, then, we want to dispel, or at least to 
dial down, two recurring thoughts that structure interdisciplinary research. 
One, as above, is the thought that being interdisciplinary is inherently 
risky – that, if you are not careful, you will fall between stools, have your 
work be ignored, and be seen as a ‘jack of all trades’. This generally held 
position is not ridiculous, but it is, we believe, overemphasized. The reality 
is that, even if the old markers of achievement remain (the single-authored 
article in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers has not yet lost 
its lustre for geographers, nor the first authored article in Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences for neuroscientists), the reality is that more 
and more editors, research managers, heads of school, and other gatekeepers 
are explicitly looking for people – in the humanities and social sciences as 
well as in the sciences – who have expertise in interdisciplinary, collabora-
tive projects. The risks of interdisciplinarity aren’t what they used to be.
The second thought we want to dispel is the mirror-image of this one, 
which is that caution betokens staying within the bounds of disciplinary 
respectability. The more we wander down strange interdisciplinary tracks, 
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the more apparent it becomes to us that being disciplined isn’t playing it 
safe: the truth is that staying within the narrow epistemological confines 
of – for example – mid-twentieth-century sociology, while it may produce 
short-term gains, is not, in fact, the best way to guarantee a career in the 
twenty-first century (and we mean ‘career’ in its most capacious sense here: 
we are not using it with the assumption that everyone wants a permanent 
post at a university, but to express an idea that many would like to find some 
way to advance their projects, ideas, and so on). The plate tectonics of the 
human sciences are shifting: we here describe our own forays into one small, 
circumscribed niche between the social and natural sciences, but expand 
this horizon to epigenetics, to the emergence of the human microbiome, 
to all kinds of translational research in mental health, to ‘big data’ and the 
devices that append it, to the breakdown of the barrier between creative 
practices and research, and to a whole host of other collapsing dichotomies, 
and it becomes apparent that ‘neuro-social science’ is only one local effect 
of a much broader reverberation. Despite everything that follows in the 
book, we remain excited by such movement. And if cracks are emerging that 
we – and our collaborators – might yet fall through, still the two of us, at 
least, are determined to go into them facing forward. This monograph is 
therefore part of the archive of one moment, when those same cracks started 
to appear – and when it seemed to us, and to many of our collaborators, like 
a good idea to try to work our way into them. Our hope is that it helps to 
create room for similar reflections in this same space – and even that such 
reflections will go on to effect similar reverberations of their own.
 * * *
This volume comprises, as we imagine is pretty clear by now, a partial 
account. It traces journeys that we – both singly and together – have 
taken, since 2008, through the bizarre world of interdisciplinary research 
that addresses the mind and brain. We have written it in the midst of our 
other research within ‘Hubbub’, a large interdisciplinary project (which 
crosses the neurosciences, mind sciences, social sciences, humanities and 
the arts) that we take up in greater detail in Chapter 4. As we have pieced 
the book together, we have increasingly imagined that the book might be 
read – by some at least – as a strange version of the picaresque novel. The 
genre of picaresque is characterized by a dishonest but agreeable picaro 
who drifts from one locale to another and immerses himself in the vagar-
ies of different social milieux in his efforts to survive. Such a description 
could well be said to characterize our inhabitation – sometimes chosen, 
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sometimes un-willed – of various socio-technological worlds in several 
countries, many cities, and alongside many individuals who have become 
personages, characters, and, often times, our friends. And if picaresque 
fiction narrates adventures in an episodic manner, leaves certain things 
out, and is not always clear about the epistemological robustness, let alone 
rectitude, of its protagonist’s intentions and actions, then this volume is, 
we hope, a decent imitation of the genre. We include stories that incor-
porate the reported speech of some of the aforementioned characters, 
and we anatomize the emotional timbre of both their and our journeys 
through these spaces. No story has been invented (though each has been 
filtered through one or both of our memories, rather than attempts to do 
justice to the memories of all those involved). Identifying details have 
been excised or changed (unless permission has been granted from the 
person invoked to use that person’s name). The book is built on the back 
of those affectively freighted stories. The experiences from which they 
arose told us much more about interdisciplinarity than the many books 
we read before and during our life spent in the interdisciplinary field.
‘Every discipline tells a story’, notes the historian of science Simon 
Schaffer: ‘where it comes from, what it is and where it is going. Disciplines 
learn such parables as part of their induction’ (Schaffer 2013, 57). The 
range of parables about interdisciplinarity is distinctly narrow: most of 
them have tended to send both of us to sleep. We hope in the episodes 
that follow at least to keep you awake. ‘A sociologist collaborating with a 
human geographer’, noted a commentator on interdisciplinarity recently, 
‘is scarcely likely to generate as much excitement as an artist working with 
a scientist’ (Osborne 2013, 95). Well, the constraints of genre are such that 
we don’t believe we can escape our disciplinary origins. Even the picaro 
has to come from somewhere. Let us try to convince you, nonetheless, 
through the labour of our collaborations – as a human geographer and 
sociologist – with many others from multiple disciplines – that there are 
forms of interdisciplinary practice that, even if only occasionally, even if 
sometimes fractious, even if freighted with all the worries and anxieties 
that we are going to set out below, even if they sometimes fall apart, are 
still sometimes epistemologically and interpersonally exciting.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Meeting People Is Easy: The 
Pragmatics of Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration
Abstract: This chapter establishes the pragmatics of 
how we have actually put together specific moments of 
interdisciplinary collaboration. Thinking through the 
‘why’ of interdisciplinarity (and drawing on some of our 
collaborators’ own accounts), it situates our own work within 
a particular interdisciplinary constellation of institutions 
and endeavours. The chapter offers some practical advice for 
getting projects started and funded – and, drawing on some 
peer review material, pays particular attention to the labours 
of interdisciplinary publication. It concludes with a call for 
interdisciplinary collaborators to treat their own progress as a 
legitimate research object, and offers some advice for tracking 
that progress.
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Introduction
In developing an account of the pragmatics of collaboration, this chapter 
is aimed at those who might welcome some concrete suggestions for 
embarking on – or persisting with – interdisciplinary research. In offer-
ing such an account, we will resist normative claims on what the reader 
should do; rather, we bring to the foreground some of the resources, 
motivations, infrastructures, frameworks, people, and modes of work-
ing that enabled (and, undoubtedly, constrained) the paths we have 
ourselves taken. Many of these entities will reappear, episodically, as the 
book threads its conceptual arguments through different research stud-
ies, workshops, and collaborations; we want to orient the reader at the 
start, so that she can carry some of these details with her as she proceeds 
through later chapters.
First, let us note that the book emerges out of a configuration of funding 
and network(ing) opportunities that we believe to be somewhat particu-
lar. From 2008 to 2015 (the stretch of time during which the two of us 
have been engaged in interdisciplinary research across the social sciences 
and neurosciences), certain kinds of activities and collaborations across 
the terrain of the mind and brain became possible, we believe, because of 
particular configurations and pressures – epistemological, institutional, 
and disciplinary. To paint in very broad strokes: these opportunities 
came in the wake of (and, in some way, the disappointments of) the 
‘Decade of the Brain’, on the one hand, and the Human Genome Project, 
on the other (see e.g. Meloni 2014a), around which a tacit intellectual and 
administrative conviction emerged that the neurosciences and the social 
sciences (among other sets of actors) needed to find some kind of shared 
language, and, through such language, to work better together. (Here, 
in passing, is a potential historical or sociological research project that 
we ourselves do not attempt: are we right in diagnosing an interesting 
‘moment’ in interdisciplinary collaborations across the neurosciences 
and social sciences at this particular point? And if we are, how should 
one account for its emergence? There are, after all, many reasons why 
inter- or cross-disciplinary assemblages gain energy: David Engerman, 
to take one example, has stressed the importance not of research impera-
tives but of pedagogy (via both undergraduate and graduate training) in 
understanding the rise of interdisciplinary ‘area studies’ after the Second 
World War (Engerman 2015)). One of the core tasks of this chapter, then, 
is to bring that moment into visibility – to use our own experiences to 
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begin to understand, and to diffract, a broader neuro/social/science 
landscape that has emerged in the last decade or so.
In this sense, rather than focusing on providing a quickly dated and 
extensive list of recommendations of specific places to go, and bodies to 
talk to, we place greater attention on how we progressed – with refer-
ence to some of the ideas, people, things, institutions, and funders that 
helped us along the way. Undoubtedly, there is now a whole range of 
new actors (both individual and institutional) of which we are barely 
even aware. Still, our hope is that the reader takes less note of where we 
have gone, with whom we have collaborated, or what exactly we have 
done, and pays attention instead to the kinds of moves – across episte-
mological and disciplinary boundaries, towards particular institutional 
and/or sub-disciplinary problematics – that have gotten us there. The 
chapter moves from general reflections on the motivations and struc-
tures that assist in opening up interdisciplinary collaboration, to the 
specific means through which we were able to build collaborations and 
garner expertise, to the strange world of interdisciplinary funding and 
peer review – and to how, finally, one might track the look and feel of 
interdisciplinary practice, such that that practice stops being a vaguely 
gestural thing ‘out there’, and becomes, instead, an object of scholarly 
attention in its own right.
Why are you here?
If you are reading this book, perhaps your appetite has been whetted – 
whether recently or a long while ago – for interdisciplinary collabora-
tion in the space enjoining the social sciences, the humanities and the 
natural sciences. Perhaps this has come via conferences or workshops 
you attended, or through journal articles or books you read (e.g. Slaby 
and Choudhury 2011). Perhaps your research interests have taken you, 
more or less unbidden, to a point of crossing between the sciences, social 
sciences and humanities – such as legal debates over the extent to which 
neuroscientific findings might be used in law courts (Jones et al. 2013). 
In any event, it is worth paying attention to what has led you to the 
question of interdisciplinary collaboration: not only might this help to 
diagnose what you might desire from it, but it might also help to shape 
where you would be happy – and unhappy – for any putative collabora-
tion to take you.
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One of us (DF), for example, is here, ultimately, because of an argu-
ment in a graduate seminar, many years ago, about whether or not schiz-
ophrenia could be ‘seen’ in the brain. So taken was he with this problem 
that he pursued it through a doctoral thesis on how the neurosciences 
actually come to know specific disorders – a process that took the form 
of a gradual realization that the broadly social constructionist impetus 
motivating his project was quite useless for helping to understand the 
data it produced. As DF came to realize that the neurosciences were not 
what he thought they were, he found himself becoming increasingly 
disenchanted with the dominant explanatory logics of the social sciences 
as regards their accounts of psychiatric disorder and mental illness (for 
example, Martin 2004; Ortega and Vidal 2007). Through another chance 
recommendation from a graduate school colleague that he check out the 
literature on ‘material feminism’ (see Alaimo and Hekman 2008), and 
subsequent engagement with the work of cultural theorist Elizabeth 
Wilson (2004) and Donna Haraway (1997), one of the leading lights in 
science and technology studies (STS), DF came to think very differently 
about just what kind of practice cognitive neuroscience might actually 
be – and, in particular, about how that practice might get traced across 
the social and cultural environments in which it took place. The other 
author of this volume (FC), in the course of co-writing an article on 
the use of neuroscientific literatures within the humanities and social 
sciences (Papoulias and Callard 2010), became perturbed that she was 
not doing justice to the heterogeneity of these literatures – not least when 
she subsequently ended up at one of the heartlands of the psychiatric and 
neuroscientific establishment (the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & 
Neuroscience (IoPPN), King’s College London). The disjuncture between 
publically circulating accounts of cognitive neuroscience (which were 
often of the unsatisfying form: ‘this bit of the brain lights up in these 
circumstances’), and the diverse and dynamic models, theories and 
vocabularies that many of FC’s colleagues at the IoPPN mobilized, led 
her to pay much closer attention to how that space was being conjured.
For both of us, then, there was a significant drive to collaborate with 
neuroscientists in order to understand more about the specifics of ontol-
ogies, concepts, and also neuroscientific phenomena that felt quite alien 
to us. Compare this with how one of our neuroscientific collaborators, 
Simone Kühn (SK), explained why she engaged in an interdisciplinary 
study with the psychologists Russ Hurlburt and Charles Fernyhough. 
(We will discuss this collaboration in greater detail in Chapter 2.)
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SK: I was studying psychology [a while back]. I thought introspection was 
what psychologists should be interested in. That’s why psychology is 
interesting: we want to know about inner experience. I found Russ 
[Hurlburt]’s publications and found his approach very, very interesting. 
I didn’t know at that point that introspection was different from what 
Russ does [Descriptive Experience Sampling]. Now it’s nice I can offer a 
[brain] scanner and my expertise and my neuroscientific methods.
What SK emphasizes is a long-standing interest in a particular problem-
atic – the elicitation of inner experience – that led her to find research 
articles by the scientist with whom she later collaborated when she was 
more centrally embedded within neuroscientific than psychological 
research. For SK, the collaboration enabled her to bring her neuro-
scientific methods and expertise into contact with Russ Hurlburt’s 
psychological methods for eliciting momentary states of consciousness; 
as she put it, ‘I need certain skills that they [Russ and Charles] have; they 
need skills that I have.’ Compare this with the account of another of our 
collaborators, medical humanities and cultural studies scholar, Angela 
Woods (AW):
AW: I completed my doctorate – an analysis of schizophrenia in clinical and 
cultural theory – in a department of English with cultural studies, an 
environment all but fully insulated from clinical and scientific practice. 
All that changed immediately following my appointment to a philoso-
phy-based lectureship in medical humanities in a school of medicine, 
pharmacy and health. Within a few weeks of arriving, the co-director 
of the Centre for Medical Humanities somewhat spontaneously invited 
me to a meeting with Charles Fernyhough and his doctoral student 
Simon McCarthy-Jones – psychologists interested in developing inter-
disciplinary approaches to the phenomenon of hearing voices. Eighteen 
months later, Charles, as Director, and I, as Co-Director, led a team of 
13 co-applicants to secure substantial Wellcome Trust funding for the 
Hearing the Voice project (a large, interdisciplinary investigation of the 
experience of hearing a voice in the absence of any external stimuli); six 
years on, the collaboration continues to expand and develop – producing 
an ongoing upheaval in my own disciplinary identity along the way.
If, for SK, collaboration emerges from carefully considered opportunities 
to share methods, AW’s account seems to us much more alive to seren-
dipity, chance, and contingency. Moreover, AW’s collaborative trajectory 
is not only tied to particular projects, but is also woven through an atten-
tion to a broader sense of a changeable disciplinary identity. Perhaps 
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somewhere between these two approaches is the account of our collabo-
rator Charles Fernyhough (CF), one of the psychologists mentioned 
above by both SK and AW:
CF: Returning to academia after a long break in the early 2000s, I realized that 
the experiences I was most interested in – inner speech, voice-hearing, 
memory – reached depths that standard psychological methodologies 
couldn’t fathom. There was wisdom in the humanities that I had to try 
to tap, and my first experiments involved exhilarating collaborations on 
memory and space, mind and consciousness, thinking and feeling. As 
a humanist manqué, I found plenty to thrill me in, say, putting literary 
and psychological accounts of inner experience up against each other, 
and over time – particularly through the Hearing the Voice project and 
Hubbub – I’ve seen how this open-minded spirit of collaboration can 
spur scientists to raise their game in profound ways.
In CF’s account we are inclined to hear both the orientation around 
specific questions and methods – but also a broader sense of his own 
variable trajectory, and an openness to where that might ultimately 
lead him.
Perhaps you, too, are – or have been – intrigued by conversations 
that you have overheard; or you’ve become bored with your own set 
of disciplinary debates. Perhaps you can no longer ignore the gap 
between what you’ve read about the neurosciences (or, indeed, other 
fields) in the canonical texts, and your own empirical encounters with 
those fields. Perhaps you think there are things about the materiality 
of human social life that are not exhausted by the canonical works of 
sociology and anthropology. Perhaps you can no longer face using 
certain scales in your scientific studies that you increasingly believe to 
have little face validity, and even less construct validity. If you’re a social 
scientist, perhaps you just think that your social scientific and humani-
ties colleagues who circle the neurosciences are more likely to get fund-
ing than you are. Perhaps you are a neuroscientist with a cosmopolitan 
approach to methods and theories. Perhaps you are wondering how you 
might gain access to resources specifically earmarked for interdiscipli-
nary work. What actors, phenomena, and motivations, in other words, 
are present in your own landscape that might open up (or that have 
opened up) paths towards interdisciplinary collaboration? What might 
you do with your own, specific epistemological and affective orienta-
tions vis-à-vis the potential for interdisciplinary collaboration in these 
domains?
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Getting started
In many ways, we were both lucky to be in more or less the right place 
at the right time for the kinds of collaborative research that we wanted 
to do. Specifically, we benefited from two significant European networks 
and platforms that preceded us: the European Neuroscience and Society 
Network (ENSN; funded by the European Science Foundation (European 
Neuroscience and Society Network n.d.)) and the European Platform for 
Life Sciences, Mind Sciences, and the Humanities (funded and organ-
ized by the Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung n.d.)). These 
two platforms, both established in the mid-2000s, were transformational 
in training and connecting new cohorts of researchers, fluent (or at least 
vaguely literate) in both the neurosciences and the social sciences. They 
were also both grounded in the conviction that physical co-location 
for a certain number of days is indispensable for sparking collabora-
tive possibilities across the disciplines. And finally, beyond the format 
of the traditional workshop, both offered the opportunity for scientists 
and social scientists to work together to develop new experiments. (See 
Frazzetto 2011; Rose n.d. for illuminating accounts from two of the 
designers and originators of the residential ENSN Neuroschools, which 
include explications of the importance of engaging in ‘experiment’.) A 
little later, we were also both accepted on, and received funding to attend, 
the residential Neuroscience Boot Camp, at the Center for Neuroscience 
and Society at the University of Pennsylvania. (The nine-day boot camp 
is designed to provide academics, business people and policy makers 
with ‘a basic foundation in cognitive and affective neuroscience and to 
equip them to be informed consumers of neuroscience research’ (Center 
for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania 2015).) A conflu-
ence of temporary and contingent initiatives and institutions – none of 
which we participated in setting up or designing – was thus foundational 
in allowing us to acquire cross-disciplinary expertise, as well as meet 
collaborators from other disciplines.
It is worth stressing, again, that these networks represent a definite 
moment, in which there was a sense of flux around the relationship 
between the neurosciences and social sciences. The specificity of that 
moment is also evidenced by the emergence of a series of groups, coali-
tions, and interdisciplinary research arenas during roughly the same 
period – and to which our own forays are significantly indebted, both 
directly and indirectly. These include the NeuroGenderings Network 
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(Dussauge and Kaiser 2012), the people and publications assembled 
around ‘critical neuroscience’ (e.g. Choudhury, Nagel, and Slaby 2009; 
Choudhury and Slaby 2012; Critical Neuroscience n.d.), the field of 
neuropsychoanalysis (Solms and Turnbull 2011; Fotopoulou, Pfaff 
and Conway 2012), the Association of Neuroesthetics (Association 
of Neuroesthetics 2015), the BIOS centre at the London School 
of Economics (BIOS 2015), as well as various ‘Neurohumanities’ 
programmes in prestigious universities (Hagouel 2012). We conjec-
ture that that moment is no longer alive in quite the same way. It 
is certainly not that the avenues for interdisciplinary research have 
suddenly narrowed, but rather that the horizon of interdisciplinary 
possibility, in 2015–2016, is not quite the same as it was in, say, 2008–
2009. Our hunch is that the sense of possibility that we witnessed has 
moved to other, currently ‘sexier’, biosocial fields. We think here, for 
example, of epigenetics (Landecker and Panofsky 2013) or metabo-
lomics (Levin 2014). It is noteworthy that neither the ENSN nor the 
European Platform exists any longer (although a group of junior 
researchers, based primarily at King’s College London, is attempting 
to resuscitate a ‘Neuroscience and Society Network’ – see Mahfoud 
and Maclean 2015). In our particular neck of the woods, it is notice-
able that there now appear to be more large, grant-funded interdis-
ciplinary projects that address the terrain of the brain and the mind 
(e.g. Hearing the Voice and Hubbub), and fewer specially designed 
‘platforms’ or programmes to train cohorts of researchers compe-
tent in at least two disciplines (though note graduate programmes, 
such as the Berlin School of Mind and Brain, committed to training 
interdisciplinary researchers). None of which is at all to say that such 
opportunities are now entirely foreclosed – or that nothing remains 
for the would-be junior collaborator save the unenviable labour of 
shaving the rough edges from an earlier, open, precarious moment, 
now sadly passed. But there is a temporality, as well as a momentum, 
of openness and closure around specific interdisciplinary fields. For 
those interested in collaboration around the brain and mind, it’s 
worth asking the question: What kind of moment are we actually 
in now in the relationship between the neurosciences and the social 
sciences? How might the specific dynamics and constellations of that 
moment shape how interdisciplinarity is imagined and practised?
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Getting funded
“I can’t work out if they are actually going to do an imaging experiment, or just sit 
around and discuss it.”
We do not overstate the case when we note that interdisciplinary funding 
applications have taught us more than anything else about the current 
shape of, and pressures on, interdisciplinarity across the social sciences 
and the neurosciences. All of the peer reviewer responses to grant 
applications that have accompanied us through the last few years have 
provided us with insights into both the scope and limits of the interdis-
ciplinary field in which we have been struggling to find a place. We use 
fragmentary quotations from some of these comments throughout the 
book. We are aware that some will consider their use in a book – even, as 
here, without any marks of identification or attribution – to be in poor 
taste, or at least to run counter to the tacit norms through which such 
reviews are written and received within a restricted economy of circula-
tion. The problem for us is that it is precisely in the construction and 
delivery of these reviews, understood here as perhaps the most potent 
and consequential genre of academic writing, that emergent fields, ideas, 
and problem-spaces are variously enacted, produced, realized, bounded, 
constrained, policed, squashed, and so on. We simply cannot write 
about the emergence of a new interdisciplinary field, still less narrate 
our own paths through that field, without some attention to moments 
of peer review. More broadly, and in excess of any other genre we have 
encountered, they stage the complexities, tensions, and excitements of 
‘interdisciplinarity’, precisely at the moment in which interdisciplinarity 
inveigles itself into the strictures and assumptions of (to use a flat-footed 
term) ‘normal science’.
There are two current certainties in the funding of interdisciplinary 
research: everyone wants to do it, and no one quite knows how. In the 
United Kingdom, national research councils – which are largely split along 
sharp disciplinary lines (such that there is an Arts & Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC), a Medical Research Council, an Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council, and so on) – are at pains to stress 
their keenness to fund work that falls between them (Research Councils 
UK n.d.). And even within individual research councils, there is a great 
desire to fund – and to be seen to fund – work that may traditionally 
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fall outside the council’s remit (see e.g. Economic and Social Research 
Council [ESRC] 2013; Arts & Humanities Research Council 2015). A 
growing number of funders are prioritizing research that crosses the 
sciences, social sciences and humanities. In the United Kingdom alone, 
researchers seeking interdisciplinary funding might look to (this is a 
partial list that will likely already be out-dated by the time you are read-
ing it): the AHRC’s ‘Science in Culture’ scheme (Arts & Humanities 
Research Council n.d.); the ESRC’s ‘Transforming Social Science’ portfo-
lio (Economic and Social Research Council 2013); the Medical Research 
Council’s ‘Skills Development Fellowships’ (Medical Research Council 
n.d.); The Wellcome Trust’s Hub award, Seed awards in both Science and 
the Medical Humanities, and Collaborative Awards (Wellcome Trust 
n.d.); and the Fellows Programme of MQ: Transforming Mental Health, 
a charity that funds mental health research (MQ n.d.) – to mention 
just a few. In Europe more broadly, scholars might look at the explicitly 
interdisciplinary imperatives of the European Commission’s Horizon 
2020 programme (European Commission n.d.), as well as opportuni-
ties provided by the Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung 
n.d.), and Brocher Foundation (Fondation Brocher n.d.), among 
others. In the United States, comparable opportunities are provided 
by the Interdisciplinary Behavioral and Social Sciences competition of 
the National Science Foundation (National Science Foundation 2015) 
or, more closely related to our interests, the Behavioral Science and 
Integrative Neuroscience research branch of the National Institute of 
Mental Health (National Institute of Mental Health 2015). With a view 
to finding one’s way through this dispersed and varied assemblage, our 
pragmatic and uninspired advice is: persistence can pay off. We have had 
at least one interdisciplinary proposal turned down (very unambigu-
ously) from one scheme, to be received more generously, and ultimately 
funded, by another. This, of course, is the story of research funding as 
such. But that degree of normal variation becomes, we think, much 
sharper in interdisciplinary contexts, when epistemological norms that 
might otherwise be taken for granted are often, suddenly, in question.
What, then, are some of the stumbling blocks? If the spirit of interdis-
ciplinarity is willing in funders, the body often remains weak. Our own 
experience has been that interdisciplinary proposals – and here we do 
want to distinguish the inter- from the pretty standard multi-discipli-
nary – can have a tough time. Partly this is because peer review colleges 
and panels are often made up (not unreasonably) of people with strong 
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disciplinary expertise. Thus a grant proposal crossing disciplines A and 
B is likely to be reviewed by an expert on A and an expert on B – neither 
of whom is necessarily likely to feel favourably towards the other, nor 
towards the interdisciplinary proposal as a whole. Below, in providing 
examples of peer reviewer comments we have received on some of our 
interdisciplinary grant applications, we dwell on what such comments 
might tell us about the possibility – or impossibility – of intervening in 
the field of interdisciplinary research on the mind and brain.
The quotation that begins this section comes from our first example. 
With some of our neuroscientific collaborators, we had proposed to 
run a series of brain-imaging experiments whose design would not be 
specified in advance, but which would emerge iteratively from a series of 
interdisciplinary workshops that we would run. This got short shrift: ‘In 
my field (scientific and medical neuroimaging)’, one reviewer wrote, ‘it is 
imperative to describe the proposed experiment in detail, e.g. paradigms, 
number and type of subjects, analysis plan ... . I did not feel sufficient 
information was provided to indicate the quality of outputs.’ Here, we 
rub up against keenly guarded disciplinary norms surrounding robust 
research. But if this neuroscientist found our proposed experiment too 
loose and underspecified, another reviewer (likely someone from the 
social sciences) found it too concrete: our proposal demonstrated a 
‘naïve realism about the experiment and its ambitions for experimental 
convergence ... [while the] ambition to establish a more general proto-
col to be followed by others is epistemically naïve and unreflexively 
normative’. The broader problem becomes clear here: try to design an 
interdisciplinary experiment that puts together the empirical rigour of 
neuroimaging and the conceptual openness of the humanities, and there 
is a good chance that you will be condemned by neuroscientists for your 
ambiguity, and by humanities scholars and/or interpretive social scien-
tists for your empiricism.
In a second example – from a peer review of a different grant applica-
tion – we were informed that while our project had ‘potential’, we should 
not only do more to test our proposed approach (presumably prior to 
applying, again, for funds), but specifically provide ‘evidence of potential 
to engage neuroscientists in a reciprocal relationship’. The reviewers did 
not see sufficient evidence of ‘real collaboration with the community [we 
were] targeting’. Note, first, how the injunction to engage our targeted 
community (‘neuroscientists’) betrays the assumed direction of travel: it 
seems inconceivable, for example, that the field might be too entangled 
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to allow the identification of a ‘target community’. The interdisciplinary 
endeavour, here – ‘real collaboration’ – is set out as an attempt by one 
discrete ‘community’ to target another in a reciprocal relationship. 
Indeed, this comment was offered in spite of the application’s self-citation 
of articles co-authored with members of that same ‘targeted community’, 
some of whom were even co-applicants on that very grant. Our point, 
here, is not to offer a mundane gripe about peer review, but to note how 
reviewers might conjure interdisciplinary applicants as people desirous 
of a relationship with some other – and thus adjudicate them on the basis 
on whether or not they show evidence of their ability to so ‘engage’. This 
is a very specific mode of interdisciplinarity – one that already forecloses 
a range of possibilities for crossing boundaries. What get potentially 
occluded here, are modes in which collaborators are already deeply 
intertwined with people who come from other disciplines, and in which 
the collaboration is embedded in tightly braided methodological and 
affective trajectories, rather than straight-laced strategies for targeting or 
engagement.
Getting published
Much could be written about the challenges of publishing for an interdis-
ciplinary audience, given the pronounced differences in the cultures of 
publishing, the rhetorics at play, the formalities of presentation, differing 
conventions around citation, and so on. As with interdisciplinary grant 
proposals: write an article that tries to speak across the social sciences 
and neurosciences, and you might well be reviewed by a social scientist 
and a neuroscientist, either of whom might well object to what you’re 
doing – but for different reasons. Below we summarize material from 
two peer reviews that we received in response to one interdisciplinary 
submission.
In the first, the reviewer, who explicitly identified him- or herself as 
a neuroscientist, noted that while s/he had found the manuscript very 
interesting, it was unlike anything s/he had read ‘since [his/her] under-
graduate women’s studies courses’. Not only was the manuscript ‘incred-
ibly difficult to parse’ – which s/he explained was a result of a ‘stylistic 
difference across fields’ – but it would, in its current form, be very unlikely 
‘to have any sort of impact upon neuroscientists or experimentalists’. (The 
reviewer carefully noted that there was no assumption that the authors 
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wanted to have any such impact.) The advice? We should ‘be much more 
direct about what it is that [we] mean to say’. Neuroscientists and experi-
mentalists would, in fact, warm to ‘a list of facts or statements separated 
by periods with the occasional transition term to hold it all together’; at 
the moment, it was hard to ‘[extract] the message out of what seemed 
like an artistically-written piece that made use of many unconventional 
phrases and secondary definitions of otherwise common words’. The 
second reviewer came from quite a different angle – arguing that there 
was ‘something peculiarly paradoxical in [the paper’s] very concept’. We, 
the authors, were trying to set ourselves up as ‘experimentally, experi-
entially, and intellectually outside of the “black box” ’, but in actual fact, 
we were held captive by ‘the tools of cognitive neuroscience, i.e., on a 
scientific apparatus’. No matter the ‘depth and authenticity of the joint 
collaborative exercise’ for which we were advocating, we were pinioned 
by the inescapability and irreducibility of the scientific laboratory. For 
this reviewer, the point of ‘this “fourth way” of neuro-engagement’ was 
far from clear. For the scientist, the rhetorical style in which the ‘artisti-
cally-written’ paper was written obviated the chance that its arguments 
would be received by those coming from different, scientific, traditions 
of research writing. For the second reviewer, whom we assume to be a 
social scientist or humanities scholar, it conceded far too much to the 
sciences. This is a fairly consistent refrain. And yet, in general the two 
of us, as well as many of our collaborators, have been quite successful at 
publishing significantly interdisciplinary papers in relatively high impact 
journals – a success that we attribute at least in part to such papers having 
a certain currency among editorial board members at some journals. We 
do not want to prejudge whether this enthusiasm is necessarily shared 
by the editorial board members of many mainstream neuroscience 
journals. And for the collaborating neuroscientist, being published in a 
high impact social science journal, which may have both a relatively long 
time from submission to date of publication, and a relatively low ‘impact 
factor’ compared to even mid-ranking journals in some biological and 
medical fields, might represent poor return for her labour. (Let’s note at 
this point that while the 2014 impact factor of the leading journal Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience was 31.427, that of Social Science & Medicine (a very 
highly regarded social science journal) was 2.890.)
There does appear to be a growing appetite among clinically-oriented 
journals for interdisciplinary research that crosses the life sciences, social 
sciences, and humanities. (e.g. The Hearing the Voice research team, of 
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which one of us (FC) is a member, has had success in publishing in both 
Schizophrenia Bulletin (Woods et al. 2014) and Lancet Psychiatry (Woods 
et al. 2015). See also Woods 2015.) It is also noticeable that many of our 
own (and our collaborators’) publications have been enabled by cross-
disciplinary special issue calls (e.g. the special issue of Subjectivity on 
‘Neuroscience and Subjectivity’ (see Cromby, Newton, and Williams 2011; 
Callard and Margulies 2011); the special topic on ‘Critical Neuroscience’ 
in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (see Choudhury, Slaby, and Margulies 
2015; Fitzgerald et al. 2014b; Callard and Margulies 2014) – and through 
new, more open and flexible spaces (again, see the Frontiers journals). 
New journals supporting interdisciplinary research are also being 
launched by reputable publishers (e.g. see Palgrave Communications). As 
with interdisciplinary grant applications, a certain degree of mobility 
and persistence – perhaps beyond the usual requirements of mono- or 
multi-disciplinary research – plays a major role in the publication of 
collaborative interdisciplinary papers.
Tracking your process
It is startling how few studies of interdisciplinarity in action there actually 
are, despite the almost daily injunctions for researchers to collaborate 
with people from other disciplines (and in striking contrast to the numer-
ous processual and outcome-based evaluations of working practices that 
otherwise dominate the arts and sciences fields). On the one hand, this 
is a source of frustration for those keen to know more about such prac-
tices, as well as about the ontological stakes of such endeavours (e.g. see 
Greco 2013). On the other hand, it presents an opportunity: it means that 
researchers in interdisciplinary projects have access to data on an impor-
tant and under-researched topic within the landscape of contemporary 
knowledge-production, viz. interdisciplinary collaboration.
We have attempted this kind of reflection previously (see e.g. Fitzgerald 
et al. 2014a), working mainly through auto-ethnographic reflection. In 
the course of our current work in Hubbub, however, we are trying to set 
out specific methods for capturing collaboration in action. One of us (DF) 
is keeping a field diary, both as a form of attention to his own current 
project – on how urban spaces get imagined, and intervened-upon, as 
locations of noise and restlessness – and more generally on the work of 
‘collaboration’ in its own right, which is also one of the guiding logics of 
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Hubbub itself. Focusing on Hubbub’s different projects, the social inter-
actions that make it up, its public statements, the strategies of its manage-
ment team, and so on, this project resituates Hubbub within a broader 
field of early twenty-first century interdisciplinarity – and the projects 
within it as projects suspended within Hubbub’s own collaborative logic. 
We are also using a qualitative and quantitative questionnaire (designed 
by Angela Woods, and drawing on her work in ‘Hearing the Voice’ (see 
Robson, Woods, and Fernyhough 2015 )), which is taking the pulse of the 
50 or so collaborators in Hubbub at two different time-points. This ques-
tionnaire includes a social network analysis, which will be used to track 
the density and dynamics of the projects’ collaborations over time – and 
which, incidentally, draws on our neuroscientific collaborators’ expertise 
in topological methods that they employ in functional connectivity 
analyses of the brain (e.g. Margulies et al. 2013). We are also designing 
and trialling a new method called ‘In the Diary Room’ – which will be 
an automated collective reflection and self-tracking process, loosely 
inspired by ‘The Diary Room’ of Big Brother fame. Collaborators who 
volunteer will be randomly called into a small room just off our main 
project space, and will therein be asked a series of recorded, randomized 
questions about their day, how they feel the project is going, different 
feelings they have around collaboration in that project space, and so on. 
This is one of the ways in which we are gathering data about relations of 
power (see Chapter 6), and about the dynamics of affect (see Chapter 7). 
(For further details of all of these techniques, see Callard, Fitzgerald, and 
Woods 2015.)
The important point is that all the different elements of building an 
interdisciplinary career that we have discussed – finding collaborators, 
getting training, meeting people, applying for grants, having interdisci-
plinary papers published – are worth tracking and reflecting on in their 
own right. And this is not simply out of a narcissistic sense that one’s 
own and one’s collaborators’ research trajectory is intrinsically fascinat-
ing, but rather because these mundane actions, spaces, and efforts make 
up what we might call, following Bruno Latour, the ‘plasma’ of interdis-
ciplinarity, viz. the ‘circulations of totalizations and participations’ of 
interdisciplinary collaboration that are still ‘waiting for explication and 
composition’ (2012, 93). To put it more prosaically: if a range of inter-
disciplinary scholars begin tracking their own progress through these 
fields, and begin following the trajectories of the different people, things, 
ideas, bureaucracies, machines, and so on, that make them up – then not 
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only might that progress, we conjecture, become more bearable; it might 
even help us all, collectively, to build a denser account of just what kind 
of interdisciplinary field it is, actually, that all those mundane actions 
and intra-actions are in the process of bringing into existence.
Notes & Queries: 1
Q: What are some of the basic things out there that help someone who is 
potentially interested in doing some collaborative work across the disci-
plines? What are some of the things a person could do, or look out for, in 
terms of actually starting out and getting things done?
Outside of the major networks and funding initiatives that we have 
discussed in this chapter lay a whole series of other, small, mundane 
activities, which were, for us specifically, in many ways just as impor-
tant in establishing the relationships and interests that either got 
us off the ground, or kept us going. And, as we have stressed here, 
we were fortunate to find ourselves within a place that had already 
been painstakingly carved out by many others before us – who first 
had the inkling that the separation of the biological from the social 
might lie on shaky ground. We also emphasize that it is often the 
gradual accumulation and assemblage of minor interventions that 
make up the nitty-gritty of interdisciplinarity, over and above the 
big grant calls, major co-authored papers, and so on. Below is a very 
partial list of things to look out for, which is culled from our own 
retrospective reflections:
Residential workshops ? : Small, ephemeral residential workshops, 
with all the intersubjective intensity they entail, have been some 
of the most important locations for us, not only in terms of 
meeting people, but also for generating and sustaining a sense 
of excitement around particular questions: we have benefited 
especially from workshops funded by the European Science 
Foundation, the Volkswagen Foundation, and the Brocher 
Foundation.
Visits and exchanges ? : For generating the bonds that make inter-
disciplinarity possible, as well as getting a better sense of the 
texture of an intellectual practice, there is no substitute for actu-
ally being present in someone’s working space (whether a neuro-
scientific laboratory or a social sciences or humanities centre) 
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for a while – not in the (sometimes) watchful, self-satisfied 
ethnographic mode, but rather through more open logics of 
hospitality and curiosity.
Virtual spaces ? : Virtual spaces are vital for undergirding collabo-
ration. They range from actual collaborative tools (such as Slack, 
Google Docs, or shared Zotero libraries), to simply having a 
decent Twitter presence that makes you visible to potential 
collaborators from other fields. Twitter is also good for keeping 
track of a field that isn’t your own.
Themed conference sessions ? : A lot of major conferences explicitly 
invite applications to curate themed sessions. These can be 
excellent opportunities for bringing potential interdisciplinary 
collaborators together.
Taking courses ? : It was only through sitting in on a course on 
psychopathology that one of us learnt to take the neurosciences 
much more seriously. If you are a social scientist or humanities 
scholar, auditing a course on cognitive neuroscience can be 
enormously enlightening; if you are a neuroscientist, an expo-
sure to what is actually entailed by qualitative methods might 
be extremely useful. You could even try out one of the Massive 
Open Online Courses (MOOCs). If you need really to get up 
to speed on the neurosciences, the University of Pennsylvania’s 
residential Neuroscience Boot Camp is worth considering.
Small grants ? : Many funders (and some institutions) offer ‘seed-
corn’ or small grants to develop networks, or to pilot ideas. These 
can often be less competitive to acquire than larger grants, and 
can be an excellent means of bringing potential collaborators 
from across the disciplines together.
Keeping up to date with journals and blogs ? : ‘Collaboration’ doesn’t 
just mean working with someone, of course. You can adopt 
a collaborative stance simply by keeping up to date with the 
journals and blogs of another field – that is, knowing the major 
debates, the papers people are getting excited about, the contro-
versies, and so on.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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‘Which Way Does It Go 
between You Two?’ Modes of 
Interdisciplinary Intervention
Abstract: Interdisciplinarity is often imagined as a specific 
mode of practice, one that works by carefully separating 
different sets of expertise from one another (e.g. wherein a 
philosopher does conceptual work, and a neuroscientist simply 
collects data). This chapter, by contrast, radically opens up 
the range of legitimate modes of interdisciplinary practice. 
It analyses, and works through, three different, entangled, 
modes of interdisciplinary practice that have undergirded 
our own research – co-authorship, co-experimentation, 
and co-organization. The chapter ends with a call to retire 
formulations of interdisciplinarity that delineate sets of 
expertise and practice from the outset.
Keywords: authorship; co-authorship; experiment; 
expertise; interdisciplinarity; writing
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Felicity and a scientific collaborator are giving a joint presentation at a 
conference on social consequences that arise from the neurosciences. They 
have a carefully choreographed set of slides, which demand them passing 
the ball – as it were – a number of times, one to the other, so as to ensure 
that each presents different kinds of empirical and conceptual data. Each 
ventriloquizes some of the scientific figures who feature in their analysis 
of the emergence of the field of resting state fMRI; at times, one completes 
the slide that the other has started out presenting. It’s perhaps difficult, if 
you didn’t know either of them, to discern who is the social scientist, and 
who the neuroscientist. Then it’s time for questions. Someone in the front 
raises her hand, looks from one to the other with a somewhat baffled 
expression, and says, “Which way does it go between you two?” She looks 
at Felicity. “I mean, do you study him?” She looks at Felicity’s collabora-
tor. “Or ... ?”
Introduction
What does a meaningful interdisciplinary intervention involving the 
humanities, social sciences, and neurosciences look like? Certainly we 
have been in spaces, and read papers, where there has been an assump-
tion that it means someone not trained in the neurosciences participating 
in a project where some measure of brain activity is deployed (e.g. with 
philosophers parsing the concepts at stake such that phenomenological 
distinctions are made empirically testable; see, for example, Farrer and 
Frith 2002; Gallagher 2000). In this chapter, we will suggest that such 
configurations should not be seen as the only way in which ‘interdiscipli-
narity’ across the social sciences, neurosciences, and humanities might 
happen – not least because such models tend to leave unperturbed the 
usual epistemological divisions of labour between different disciplines.
Some of our own interdisciplinary and collaborative interventions 
have indeed oscillated around the fMRI scanner (see Fitzgerald et al. 
2014a); others have involved in-depth work on the history of concepts 
(see Callard and Margulies 2014); some have taken the form of shared 
workshop organizing, or paper planning, or grant writing or advice seek-
ing; still others have involved simply conversing. In what follows, we are 
going to shy away from providing any definitive answer vis-à-vis what a 
‘good’ mode of interdisciplinary intervention might look like. Instead, as 
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an attempt to broaden some assumptions about what constitutes an inter-
disciplinary moment in the first place, we outline three modes through 
which we have intervened within the capacious field of interdisciplinary 
neuroscience. Some of our attempts worked well; others, quite a bit less 
so; at least one other ongoing effort could still go either way. In another 
case, a good collaboration got off the ground only after the two of us 
had moved out of the way. But the key is that, in each case, something 
took place outside of a model in which representatives from a number 
of disciplines lay their knowledge next to one another without any seri-
ous entanglement in the methods, logics and principles of those other 
disciplines. The three modes we will consider here are: (1) co-authoring; 
(2) co-experimenting; (3) co-organizing. Only one features the work of 
a brain scanner, although even here the constellation of experimental 
subjects, experimenters, and technologies – alongside the interpretations 
of what they and we collectively produced – is rather different from what 
is usually attempted via an interdisciplinary intervention.
Let us stress two things in advance: (i) These modes do not constitute 
a full palette of options. Notably absent here, for example, is the ‘ELSI’ 
mode of intervention (i.e. in which social scientists and others gather 
around a scientific project in order to do the ‘Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications’ part of it). This is left out not because we think it unimpor-
tant. We sidestep it partly because we have never inhabited this position, 
but also (and not unrelatedly) because we retain a strong suspicion that, 
in its careful parsing of duties and expertise, the ELSI mode is not only 
a weak form of interdisciplinarity, but is in some ways precisely the 
opposite of what we always taken interdisciplinary collaboration to consist 
of (see Balmer et al. 2012 for a lament; see Strathern and Rockhill 2013 
for an interesting analysis). (ii) We make no claim that we have initiated 
these modes: in multiple ways, we have built on and learnt from others’ 
practice. Additionally, we have a strong sense – which has been further 
consolidated by numerous people asking us for specific details of how 
we ended up doing the kind of projects that we have become involved 
in – that it might be useful to provide some more informal accounts of, 
and reflections on, our own experience of various collaborative modes, 
which might allow readers new to such formations to peer behind the 
curtain of interdisciplinary collaborative work. In short, we want the 
chapter, first, to augment and organize the variety of methods, and 
modes of collaboration, that any of us might undertake when conduct-
ing interdisciplinary work involving the mind and brain; and, second, to 
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offer some honest reflections on how, and for what purposes, we and our 
collaborators initiated and then persisted in carrying out interventions 
across those modes, despite frequent frustrations and setbacks.
Co-authoring
A collaborative bond – like any relationship, we are tempted to say – 
can come from anywhere, and be pursued in any variety of ways. For 
one of us (FC), the most important collaborative relationship, with a 
neuroscientist, emerged from the discovery of a range of shared intel-
lectual affinities during a residential workshop. Immediately on leaving 
the workshop, the two of them began a correspondence, based around 
a call for articles that had just emerged, in which they considered how 
they might work together to make an interesting contribution. What is 
striking, in retrospect – and here our account is of course written from 
the perspective of FC – is that their shared interest in the call was an 
attempt to ensure ongoing social contact; notably, the implicit offer from 
one of them to the other to co-write an article was only one of various 
mechanisms that could have achieved such a purpose. Even more strik-
ing in the formation of this collaboration was that there was no identified 
research problem that the proposed co-authorship was being called upon 
to fill; this runs counter to many formal encomia for interdisciplinarity, 
in which different disciplines are often imagined as coming together to 
answer particular (already identified and identifiable) problems. Nor 
was there any legible reason why someone working in neuroanatomy 
and someone who was at that point based in a health services depart-
ment and working on patients’ and family members’ conceptualizations 
of genetics (FC) would feel that the other was especially well placed to 
enrich his or her line of research inquiry. Indeed, the only real shared 
point of contact was some interest in a field (psychoanalysis) that was 
marginal to both of their primary research priorities (as well as marginal 
to the practices of ‘science’ in toto).
They ended up circling around the neuroscientist’s field of research – 
the field of resting state fMRI (which measures low-frequency fluctuations 
to investigate spontaneous activity in the brain and hence to understand 
the functional architecture of the brain). In the course of the next two 
years, these collaborators wove tight webs of social and intellectual inter-
est around that point of conjuncture. Without significant external grant 
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support, they co-wrote papers, and co-presented talks, that investigated 
the intriguing and heterogeneous origins of resting state fMRI research 
(for an internalist history of this field, see Snyder and Raichle 2012). For 
FC, this collaboration comprised an extraordinary, new opportunity to 
read and think – and then write – with a neuroscientist whose generos-
ity and willingness to open up, and explain to her, the theoretical and 
methodological complexities of his field allowed her to become proficient 
in a wholly new corner of the neurosciences. FC conjectured that this 
collaboration, for the neuroscientist, potentially offered the opportunity 
to go back to identify and (re)interpret some of the foundational papers 
within his field in conversation with someone ‘coming from the outside’.
As the collaboration developed, these two researchers developed 
a paper on the current status of the ‘default mode network’ (DMN) 
(widely understood to be the set of brain regions that are engaged when 
people are in a ‘resting state’ – i.e. left to themselves in a scanner, with 
no explicit task instruction). In it, they suggested that the DMN would 
not necessarily remain at the centre of future research that attempted 
to understand the relationship between brain dynamics and the mecha-
nisms of thought. In other words, they raised the possibility that the 
current, apparently foundational, concept would not necessarily remain 
at the centre of its field. Co-authoring a publication such as this opens 
different possibilities, and carries different risks, depending on one’s 
disciplinary location. For a cultural geographer and historian of science 
(FC) to question the ontological consistency and durability of a scientific 
object is one thing – in many respects, it is one of the indispensable 
tools of her trade. However, it is often far easier to do such a thing after 
a scientific object has disintegrated and decayed – when such disinte-
gration is clearly recognizable as one looks back at a time now past – 
rather than become deeply immersed within the current scientific and 
technological practices of a field. FC speculated that for a neuroscientist, 
who might well be, in certain respects, importantly committed to that 
same scientific object (not only for his own research, but perhaps also 
for his lab members’ stability, as well as for the longevity and collegiality 
of collaborative relationships with other scientists), publishing such an 
intervention potentially carried some risks. There is, of course, a long 
tradition of debate and critique by scientists who are internal to their 
field (see Poldrack 2006; Vul et al. 2009 for two different kinds of critique 
within the field of fMRI). But in such cases, critique is most commonly 
routed through (and is legitimized around) questions of methodology; 
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research that gets to the heart of the historical, theoretical, and concep-
tual frameworks of the science are, we suggest, rarer. FC recalls that both 
authors expended significant energy, over the course of many drafts, 
adjusting the wording so that it carried enough punch for the cultural 
theorist and historian, and enough nuance for the neuroscientist: in 
particular, the many (many) annotated drafts of the article reveal, for 
her at least, ongoing, shared anxieties about the politics of word choice; 
about how, or whether, normative claims might be made; and about if 
and how to include sentences that pointed to the future of the field. And 
yet despite these risks and efforts, co-authoring brought, for FC, signifi-
cant pleasures. For a cultural theorist engaged with the history of science, 
the opportunity to co-author and publish in a scientific journal shifted 
her position of annunciation from the usual disciplinary one of external 
commentary to one of audible authority within a field. She surmised that 
for a neuroscientist, the opportunity to participate in meta-conjecture, 
and to intervene in the overarching frameworks and potential ontolo-
gies at work in one’s own field, might offer a somewhat unusual, and yet 
potentially productive, intellectual position vis-à-vis one of the scientific 
objects that is the focus of much of his research.
What collaborators cannot control, of course, is how they get read, or 
how they will be subsequently positioned against one another. At one 
stage in this process, FC followed up a shared invitation, to an interdis-
ciplinary event, to ask whether it would be of interest to hear a linked 
presentation (from both FC and her neuroscientific collaborator) that 
included some reflection on how this cross-disciplinary partnership had 
developed. She received a warm reply – but one that warned her of the 
preponderance of ‘cutting-edge neuroscience’ at the event, and thus likely 
scepticism about a talk that would go ‘too deeply into the genealogy of a 
field’. Some historical context was welcome, she was told – but perhaps 
not too much. The key was not to work too hard at ‘reaching across the 
divide’ (between the sciences and the humanities), but simply to present 
cutting-edge (neuroscientific) work. Her respondent lamented, addition-
ally, that humanists were sometimes ‘quite lazy’ and not up to speed with 
the science (this writer, we note, came from the humanities).
There are many important points embedded here – not a few of which 
we are inclined to agree with. But what is especially fascinating is the 
way in which a concern about an ostentatious reaching across the divide 
ended up not only reinscribing an unequal dyad of science (cutting-
edge, worthy of admiration, and excitement) and the humanities (that 
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which provides social and historical context, not cutting-edge), but also 
found humanists to be potentially at fault in relation to a practice that 
neuroscientists need not imagine themselves as required to undertake. 
At the same time, the interdisciplinary was positioned as being at risk 
of weakness and lack of rigour in relation to the virility of ‘cutting-edge’ 
science. Notably, there was no articulated need for either the professional 
neuroscientists or the humanities people in the audience to hear any 
‘cutting-edge’ social science or humanities scholarship. This exchange 
thus became a moment that revealed to FC how her own way of envisag-
ing her intellectual relationship with her neuroscientific collaborator, 
as well as the relations between their respective disciplines, was quite at 
odds with many other, better established spaces of/for interdisciplinary 
exchange. Her and her collaborator’s jointly authored manuscripts 
marked, for her, an attempt, by contrast, to disrupt the assumptions that 
undergirded the usual models of co-authorship and co-presentation – 
not least by situating the context and progress of the collaboration itself at 
the heart of any shared inquiry, and refusing to disentangle such context 
from the cutting-edge of the research object in question.
Co-experimenting
In 2010, one of us (DF) attended a workshop on social neuroscience, 
organized by the European Neuroscience and Society Network, at the 
University of Vienna. What attracted DF to this event was that it promised 
not only a workshop about, but also a shared experiment in, social neuro-
science: everyone who came to the event had to precirculate a design for 
a real experiment, drawing on whatever account of experimental logics 
was available to him or her. On arrival, attendees were split into teams 
with a loosely equal disciplinary mix; they attended some workshops 
on experimental design, as well as on the actual physical logic of the 
scanner – and were then more-or-less left to their own devices: the task 
was to settle on one question between them, and design an experimental 
paradigm around it – with the organizers holding out the inducement 
that one group would be supported actually to carry out its experiment. 
In the group that DF was placed in, by far the most compelling proposal 
was provided by Melissa Littlefield, then an Assistant (now Associate) 
Professor of English at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
The idea was centred on the neuroscience of lie detection: Littlefield’s 
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proposal was to turn the experimental logic of fMRI lie detection away 
from its fascination with ‘deception’, and to redirect it towards the 
nuances of ‘truth’. Given that the dynamics of truth-telling and deception 
are fundamentally social in similar ways – deception is, after all, always 
a relational disposition – the collaborators designed an experiment that 
would take a brain measure when participants told a ‘socially-awkward’ 
truth, in order to see how brain regions associated with that truth would 
map on to regions already associated with deception (see e.g. Langleben 
et al. 2005).
The subsequent experiment (this proposal was indeed the winning one, 
and the real experiment was facilitated by the Interacting Minds Centre 
at Aarhus University, Denmark) combined insights from the humanities, 
social sciences, and neurosciences: the team created a complex ecologi-
cal situation (involving team-building, the generation of in-groups and 
out-groups, and dynamics of trust and competition) designed to induce 
participants, in the scanner, to tell a difficult truth about a teammate (see 
Fitzgerald et al. 2014a for a longer account of this experiment, from the 
perspective of science and technology studies; see also Littlefield et al. 
2014; see especially Littlefield 2011 for a broader analysis of the science 
of lie detection). The hypothesis was that a neurobiological measure 
taken at this point would show activation, at the moment just prior to 
enunciation, in intensely ‘social’ brain regions previously associated with 
deception. At the heart of this experimental design was a suggestion that 
the fMRI scanner might have difficulty distinguishing between a ‘truth’ 
and a ‘lie’ – because what it means to be deceived, or to confess, is buried 
within a whole series of fraught social relationships, memories, feelings, 
sensations, and so on, whose entanglements are not well indexed by the 
hemodynamic response at stake in fMRI.
Simultaneously, the experiment was an attempt to open up how the 
adjective ‘social’ was being mobilized within social neuroscience – and 
the ways in which some deeply complex social dynamics had become 
sequestered within a series of physiological effects that happened to be 
available to brain-imaging technologies. But the form that this perspec-
tive took was not historical or social analysis (cf. a number of the essays 
in Pickersgill and van Keulen 2011); nor was it a critique of either the 
object or the method of fMRI lie detection; nor still was it a critical 
theorization of the psychological literature on social cognition. Instead, 
it was a real experiment (Fitzgerald et al. 2014b). More precisely, it was 
an experiment that recruited the implicit logics of fMRI lie detection 
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into a scenario in which precisely the opposite dynamic was at stake, 
viz. an awkward truth. The experiment used the modes of visualiza-
tion and interpretation, as well as the conceptual leaps that had made 
deception visible in particular neurobiological locations, in order to bring 
the intersubjectivity of truth to light. In this sense, a critique was made 
on the basis of an expertise – that is, Littlefield’s literary and historical 
research – that is not always available to people involved in neuroimag-
ing studies. More importantly, this expertise, and the critical interven-
tion it afforded, was articulated exclusively through the internal logics 
of fMRI brain-imaging. It would not be enough to assert that deception 
depended on context: the point was to co-design and run an experiment 
that would work with the potent and important reductive force of the 
scanner, in order to bring something like ‘context’ into view.
But co-experiment is not without its problems. More recently, DF and 
FC discussed this research at an interdisciplinary workshop concerned 
with ‘critical neuroscience’ – a term signifying the desire for a form of 
neuroscientific investigation more attentive to its own biases, limita-
tions, and political entanglements, and thereby contributing to a more 
‘critical’ (and potent) analysis of social and political relations (Slaby and 
Choudhury 2011). The lie detection project was discussed as one instance 
of what we had by then come to understand as an ‘experimental entangle-
ment’ – a term that we had introduced (Fitzgerald and Callard 2015) to 
expand the kinds of interventions that might be understood as ‘critical’ 
(see also Viney, Callard, and Woods 2015). A prominent neuroscientist, 
who happened to be in the room, responded to our presentation by 
saying (we paraphrase): ‘What’s critical about that? This is just normal 
science.’ In an important sense, this is very true. Such a question draws 
our attention to what it might mean to intervene through experimental 
modalities that do not, in fact, depart from the constrained logics of 
‘normal science’. What does it mean for the interdisciplinarian to garb 
herself in experimental procedures, such that her critical impulses might 
have the hope of passing in intellectual institutions that privilege certain 
kinds of bioscientific reasoning? (For a canonical account of some of the 
fraught literatures and histories that we are invoking here, see Chapter 6 
in Butler 1993.) And beyond such concerns, there are also of course 
cognitive neuroscientific experiments that do not consider themselves to 
be explicitly interdisciplinary, and which have mobilized the resources 
of ‘normal science’ to exert forms of critique. The famous ‘dead salmon’ 
experiment, for example, critiqued the use of poor statistical corrections 
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that generated false positives in fMRI studies, by running a ‘normal’ 
experiment that showed brain activity in a dead Atlantic salmon (Bennett, 
Wolford, and Miller 2009; see Margulies 2011 for a discussion). More 
recently, Amir Raz and colleagues drew together cognitive neuroscientific 
methods and techniques from magic to demonstrate experimentally the 
risk of ‘neurohype’ (Ali, Lifshitz, and Raz 2014). There remains an open 
question of how – if at all – interdisciplinary experimentation (of the 
kind that involves the interpretive social sciences and humanities) differs 
from modes of practice internal to the field of cognitive neuroscience.
Co-organizing
We are at an interdisciplinary networking event, with about 40 other 
people from various disciplines. Stand up; introduce yourself; give a 
thumbnail sketch of your strengths; explain what you’re looking for; sit 
back down. The day drags a bit. One neuroscientist, Simone Kühn (SK), 
in her allotted five minutes, spoke as an expert designer of experimental 
neuroscientific paradigms; she was at the workshop because she was 
potentially interested in collaborating with people from the humanities and 
social sciences who could help her investigate, assess, and interpret subjec-
tive experience. Cognitive neuroscience, she noted, was incredibly good 
at establishing objective responses to tasks designed by the experimenter, 
but still in its infancy vis-à-vis acquiring subjective data that captured 
the experimental subject’s responses to the experimental paradigm (Jack 
and Roepstorff 2002). Her pitch piqued our interest: after all, literatures 
within sociology, the history of the human sciences and geography have 
long reflected on the ‘problem’ of eliciting subjective experience and of 
adequately conceptualizing the relationality between an experimenter, an 
experimental subject, and the social and technological artefacts amongst 
them (Despret 2004; Morawski 2007). By the end of the workshop, the 
three of us were part of a larger group attempting to get funding for a new 
interdisciplinary programme of research on ‘intersubjectivity’.
With SK, we devoted significant time to planning, curating, and organ-
izing a workshop on that question. We juxtaposed researchers from 
different fields in the same panel, and forced each to respond to the same 
provocation. (For example, the provocation ‘Where is the introspective 
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self?’ was addressed by Russ Hurlburt, the psychologist who has worked 
for many years to develop a painstaking and extraordinary psychological 
method called Descriptive Experience Sampling (Hurlburt and Akhter 
2006), and the philosopher and critical neuroscientist Jan Slaby. For 
further details, see Callard et al. 2012a.) And we borrowed from our own 
experience of European Neuroscience and Society Network (ENSN) 
events to ensure that the last day was devoted to developing an actual 
protocol for some kind of empirical study, rather than the event simply 
remaining at the level of discursive exchange. Such attempts can always 
fail; indeed this is what happens more often than not. But our intention 
was to push beyond the endless ‘dialogues’ that beset interdisciplinary 
workshops – and that frequently end up simply reinstalling the ‘inter-’, 
as well as consolidating existing positions – even at the risk of failure.
Beyond the actual curation of the event itself, some of the value of 
co-organization as a mode of interdisciplinary intervention was revealed 
in offshoots from, or tangents to, the main business of the workshop. In 
the course of the event, for example, SK and her neuroscientist colleague 
Elisa Filevich presented initial findings from an innovative protocol that 
they had designed and tested to explore the vexed construct of ‘free will’. 
Working to prise open decades of black-boxed studies that have kept 
constructs out of the reach of the experimental subject, and that have 
evinced no interest in what the experimental subject interprets the study 
to be about, their paradigm focused instead on the subtleties of what 
it feels like to choose, in which the experimental subject herself adju-
dicated which decisions had felt more or less ‘freely’ selected (Filevich 
et al. 2013). We subsequently co-authored a short commentary on this 
study for the journal that published their article (Callard and Fitzgerald 
2014), in which we reinscribed this nuanced experiment within some 
other (social scientific, historical, and psychological) literatures that had 
tried to think through the fraught relationship of the experimenter to 
her subject. SK’s and Filevich’s imaginative experimental intervention 
opened up for us new possibilities for how we might, in the future, 
‘torque’ existing experimental paradigms that are focused on other 
phenomena, and that also employ complex intersubjective relations 
between the experimenter and her subject.
At the same event, an entirely new collaborative endeavour emerged. 
As we noted above, FC, DF, and SK had already ensured that Russ 
Hurlburt was part of the workshop; this was because SK had mentioned 
her interest in his work at the beginning of the exchanges between the 
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three of them. On the final day of the event, likely collaborators were 
more-or-less forced – via highly curated groups – into extended interac-
tions with one another, and instructed to return with the outline of a 
collaborative experiment. Most of these conversations did not produce 
anything very concrete (and this was fine) – but a fascinating interdis-
ciplinary collaboration, drawing together very different traditions of 
psychological and neuroscientific experimentation on introspection, 
did emerge from the conversation between SK, Russ Hurlburt, Charles 
Fernyhough (CF), and others (Kühn et al. 2014). For FC and DF, the key 
mode of interdisciplinary intervention, here, was to use this workshop 
as a vehicle to ensure that likely collaborators were pushed to work with 
one another – and, critically, for the two of them to get out of the way 
once this curatorial work was done, and they were no longer required. 
Interdisciplinarity, here, was located first in the curatorial labour of 
bringing SK’s, CF’s, and Russ Hurlburt’s different, psychologically-rooted 
research traditions together (and we are absolutely committed to the 
view that the joining of heterogeneous psychological and neuroscientific 
traditions, rooted in profoundly different epistemological histories, is an 
intensely interdisciplinary endeavour), and generating the space for an 
experimental conversation to take place. But there was also a significant 
interdisciplinary intervention in knowing when to get out of the way: a 
more traditionally-minded mode would have insisted that, for this to be 
a truly interdisciplinary effort, it must include some ‘perspective’ from 
the social sciences and/or humanities. Such a view not only flattens 
the historical and internal multiplicity of such a capacious discipline as 
psychology, but also makes invisible the vital interdisciplinary labour of 
simply bringing things together. We are insistent, by contrast, that the 
generation of space, the curatorial labour of choreographing encounters, 
and then the willingness to know when your disciplinary perspective 
is not necessarily adding anything important, remain crucial, if under-
appreciated, ways to do interdisciplinary collaboration.
So ... which way does it go between you two?
The answer, of course, is that in interdisciplinary collaborations it can 
go many ways. We have here offered three modes – but no doubt this 
barely scratches the surface. What we wish to stress is that the tired 
distinction between whether one labours ‘on’ or ‘in’ another discipline, 
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or the desire to pin down who is more likely to be the ‘object’ of study 
within a collaboration, is surely long past the age of retirement. Let us 
dispense, then, with the two-pronged formulation whereby the role of 
the social scientist/humanities scholar is either to critique neuroscientific 
concepts ‘from the outside’, as it were, or to provide a contextualization 
of the empirical data that have been acquired by the neuroscientists 
themselves. Let us, by the same notion, do away with the mirrored 
image of the neuroscientist either as a sort of crude empiricist, waiting 
patiently for the philosopher to sort out her concepts, or as an external 
intellectual imperialist, blithely washing sociological histories away with 
her all-conquering brain machine.
If we understand interdisciplinary interventions, instead, as ways of 
marking, folding, and perturbing the existing order of the world, then 
interdisciplinary collaborations might take place in an untold number 
of ways. These could include written arguments, the performative 
power of heterogeneous experimental situations, and elaborations of 
the discursive and paradigmatic constraints within which researchers 
from both the sciences and the humanities/interpretive social sciences 
work. They might also include shared applications, the joint labour of 
workshop organization, shared senses of joy and rage at the decisions of 
grant committees – as well as the whole, unspoken panoply of ways for 
thinking, together, about the intersections of culture, society, environ-
ment, mind, and brain.
Notes & Queries: 2
Q: Can you give a quick list of other possible ways, however seemingly 
small or minor, of actually making an interdisciplinary intervention?
A: There is no easily circumscribable list of things that would count 
as interdisciplinary interventions. Rather, we consider it more 
helpful to think about an intervention as the act of stepping in to 
affect a course of action, or an issue. This can be through a variety 
of means – and could mean stepping in and thereby preventing 
something from happening. Many acts might, then, be worthy of 
consideration, for example:
acting as the reader of a draft written by someone in another  ?
field;
carefully setting up respondents at workshops or shared meetings; ?
‘Which Way Does It Go between You Two?’
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0005
watching an experiment that someone in another discipline is  ?
conducting (given that the act of observation can often influence 
what happens next in predictable and unpredictable ways);
disrupting what you perceive to be the deathly curation of an  ?
interdisciplinary event that seems to be able to do no more than 
encourage ‘dialogue between the disciplines’;
putting your foot down about being tagged ‘the (one) neurosci- ?
entist’ or ‘the (one) social scientist’ at an interdisciplinary event;
attending more carefully to what might be described as ‘interdis- ?
ciplinary’ differences that are working themselves out within an 
apparently disciplinary space.
This list could go on and on (and for some other examples, see the 
‘project shorts’ in Fernyhough, Woods, and Patton 2015). What we 
want to emphasize, here, is not the specifics of those acts enumer-
ated above, but rather our general starting point. We want to depart 
from thinking at the level of a ‘discipline’ – which then rapidly 
moves into interdisciplinary situations that bring one discipline 
‘into conversation’ with another discipline – and attend to other 
scales and logics at which something different might take place. A 
mode of interdisciplinary intervention, in this view, is constituted 
by some perturbation in the neatly bounded landscapes of intel-
lectual labour; it is the work of actually refusing those boundaries 
in the first place.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
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Environmental Entanglements: 
Neurological Lives 
and Social Worlds
Abstract: This chapter begins with the object that has perhaps 
most frequently underwritten collaborative work (including 
our own) between the social sciences and neurosciences: the 
effects of the environment. The chapter thus analyses a series 
of conceptual and methodological developments – in both 
biological and social domains – that have created the ground 
for life scientists and social scientists to begin collaborating 
around the simultaneously cultural and embodied effects of 
living in a particular environment. However, the chapter warns 
against some vitiated accounts of social life that can emerge 
from endeavours like these – and draws on recent research on 
the relationship between city life and mental health to begin 
thinking about how rich, thick and nuanced attention to the 
social can be traced through bioscientific methods.
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Introduction
In an article discussing the neural effects of the social environment, 
published in 2014 in the leading psychiatric journal Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
Lydia Krabbendam and colleagues pointed to the difficulty of investigat-
ing how city upbringing and minority status affect brain structure and 
function. In lamenting how ‘the role of the social environment has been 
largely neglected in the search for the neural mechanisms underlying 
schizophrenia’, they offered the following explanation:
For one thing, the complexity of social risks may have precluded research-
ers from trying to pin down the neural substrate underlying their effect. In 
addition, social risks have traditionally been the realm of social scientists and 
thus an improbable target for neuroscientists. (Krabbendam, Hooker, and 
Aleman 2014, 248)
Here, Krabbendam and her colleagues remind us of the legacy of a terri-
torial division in which the neural has been handed over to the neurosci-
entists, and the social to the social scientists. This chapter comprises an 
effort to disrupt disciplines’ careful tending of their own epistemological 
spaces, in order to figure out how those interested in understanding the 
tangled relations between the neural and the social – not least those 
whose research is devoted to understanding and intervening upon 
mental ill health and mental disorders – might work profitably together.
Many disciplines and epistemological domains now acknowledge 
that our neurobiology is intimately marked by the social, cultural, and 
environmental circumstances in which our lives take shape. Indeed, a 
range of disciplines and approaches – including, most prominently, 
social neuroscience (Cacioppo 2002), environmental epigenetics (see 
Niewöhner 2015; Pickersgill et al. 2013), and social epidemiology (Krieger 
2001) – have lately emerged, or redefined their already-existing mission, 
in order to trace the multiplicity of ways in which, to use the cliché du 
jour, the social ‘gets under the skin’ (e.g. see Ferraro and Shippee 2009; 
Hertzman and Boyce 2010; Hyman 2009; McEwen 2012). Research foci 
range from interests in the role of socio-economic status in childhood 
neural development (Hertzman and Boyce, 2010), to the way that human 
social interaction becomes visible in brain function, to the role that the 
insults of poverty can play in the development of subsequent patholo-
gies (Galea 2011). These approaches and areas, needless to say, have their 
own complex and contested genealogies, both internally and in relation 
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to one another, as well as important differences in what exactly they 
intend by the ‘social’ or the ‘environment’ (or the ‘social environment’). 
We will not attempt to disaggregate those differences here. What we do 
wish to stress is that a still-emerging, cross-disciplinary consensus on 
the developmental, and indeed ontological, inseparability of biological 
and social life underwrites many of the most compelling ways in which 
social scientists (and, at times, humanities scholars, when they can 
claim some purchase on investigations of the social and the cultural) 
and neuroscientists have learnt to labour together. Indeed, it is precisely 
the growing awareness of the importance of the environment (such is the 
favoured term) and of (social) experience in understanding both psycho-
pathological and so-called ‘normal’ development that pushes the life and 
mind sciences to offer hospitality – if not to social scientists themselves, 
then at least to some of the concepts and phenomena with which they 
typically ply their trade.
Let us look briefly at how some of those invitations are crafted. 
Clinical psychologist Emily Holmes and colleagues, in calling for a 
strengthened ‘mental health science’ that will allow ‘[p]atients, mental-
health-care providers and researchers of all stripes’ to benefit, argue 
that: ‘great strides can and must be made by focusing on concerns that 
are common to fields from psychology, psychiatry and pharmacology to 
genetics and molecular biology, neurology, neuroscience, cognitive and 
social sciences, computer science, and mathematics’ (Holmes, Craske, 
and Graybiel 2014, 288). A recent Nature editorial, which endorsed the 
importance of interdisciplinary research involving the social sciences, 
cautioned that ‘[i]f social, economic and/or cultural factors are not 
included in the framing of the questions’ posed by natural scientists 
working to ‘deliver wonderful solutions to some of the challenges 
facing individuals and societies’, then ‘a great deal of creativity can be 
wasted’ (Nature 2014, 5). Social psychiatrists Stefan Priebe, Tom Burns, 
and Tom Craig, proposing that ‘the future of academic psychiatry may 
be social’, have argued that a ‘social paradigm ... would not ignore the 
neurobiological and psychological dimensions of mental disorders, but 
link them to social phenomena in the patient’s life and in treatment’ 
(Priebe, Burns, and Craig 2013, 320). Such an approach ‘challenges the 
accepted distinction between basic and applied sciences’ (whereby basic 
science discoveries are ‘translated’ into practice) by emphasizing that 
‘basic research on mental disorders as social phenomena would have to 
be conducted in the “real world” ’ (Priebe, Burns, and Craig 2013, 320).
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At the other end of the translational pipeline, Ralph Horwitz and 
colleagues warn that ‘unless clinical, social, and environmental features 
that affect the outcomes of disease’ are incorporated within genomics-
based knowledge, the current approach may be carving a path to 
‘ “depersonalized” medicine’. On Horwitz’s account, there has been the 
neglect of ‘social and behavioral features that have been long disparaged 
as “soft” in measurement (because they often rely on subjective reports 
and physician assessment)’ (Horwitz et al. 2013, 1155, 1156). The answer 
for Horwitz is to combat the atrophy of clinical science – by ensuring 
that physician investigators are not waylaid by ‘quantitative models or 
reductionist science’ so that they can focus on investigating the ‘personal 
attributes of patients and their environments’ (Horwitz et al. 2013, 1156). 
We are in agreement with Horwitz and colleagues. But one strand of 
argument that we wish to maintain in this chapter is that there has been 
no atrophy in the ranks of social scientists and humanities scholars: 
they – we – have long been working to understand the elements that go 
towards making up ‘the complexity of human experience’ that Horwitz 
is rightly convinced lies at the heart of understanding risks for disease as 
well as responses to treatment (Horwitz et al. 2013, 1156).
The social in the neurosciences
If ‘the social’ has never been as separate from the biological sciences as is 
sometimes now claimed, it remains true that there has been a qualitative 
shift, from the direction of the biological sciences, in perceptions of the 
grip that social life is thought to exert on the biology of the body. ‘The 
recognition that most illnesses are the result of a joint contribution from 
both endogenous and exogenous factors’, argue Satoshi Toyokawa and 
colleagues, implies that both psychiatric and non-psychiatric diseases 
are ‘likely to have epigenetic etiologies that may reflect aspects of the 
social environment’ (Toyokawa et al. 2012, 72). In a series of essays on 
what he terms a ‘new social biology’, the sociologist Maurizio Meloni 
roots this shift in a series of technical and conceptual developments 
within the biological sciences – from a renewed interested in altruism 
and forms of the ‘prosocial’ in evolutionary biology, to a realization of 
the force of social influence on the brain, to a consensus, in the wake of 
the completion of the Human Genome Project, that the genome is also 
‘reactive’ to social and cultural influence (Meloni 2014b, 594). What such 
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developments share, for Meloni, is that, in each, ‘the traditional sepa-
ration between the biological and the social has become increasingly 
difficult to define: biology has become porous to social and even cultural 
signals to an unprecedented extent’ (Meloni 2014b, 594).
Let us zoom in on the relationship that especially interests us here – 
that between the social and the neurological. The neuroscientists John 
Cacioppo and Gary Berntson, in their programmatic 1992 paper in 
American Psychologist, which proposed a ‘multi-level analysis’ of neuro-
social interaction as their contribution to the then new American decla-
ration of the ‘Decade of the Brain’, drew on the work of philosopher and 
psychologist William James to point out that ‘the brain does not exist 
in isolation but rather is a fundamental but interacting component of a 
developing or ageing individual who is a mere actor in a larger theatre of 
life’ (Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 1020). For Cacioppo and Berntson, 
not only was this a realization that social processes are underwritten by 
neurological events, but that, in its turn, and crucially, social life folded 
back on the development and expression of individual neurobiology. 
They developed this perspective into a multiple and reciprocal deter-
minism to insist that the promise of the Decade of the Brain would be 
realized only if we start to understand the ways in which ‘the brain is a 
single, pivotal moment of an undeniably social species’ (Cacioppo and 
Berntson 1992, 1027; see also Cacioppo et al. 2014 for specific reflections 
on psychiatry). There has not been a smooth passage from this generous 
proposal to an unproblematically reciprocal relationship between the 
neuroscientific and social sciences in the study of such events. It is worth 
noting, in this respect, that Cacioppo and colleagues, in a follow-up 
article in 2014 that described the potential contributions of social neuro-
science to psychiatry, reported that:
To investigate the mutual influence of the biological and social environments 
and the mechanisms through which these influences operate, social neurosci-
entists, ranging from physicists to psychologists, epidemiologists to psychia-
trists, philosophers to neurobiologists, and entomologists to zoologists, have 
begun to work together in interdisciplinary scientific teams using animal 
models, patient studies, and research on healthy individuals. (Cacioppo et al. 
2014, 132)
That sociologists (or anthropologists, or geographers) are not picked 
out in this list is striking. It suggests the need for research to account 
for why interdisciplinary collaborations between neuroscientists and 
(particular kinds of) social scientists appear to have been harder to 
Environmental Entanglements
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0006
get off the ground than collaborations with, say, entomologists. We 
might nonetheless claim that Cacioppo and Berntson set the stage for 
a contemporary research landscape that – at least in certain corners – is 
attending carefully to the ways in which social adversity is a causal factor 
in mental disorder (European Network of National Networks studying 
Gene-Environment Interactions in Schizophrenia (EU-GEI) et al. 2014; 
Hyman 2009), in which the sociopolitics of stress and trauma are situ-
ated in accounts of specific psychopathologies (Galea 2011), in which 
specific brain regions are situated vis-à-vis the role they play in human 
social interaction (Amodio and Frith 2006), and so on.
From the other direction, a range of positions in social theory have 
radically undercut the traditional scepticism that the social sciences 
(at least the qualitative social sciences) have displayed toward not only 
biological explanations – but any admixture of the biological and social 
per se. In his account of what might become of ‘The Human Sciences 
in a Biological Age’, sociologist Nikolas Rose points out that, ‘No longer 
are social theories thought progressive by virtue of their distance from 
the biological. Indeed the reverse assumption is common – it seems 
that ‘constructivism’ is passé, the linguistic turn has reached a dead end 
and a rhetoric of materiality is almost obligatory’ (Rose 2013, 4). While 
retaining some critical distance from these obligations, Rose nonethe-
less casts a future for the social sciences in which an attention to vitality 
(understood not only as a philosophical commitment, but as a deep, 
abiding and collaborative attention to the biological stakes of human 
life) returns to the centre of the sociological enterprise. Similar claims 
have been made across a range of contemporary social theories (e.g. 
Braidotti 2010; Greco 2005; Grosz 2004). In our own efforts to think 
with and through bodies, we have been especially moved by arguments 
emerging from feminist science studies, and from that literature some-
times inadequately gathered together under the rubric of a ‘material 
feminism’ – which has, at least since Donna Haraway first drew attention 
to the theoretical potency of the body positioned scientifically (Haraway 
1985), pioneered such approaches. Put very broadly, a ‘material feminism’ 
moves beyond an insistence on the construction of gendered bodies to 
ask whether feminist theory might, rather, seek resources in the materi-
ality of the body, and in the thinking of the sciences that labour to bring 
that materiality into understanding. It describes a move of feminist 
theory beyond the ‘textual, linguistic and discursive’, to refocus on the 
pains and pleasures of embodiment: ‘we need a way to talk about these 
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bodies’, Alaimo and Hekman point out, ‘and the materiality they inhabit’ 
(Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 3–4).
We have written elsewhere (Fitzgerald and Callard 2015) on the 
indebtedness of our own approach to Elizabeth Wilson’s threading of 
neurology through feminist theory (Wilson 2004, 2011a, 2011b), and to 
Karen Barad’s recasting of the relationship between political and physi-
cal worlds (2007, 2008, 2011). Our immersion in these literatures has 
led us to challenge accounts and organizational structures that separate 
the practices and objects of the sciences (including the clinical sciences) 
from the practices and objects of social scientific and humanistic inquir-
ies – accounts and structures that we have found to be common across 
the landscapes of interdisciplinary research focused on the mind and 
brain. We are quite convinced by Barad’s account that ‘even when the 
focus is restricted to the materiality of “human” bodies’:
there are ‘natural,’ not merely ‘social,’ forces that matter. Indeed, there is a 
host of material-discursive forces – including ones that get labeled ‘social,’ 
‘cultural,’ ‘psychic,’ ‘economic,’ ‘natural,’ ‘physical,’ ‘biological,’ ‘geopolitical,’ 
and ‘geological’ – that may be important to particular (entangled) processes 
of materialization. If we follow disciplinary habits of tracing disciplinary-
defined causes through to the corresponding disciplinary-defined effects, we 
will miss all the crucial intra-actions among these forces that fly in the face of 
any specific set of disciplinary concerns. (Barad 2008, 128)
In short, if there is now an invitation to ‘the social’ from (some) parts 
of the biological sciences, then there is simultaneously an openness to 
think biologically from (some) parts of contemporary social theory. And 
if such moves are often partial and contested, they nonetheless form a 
gap into which the researcher interested in interdisciplinary experimen-
tation might insert herself.
Accounting for the social
We are pitching for a grant about mind-wandering. It involves two social 
scientists (us) as well as a neuroscientist and a psychologist. At the heart of 
our bid are interdisciplinary experiments on mind-wandering, based on a 
workshop that will draw on accounts of distraction and daydreaming from the 
humanities and social sciences, as well as a reflexive ethnographic analysis of 
what that interdisciplinary process is actually like. Our collaborators have put 
together some excellent slides visualizing the state of the art in neuroscientific 
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and psychological  mind-wandering research. Des – struggling to illustrate what, 
exactly, an ethnographic analysis involves, and aware that he is handling this 
part of the pitch – talks to a slide featuring a photograph by Franz Boas of a 
man wearing a Kwakiutl whale-mask. We’re all ready, after the presentation, 
to justify to the grant panel what, exactly, the hell this is doing there. But the 
questions from the panel, when they come, are almost exclusively about the 
imaging experiments we’ve proposed, and are directed squarely at our natural 
science collaborators, concerning the intricacies of our methods, the solidity of 
our conceptual underpinnings, and so on. The ethnographic portion of the project 
(which makes up the bulk of one of the two work-packages, i.e., more or less half 
the programme of research), is largely unremarked upon.
Afterwards, one of our collaborators wonders what it means when there is so much 
attention to what the experimenter will do, while the person whose presentation is 
centred on an image of a man in a whale-mask has something of an easier ride.
Our scientific collaborator diagnosed the situation, we believe, with 
great acuity. Here, we understand him to have been drawing our atten-
tion to the fact that while the funding panel was profoundly interested 
(and very well versed) in the nuances, specificities, and problematics of 
the novel experimental design that he proposed, there was no evidence 
of an equivalent focus on ‘the social’ or ‘social relations’, still less on the 
variable methods and attentions through which those phenomena, in 
their turn, might be brought to light. There was clearly room for the 
social to be brought into this space (and we do not diminish, on the part 
of the funding panel, the boldness and value of that move alone), and 
yet, beyond that generosity, there was still little scope to account for its 
specificities – or, indeed, to grapple critically with its own problematics, 
erasures, lacunae, and so on. The space was open to the social, certainly, 
but, for the two of us, at least, we had little sense that ‘the social’ itself 
might represent an important epistemological opening.
If an increasing attention to the social environment in the biological 
sciences can be read as an invitation to people in the social sciences, 
what ‘the social’ actually is in such spaces is often rather different from 
what it is within the social sciences themselves. This need not, of course, 
be a problem in itself: there are many models of the ‘social’, as well as of 
the ‘neural’, the ‘cognitive’, the ‘affective’, the ‘cultural’ (and so on) that 
course within and across a number of disciplines; such differences can 
themselves be revelatory to those exposed to them, and can precipitate 
new kinds of research questions as well as methodologies. What perturbs 
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interpretive social scientists is when neuroscientific accounts and opera-
tionalizations of the social recapitulate ideas about culture and society 
that have long been repudiated – for epistemological, ontological, and 
political reasons – from many parts of the social sciences themselves.
Needless to say, there are analogous instances in which social scientists 
and humanities scholars employ outmoded or problematic or radically 
simplified concepts from the neurosciences – either to work with or to 
employ in severe critique of the science. We need think only of the way 
in which such concepts as ‘mirror neurons’ and ‘plasticity’ have been 
wielded outside of their home domains. Nonetheless, we well remember 
the interdisciplinary meeting in which the only other presentation, apart 
from our own, that attempted seriously to engage an account of social and 
cultural specificity did so by mobilizing the social-psychological bifurca-
tion between ‘individualist’ and ‘collectivist’ cultures, which unproblem-
atically split the Occidental from the Oriental (see Oyserman, Coon, 
and Kemmelmeier 2002 for a detailed critical review of this literature, 
from a psychological perspective). Certainly, some important notion of 
culture was at stake in this interdisciplinary proposal – and yet few soci-
ologists, geographers, or anthropologists, and far from all psychologists 
and neuroscientists, would defend the notion of a ‘Western’ culture as a 
thing characterized by its members’ ‘individualism’, whether by refusing 
to countenance that ‘culture’ is a thing (Mitchell 1995), by rejecting any 
isomorphism of space, place, and culture (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), 
or by critiquing any simple bifurcation between two kinds of people 
(individualist/collectivist) (Omi 2012). A number of other concepts 
that frequently surface in social and cultural neuroscience carry simi-
lar difficulties. Andreas Heinz and colleagues, for example, lament the 
‘increasing use of the “race” concept in contemporary genetic, psychiat-
ric, neuroscience as well as social studies’ (Heinz et al. 2014, 1) – arguing 
that both this concept and, indeed, that of ‘culture’ (which they argue is 
often used as a proxy for ‘race’) carry within them the legacy of colonial 
attempts to categorize ‘races’ on the grounds of distinct physiognomies 
(see also the argument by the biologist William Klitz [2014]).
The point is that the roots of perspectives such as these on ‘cultures’ 
and ‘races’ lie not in accounts of society and culture as they have been 
opened up in disciplines such as sociology or cultural anthropology (at 
least in their more recent iterations), but rather in accounts of ‘culture’ 
that dominate the fields of cultural psychology and cultural neuro-
science. In a well-cited review of cultural neuroscience, Joan Chiao, 
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while tipping her hat to anthropologists such as Franz Boas and Margaret 
Mead, nonetheless figures what she calls ‘culture–biology interactions’ 
squarely within an account of ‘culture’ drawn from the narrower binaries 
that dominate cultural biology, viz. a literature that bifurcates ‘cultures’ 
along axes of ‘individualism–collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power 
distance, long-term/short-term orientation, and masculinity/femininity’ 
(Chiao 2009, 288, 291; italics in original). Such binaries risk render-
ing static and inflexible apparent ‘traits’ that are seen to characterize 
particular groups of people (‘cultures’, ‘races’, ‘genders’) (see the critique 
by Martínez Mateo et al. 2012). What gets – or can get – neurologically 
accounted for, as aspects of the social environment, is here already 
radically constrained, and constrained precisely because it has not set 
foot outside the bounds of a particular kind of psychological thought. 
‘Psychology as a hub science’, Chiao concludes her review, ‘stands in a 
natural position to merge the scientific study of culture and biology by 
harnessing theories and methods from every area of psychology, from 
evolutionary and cognitive to cultural and developmental’ (Chiao 2009, 
300); such a perimeter seems to cut from consideration all those other 
disciplinary locations in which both culture and biology have been the 
focus of intense conceptual and empirical investigation.
As Svenja Matusall and her colleagues remind us, the specific form 
of ‘the social’ on offer in ‘social neuroscience’ can be rather a dispiriting 
one: ‘currently, in neuroscience’, they point out, ‘the concept of “social” 
is a relatively static factor in experimentation ... The approach towards 
studying the social via communal genetic make-up or individuals’ brains 
is rather different from studying the external conditions for a social struc-
ture’ (Matusall, Kaufmann, and Christen 2011, 14–15). In other words, 
there is a big difference between an experiment that differentiates (social) 
groups purely on account of their different physiological attributes, and 
one that explores how those differences might be produced through 
social as well as physiological patternings and dynamics. One might 
make, here, a lament – and others have done so – about the violence 
that fields crossing the neuroscientific with the social/environmental can 
sometimes inflict upon the hard-wrought claims of culture and society 
(e.g. Leys 2011). Indeed, one might well claim that not only is there not 
an especially enticing invitation to social scientists, from a neuroscientific 
field that imagines itself ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ – but that, worse, such fields, 
through powerfully reductive methodological and conceptual strategies, 
inflict significant damage on those very concepts.
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If we sometimes find ourselves in sympathy with such arguments, still 
we are loathe to wave yet another scrawny sociological fist in the general 
direction of the social neurosciences. What we have tried to do, instead, 
through the projects that we have been involved in, is to take seriously 
the question of which accounts of the social are on offer in the interdis-
ciplinary neurosciences today (cf. Young 2011, 2012) – and to think, at 
the same time, about the value that might be placed on broader, livelier 
ways of working and thinking this notion. In this sense, we are trying 
to work through strategies through which more compelling accounts of 
the environment, of society, of culture, of milieu (to use the technical 
term of Goldstein 1995 [1934]) might yet get pulled through laboratory-
based neurobiological studies. Because, as Svenja Matusall also reminds 
us, we can trace rather different accounts of the ‘social’ even within the 
relatively small world of social neuroscience – which is to say, this field 
is itself contested in various ways (Matusall 2013). The tension between 
the rather open account of the ‘social’ that appears in Cacioppo and 
Berntson, and the thinner, more vitiated descendant of that account that 
we read in much subsequent psychological work is sobering. The ques-
tion, then, becomes: through which methods, strategies, and concepts, 
through which forms of alliance, and in relation to which research 
questions might these thicker and more capacious accounts of social 
life be mobilized and operationalized? To the extent that ‘the social’ or 
‘the cultural’ is a way in to at least some forms of interdisciplinarity, how 
do you – whatever discipline you come from – get involved in projects 
where invigorating ways of conjuring one or both are centrally at stake?
The urban brain
One of the – many – uncomfortable facts about collaboration is that some 
kind of strategic reduction (of one’s own concepts and immediate intel-
lectual ambitions) is often the price of entry. One of our core messages 
is that learning to become an interdisciplinarian means coming to terms 
with that price. We would suggest, entirely seriously, and without preju-
dice, that any social scientist who is committed to writing 12,000-word 
papers on different genealogies of ‘the social’, or who doesn’t think she 
could bear the epistemic violence of using a construct like ‘SES’ (socio-
economic status) as a proxy for dense inter-lacings of class, social posi-
tion, and education, is probably as well off not moving much beyond her 
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sociology or anthropology department. By the same token, any neuro-
scientist who is unwilling to look beyond standard social-psychological 
literatures for accounts of ‘culture’ are equally advised to stay within (or 
accept that she is already staying within) the secure boundaries of a well-
established, and singular, paradigm.
With that allowed, the mundane fact is that there are interdisciplinary 
projects where better and worse accounts and operationalizations of the 
social and of the cultural are on offer. One place to which we have turned 
for inspiration is the group of interdisciplinary researchers from the 
neurosciences and social sciences who are putting pressure on how sex 
and gender are conceptualized and operationalized in neuroscientific 
research (for a broad review, see Schmitz and Höppner 2014b). Anelis 
Kaiser and colleagues, for example, in a careful review of sex/gender 
differences that have been detected using fMRI, have demonstrated that 
focusing on sex/gender as a variable leads irrevocably to the detection 
of differences rather than similarities (Kaiser et al. 2009) – and have 
reflected on the epistemological and political implications of emphasiz-
ing such gender differences. Others have challenged core psychological 
constructs used within social and cultural neuroscience – see for exam-
ple Daphna Joel and colleagues’ study that challenged the category of 
‘core gender identity’, which is frequently employed in neuroscientific 
studies (Joel et al. 2014). Or consider the work of those critical 
neuroscientists such as Suparna Choudhury, Lawrence Kirmayer, and 
Rebecca Seligman, who have mobilized the resources of anthropology 
and transcultural psychiatry alongside those of cognitive neuroscience 
to develop and operationalize less enervating accounts of the ‘cultural’ 
(Choudhury 2010; Seligman and Brown 2010; Seligman, Choudhury, 
and Kirmayer forthcoming; Seligman and Kirmayer 2008). Seligman 
and Brown, for example, have drawn on anthropological evidence to 
show that dissociative states are not only ‘pseudo-adaptive’ responses 
to stress, as they are frequently imagined in Euro-American psychiatric 
literatures, but can also be willingly inhabited, bringing to the fore 
‘forms of consciousness that allow individuals to enact alternative selves’ 
(Seligman and Brown 2010, 134). This anthropologically influenced 
account of dissociation, moreover, can be used to parse neuroscientific 
data on the relationship between such dissociative states and inhibitory 
mechanisms, thus showing how anthropological evidence might be 
used to expand, torque and complicate neuropsychiatric data – without 
losing its specificity or force.
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We conclude this chapter by describing a project, whose contours we 
know particularly well, in which one relatively capacious account of the 
social is in play. The genesis of this project lay in three social scientists 
(Nikolas Rose, Ilina Singh, and DF) thinking through the long and 
tangled literature on the history of mental disorder in cities – focusing 
in particular on how the relations between the social and biological 
get recast in a range of different areas (see Fitzgerald, Rose, and Singh 
forthcoming, which provides a formal account of the thinking behind 
this project; cf. Singh 2012; Rose 2013). At the outset of this project, these 
three collaborators were each, in different ways, fascinated by a series of 
papers that had recently come out of the laboratory of the German neuro-
scientist and psychiatrist Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg – which purported 
to show, for the first time, and using brain-imaging methods, a biological 
mechanism through which the stress of urban life could be translated 
into a clinical pathology (Lederbogen et al. 2011; Meyer-Lindenberg and 
Tost 2012). City living has been associated with mental illness for at least 
a century: since the very emergence of psychiatric epidemiology (indeed, 
this is in some ways the founding insight of psychiatric epidemiology), 
we have known that mental illness associates with city life (Lewis and 
Booth 1994). And yet, despite a long and deep research literature, and 
despite the consistency of this finding, no one really knows why this is. 
There is no scholarly consensus around the classic debate between social 
causation (city living makes people mentally ill) and social drift (people 
who are already mentally ill tend to end up in cities for various reasons), 
while a long-standing literature on the ‘social determinants’ of urban 
mental illness has morphed into attention being given to the neurobio-
logical and epigenetic mechanisms through which the tumult of city life 
gets into the skull.
Here, then, an interdisciplinary problem-space begins to emerge. 
Because not only is the relationship between urban space and mental 
health a well-known research area in epidemiology and social psychiatry: 
it also has a rich – but less storied – history in sociology too. Indeed, the 
question of the metropolis and mental life has classical antecedents in 
sociology (Simmel 2002 [1903]), while the question of ‘mental disorders 
in urban areas’ comprised one of the foundational research questions 
of American sociology (Faris and Dunham 1939). But what is more 
remarkable is this attention, and this link, to the biological and psychi-
atric sciences is, if not exactly forgotten, certainly not at the forefront of 
contemporary sociology.
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The ‘urban brain lab’ was developed at King’s College London to work 
creatively with those heterogeneous and overlapping histories. Specifically, 
and precisely with a view to bring a simultaneously social and biological 
attention to the problem of urban mental health, the lab worked to assem-
ble sociologists, neuroscientists, psychiatrists, epidemiologists, anthro-
pologists, geographers, historians, and others around the question of 
urban mental illness – in order to develop novel conceptual and empirical 
projects. Distinct from much interdisciplinary research – which includes 
some, limited, social ‘element’ – the subterranean history of sociological 
attention to this question licensed the mobilization of sociological meth-
ods, histories, and concepts at the heart of the endeavour. Thus, at stake in 
this work is not the feeding in of sociological expertise into a neuroscien-
tific project as such, but rather a bringing of the neurosciences into those 
questions – conceptual and empirical – that are preoccupying sociologists 
and those in proximate fields. What we would call the sociological social 
was, then, built into this project from the outset.
During 2014 and 2015, the lab ran two interdisciplinary events in 
London, which (a) drew together a range of psychiatric, biological, 
sociological, and historical attention to this question; but also (b) drove 
such attention, simultaneously, through the shared co-design of a novel 
empirical project for locating urban mental illness as a phenomenon 
that is lived on the streets as much as it is experienced in the body. The 
design of that project is, as we write, ongoing; but we hope that it may 
ultimately become a space for foregrounding at least one kind of socio-
logical attention to the ‘environment’, and the pressure it exerts, in all its 
contest and complexity, through a nuanced and sophisticated attention to 
the embodiment of urban stress. It may show us, then, that even if we do 
sometimes encounter thin sociologies at the heart of avowedly interdisci-
plinary projects, there is no necessary relation between interdisciplinarity 
and vitiation. There are archives – historical and contemporary – that 
may yet help us to think and practise otherwise.
Notes & Queries: 3
Q: A lot of my geographical and anthropological research has been preoc-
cupied with socio-spatial configurations of different kinds of landscapes – 
both urban and rural. How might this be of interest to interdisciplinary 
researchers addressing the mind and brain?
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Or:
Q:  As a neuroscientist, I feel confident about how my field models genetic 
interactions, but it seems to me that accounts of social risk factors and life 
events are often much less robustly specified. Are there opportunities to 
work collaboratively across the disciplines on these questions?
A:  In response to both of you, we emphasize that there are many 
compelling points of intersection of the neural and the social that 
might draw you into interdisciplinary collaborations. Here are a 
few of the many arenas that we think would benefit from greater 
interdisciplinary attention.
? Working up the complex intersections between environment, trauma, 
and mental ill health/psychosis. There is a growing body of evidence 
that links traumatic and other kinds of adverse experiences to 
the development of psychosis and other forms of mental illness 
(Varese et al. 2012). Researchers of all stripes know, however, 
that acquiring robust assessments of traumatic experiences is a 
very difficult task. There are many rich models of trauma in all 
its heterogeneity within the social sciences and humanities that 
attend to trauma’s complex temporal structure, as well as the 
difficulties surrounding assessments of the veridicality of these 
experiences. How might these be threaded into clinical and 
epidemiological studies?
? Refining modelling of the environment in animal research. Many 
translational researchers have commented on the need for more 
ecologically valid models (particularly regarding the environ-
ment) in animal research (e.g. Nestler and Hyman 2010). Social 
scientists and historians of science and medicine have provided 
rigorous analyses of the assumptions and constraints built into 
models of the environment (Ankeny et al. 2014; Davies 2010; 
Ramsden 2011). How might these analyses be fed back into – and 
thereby refine – existing animal models?
? Improving models of stress as they entwine the physiological, the 
psychological, and the social. Neuroscientists know that there are 
multiple ways in which stress can affect brain function (e.g. 
Ganzel, Morris, and Wethington 2010). But while vulnerability 
factors have been extensively researched in relation to emotion, 
the relation between social behaviours and social brain function 
is far less well understood (Sandi and Haller 2015). In addition to 
large bodies of social scientific literature on how to conceptualize 
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and study social behaviours, there has been significant historical 
and sociological research on the heterogeneous concept of stress 
as it moves between the physiological, psychological, and social 
(Cantor and Ramsden 2014; Jackson 2013). How might these 
different bodies of research be better brought together?
? Contributing to theorizations of – and operationalizations of – 
‘human experience’ that work simultaneously with neurological and 
socio-cultural data to develop new theoretical models and new 
experimental paradigms. One good example is the Hearing the 
Voice project – which focuses on the experience of hearing a 
voice in the absence of any speaker (often referred to as auditory 
hallucinations in psychiatry). Researchers have been bringing 
together phenomenological and other kinds of material from 
the humanities into neuroscientific and psychological models of 
voice hearing (e.g. Woods et al. 2014).
? Addictions. Anthropologists and other social scientists have 
argued for the importance of understanding the complexities 
of milieu and of trajectories of addiction (Raikhel 2015). Daniel 
Lende – one of the main proponents of the field of neuroan-
thropology (Lende and Downey 2012) – has shown how such a 
project becomes possible by bringing together biological meas-
ures and ethnographic data (Lende 2005).
? Modelling race, culture, gender, and sexuality. There are many ways 
in which the insights of the humanities and interpretive social 
sciences might bear on current thin (if not problematic) ways 
of categorizing individual and social identity in neuroscientific 
studies. We have already mentioned Joel and colleagues’ work 
that pushes beyond existing psychological models of ‘core gender 
identity’ (Joel et al. 2014). Similarly, neuroscientific studies are 
beginning to add to and expand our accounts of how race oper-
ates and is mobilized as a social category (Kubota, Banaji, and 
Phelps 2012).
? Linking patterns of disorder or particular diagnoses to specific histo-
ries in particular areas. Sandro Galea’s research in Detroit demon-
strates how patterns of disorder or particular diagnoses can be 
traced to specific histories in particular areas (Galea 2011). How 
might historical sociologists and epidemiologists work together 
to develop other investigations into the entwinement of embod-
ied stress and political histories?
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? Poverty. Research attempting to model the subjective insults 
incurred through poverty so as to understand how the effects 
of poverty ‘get under the skin’ often turn to ethological models 
(e.g. by exploring the effects of status hierarchies; see Sapolsky 
2005). How might richer sociological, anthropological, and 
cultural-theoretical accounts – which attend to the complex 
ways in which poverty is produced and sustained – transform 
those models?
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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States of Rest: Interdisciplinary 
Experiments
Abstract: This chapter represents a hinge in the book, moving 
from the more pragmatic material in its first half to the more 
conceptual work that we take up in the second half. The 
chapter is centred around the interdisciplinary project from 
where we both write – Hubbub, a Wellcome Trust funded 
project that opens up ‘rest’ as a simultaneously biological, 
psychological, social, historical, and cultural object. The 
chapter offers two accounts of how Hubbub came about, 
focusing first on individuals, and their shared work, and, 
second, on the institutions and funders that have intersected 
with that work. The chapter closes by making clear some of the 
intellectual tensions that nonetheless run through Hubbub, as 
it works through different registers of intellectual practice.
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Introduction
We have been asked, many times, by researchers of all stripes, how we 
have put our ‘interdisciplinary projects’ together. In this chapter, we 
focus neither on particular elements or episodes of interdisciplinary 
working (see Chapters 1–2), nor on the broader problematics that are 
reshaping the landscape of interdisciplinary research that addresses the 
‘bio’ and the ‘social’ (see Chapter 3), but instead give some sustained 
attention to how one large interdisciplinary project, Hubbub, directed 
by FC (and in which DF is one of many collaborators) came into exist-
ence. In what follows, we describe the transformation of a number of 
nascent, fragmentary germs of ideas into a large, unruly collaborative – 
and ongoing – project, which is investigating rest and its opposites in 
neuroscience, mental health, the arts and the everyday, and which is 
based in The Hub at Wellcome Collection from October 2014 until 
July 2016. (The project was the outcome of a specific, innovative grant 
call from The Wellcome Trust for interdisciplinary research projects 
addressing health and wellbeing to apply to inhabit the specially 
designed space, ‘The Hub’, for 22-month residencies. Hubbub was 
selected through a competitive application process as the first residency. 
For additional contextual details, see Callard, Fitzgerald, and Woods 
2015.)
Hubbub offers a crucible in which we might transform our obser-
vations and prescriptions about interdisciplinarity across the social 
sciences and the neurosciences, which we set out in this volume, into a 
live, interdisciplinary project – as well as in which we might observe the 
differences and continuities between our plans and prescriptions, and 
their implementation through material spaces and topologies, particular 
people, and a given time period. The account that follows is one that has 
not been shaved clean of texture, abrasions, frayings, and fractures. (We 
stress it is very much an account diffracted through the interests and 
memories of the two of us; the co-investigators of the project, as well as 
the many other collaborators, would undoubtedly provide very different 
accounts.) Our intent is to thread some of the preoccupations of this 
book – vis-à-vis spaces and geographies, power, affect, and heterogene-
ous modes of intervention – through our narrative so that you might 
adjudicate what purchase these thematics might have when translated 
into an experimental entanglement over which one of us, at least, as 
Principal Investigator, has significant control.
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Rest
This volume has been assembled in the open-plan Hub at Wellcome 
Collection – which provides time and space to consider how Hubbub 
(as a project with its own organizational logics), is curating, limning, 
and analysing the various matrices and topologies (see Chapter 5) 
that characterize the networks of human and non-human agents that 
comprise it. The award of the first residency of The Hub (to Felicity as 
Principal Investigator and the four co-investigators [Charles Fernyhough, 
Claudia Hammond, Daniel Margulies, and James Wilkes]) has brought 
with it the opportunity to implement a different model of interdiscipli-
nary neuro-social science from many we discuss in the course of this 
volume. Before we narrate the coming together of Hubbub, we want 
briefly to outline some of the research trajectories that Hubbub is taking, 
and the experimental entanglements it is in the process of bringing into 
being.
As a project tracking ‘rest’ through a range of simultaneously 
biological, literary, psychological, sociological, clinical, historical, and 
cultural iterations, Hubbub comprises a thick assemblage of interdisci-
plinary projects and questions. These include, to take a quick sample: 
(1) Focusing on the ways in which daydreaming – as phenomenon, 
construct, and trope – has meandered across a number of disciplines 
within its own history. Hubbub researchers are pursuing both socio-
logical accounts of, as well as psychological and neuroscientific investi-
gations into, mind-wandering and daydreaming, to focus, in particular, 
on the states to which daydreaming has been (or might be) opposed or 
related. Central, here, are attempts to investigate not only how varied 
forms of experimental practice (across different disciplines) elicit, 
construe, and represent daydreaming, but how such practices might 
cross-fertilize methods used in other domains. (2) Thinking, working 
with, practising, and experimenting with exhaustion – and, in particu-
lar, cleaving exhaustion from its usual intimacy with the subjective 
phenomenon of ‘tiredness’, and with the overworked figure of a tired 
individual’s body and mind. Archival work, poetry, critical-creative 
writing, and cultural-philosophical analyses are central to our investi-
gations into exhaustion – not least vis-à-vis how they might complicate 
psychiatric and other clinical accounts of this bodily state. (3) Thinking, 
beyond commensensical assumptions, about the ways in which people 
experience, conjure, and imagine rest, as an abstract phenomenon, 
 Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0007
but also as an index of the quality of their own daily lives. Large-scale 
surveying as well as public engagement are central to Hubbub’s work 
in this domain. (4) Focusing on cartographies of rest, to ask both how 
particular spaces get imagined as noisily restless, and what kinds of 
technologies we can bring to bear on how those spaces are actually 
experienced. Researchers are using sociological and anthropological 
methods to investigate these questions, as well as experimenting with 
self-tracking devices that will draw together physiological, phenom-
enological, and geographical data.
One of the foremost intellectual preoccupations of Hubbub is 
an interdisciplinary attention to the brain and mind at rest. This 
attention has roots in the previous collaborative work of Daniel 
Margulies, Jonathan Smallwood, and FC (Callard et al. 2013; Callard 
and Margulies 2011, 2014; Callard, Smallwood, and Margulies 2012), 
which has spiralled in and out of cognitive neuroscience, cognitive 
psychology, and the history of science – and which is being extended, 
empirically and conceptually, in Hubbub. Meanwhile, preoccupations 
and priorities from other disciplines and disciplinary debates, as well 
as from other modes of inquiry, have gradually come into view. This 
latter category, for instance, includes a collaboration involving Charles 
Fernyhough (CF), Simone Kühn (SK), Russ Hurlburt and others, 
which we discussed in Chapter 2 (in the section on ‘Co-organizing’). 
This research, which brings together phenomenologically rich data 
from Descriptive Experience Sampling, and cognitive neuroscientific 
data on research participants’ brain states, so as to elicit, capture, and 
visualize ‘inner experience’ (Kühn et al. 2014), has brought to visibil-
ity compelling insights and empirical findings that offer new ways of 
understanding the brain and mind ‘at rest’. Among these insights is 
an investigation of the limitations of common ways of investigating 
‘spontaneous thought’ and ‘inner experience’ (e.g. those that rely on 
respondent questionnaires), as well as the need to attend more care-
fully to phenomenological experiences of mental and bodily ‘rest’ (or 
lack of rest) while in the scanner (Kühn et al. 2014). CF, meanwhile, 
directs another large interdisciplinary project (Hearing the Voice). 
There are not only substantive intersections between the two networks 
of collaborators, but Hubbub, as it took form on paper as a grant 
proposal, was – happily – able to draw on some of the interdiscipli-
nary methods and structures that were already being tried out within 
Hearing the Voice.
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New collaborations within Hubbub intersect with these long-develop-
ing groups and methods. One collaboration with co-investigator James 
Wilkes – a poet and writer with long-standing interests in the intersec-
tions of poetry and cognitive science (Wilkes and Scott forthcoming) – 
was started because of the lure of The Hub award, and was facilitated 
by interests that both CF and James Wilkes have long had in the voice. 
Wilkes (together with several of his collaborators from the arts [who 
include writer and performer Holly Pester, composer Antonia Barnett 
McIntosh and poet Steven Fowler]) has been opening up attention to 
the mind and body at rest, via considering the roles of pause, silence, 
noise – not least in the ways in which they loop between voice, body, and 
mind (Wilkes 2015) – in critical-creative literary production, as well as 
in performance and composition. Co-investigator Claudia Hammond, 
with her long-standing career as a broadcaster and writer, has been 
interested in exploring how the experiments on rest taking place within 
The Hub might draw in the perspectives and reactions of various publics 
beyond it. Hilary Powell, a medieval historian, is interested in exploring 
the structural similarities and dissimilarities between monks’ attempts 
to keep themselves from being distracted during the labours of devotion 
and current psychological models of mind-wandering and inner speech. 
Josh Berson, an anthropologist of human–material interfaces, is working 
to chart the technosomatics of restful space (Berson 2015). DF, mean-
while, is working to bring his interests in the long histories of biosocial 
accounts of cities, mental health, and stress (see Chapter 3, ‘The urban 
brain’) into contact with other collaborators’ interests in restful and rest-
less cities (Fitzgerald, Rose, and Singh forthcoming); Lynne Friedli has 
been tracing the experiences of psychological coercion amongst those 
who are unemployed, whereby what might previously have been charac-
terized and experienced as periods of ‘idle rest’, are now stuffed full with 
corrosive demands for self-actualization if one is not to lose one’s social 
security benefits (Friedli and Stearn 2015). Ayesha Nathoo, a cultural 
historian, is analysing various twentieth-century practices of relaxation. 
(There are multiple, additional collaborators whose research we have not 
picked out here.) As the Hubbub collaborative network has expanded 
(see Hubbub 2015), this much larger group has poured intense energy 
into thinking carefully about the various ways in which rest, relaxation, 
bodily posture, and mental quietude have been – and continue to be – 
construed, represented, spatialized, and studied in medical, scientific, 
social, and cultural domains.
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The origin story: version 1
We want to draw particular attention, in this chapter, not to what this 
project is doing, but how it came about. Here is one origin story. Not 
unsurprisingly, it construes one of the authors of this book as one of 
the central protagonists, and centres on a tight-knit group of surround-
ing characters. In 2008, FC was immersed in one of the heartlands of 
psychiatric, psychological. and neuroscientific research. She was also 
experiencing a certain amount of epistemological and professional 
disquietude. First, there was the unease she felt at how her role as a social 
scientist – and specifically as a person whose interests were those of the 
psychiatric ‘service user’ – was being imagined within a large programme 
of research addressing translational mental health. In this role, FC was 
someone who, she felt, was often positioned as simply assisting clini-
cal and other academic mental health researchers with smoothing the 
‘translational’ pipeline, or with ‘understanding the patient [or family] 
perspective’ (Callard, Rose, and Wykes 2012). She was considered rather 
less frequently, she believes, as a researcher whose expertise in social 
theory and the history of psychiatry might shift some of the logics at 
work in the translational endeavour (Mol 2002). Second, she was curi-
ous about the complexity of the genetic and neurobiological accounts 
that colleagues advanced in seminars and in the collaborations that she 
was being drawn into (see e.g. Greenwood et al. 2011) – accounts that 
challenged her existing, rather static assumptions about the ‘biomedical’. 
In the midst of this intellectual quandary, she received an email inviting 
applications for the first European Neuroscience and Society Network 
interdisciplinary ‘Neuroschool’, a five-year programme ‘involving lead-
ing neuroscientists and social scientists from eleven European countries 
in collaborative research and debate’. The Neuroschool was intended 
to ‘foster learning in an interdisciplinary symmetrical environment’, 
taking behavioural genetics as its entry point. Current methodologies 
of experimentation (as well as the implications thereof within society), 
the ‘latest scientific evidence in the field’, and ‘the history and sociology 
of psychotropic drugs’ were all scheduled for discussion and debate 
(European Neuroscience and Society Network, cited in Costandi 2008; 
see also Frazzetto 2011 for a comprehensive account of the pedagogies 
involved within the Neuroschool).
On attending the Neuroschool, FC came to know a cognitive neuro-
scientist through jointly engaging in experimental practices that are used 
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in behavioural genetics and in which neither was an expert. In FC’s mind, 
there was – as we noted in Chapter 2 (‘Co-authoring’) – no particular 
emergence of a topic or problem that could form the basis of an ‘inter-
disciplinary collaboration’ between the two of them. Over time, however, 
they pursued a number of investigations of the history and the present of 
the field of research in which the neuroscientist was embedded, namely 
that of resting state fMRI (rsfMRI) research. (While the origins of any 
field are always contested, resting state fMRI is commonly understood 
to have emerged out of work done in the mid- to late-1990s by Bharat 
Biswal and colleagues on functional connectivity (Biswal et al. 1995), 
and Marcus Raichle, Debra Gusnard and colleagues on the default mode 
of the brain (Gusnard, Raichle, and Raichle 2001; Raichle et al. 2001)). 
FC, with long-standing interests in the potency of mind-wandering 
and fantasy, and the varied socio-spatial settings in which they might 
take place (Callard 2013), was unsure how ‘rest’ and ‘resting’ were being 
conceptualized and modelled within resting state fMRI. Both she and 
her collaborator became intrigued, indeed, by how the growth in resting 
state fMRI had been accompanied by a rise in neuroscientific interest in 
phenomena such as mind wandering and daydreaming that had previ-
ously been consigned to the margins of cognitive psychology.
This collaborative enterprise was provided with greater consistency 
by their committing to co-author an article in a special issue of a social 
theory journal. The paper, FC recalls, passed through thirty or so drafts, 
mostly sent to and fro in the early hours of the morning – the hours that 
comprised a window of time before one of them went to bed and after 
which the other had risen. Both of them, FC surmises, were able to carve 
out pockets of time to pursue their collaborative endeavour, outside of 
any formal support or financial structures, in part because they were at 
a relatively early stage of their careers. They also found a creative way to 
work with the exigencies and idiosyncrasies of geographical distance and 
their different quotidian patterns. Indeed, FC believes that their diverse 
phenomenological and material experiences of ‘rest’ (and lack of rest) 
ended up inflecting – obliquely – the kinds of scientific and normative 
questions they were interested in pursuing within their collaboration. 
(Such as: Are there better or worse ways ‘to rest’? How do bodily and 
mental states of exhaustion intertwine with one another? Has the scien-
tific literature embedded normative assumptions into models of ‘the 
resting state’ and of mind-wandering?) Dynamic material and affective 
contours – those that enjoin mind and body, and those that allowed 
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precarious intersections between two researchers writing, together, 
across significant geographical distances – were (again, this is only FC’s 
account) at the heart of, rather than epiphenomenal to, their interdisci-
plinary collaboration.
If FC and her collaborator’s first published co-authored paper could 
be said to constitute the formal imprimatur for their collaboration, it 
should not be overemphasized as the thing that consolidated an inter-
disciplinary problematic that could function as a goad, at least for FC, 
for further collaborative work. (Here, we note in passing the mess of 
what goes on behind the scenes of a collaboration. What should count 
as an ‘event’ or ‘output’ to be remembered, and noted, and given weight 
when tracing twists or turning points in the development of an inter-
disciplinary collaboration?) FC and her collaborator’s shared interest 
in psychoanalysis (a profoundly marginalized field within the cognitive 
neurosciences) led them to a short opinion piece by cognitive neurosci-
entist and psychoanalyst Peter Freed in which Freed attempted to carve 
a place for psychoanalysis within the still young (interdisciplinary) field 
of resting state fMRI by tying the ‘mind at rest’ to the psychoanalytic 
problematic of ‘free association’. ‘Functional neuroimaging’s interest in 
free association’, Freed argued, ‘seems to be happening in a historical 
vacuum, at least for the majority of researchers’. In particular:
Freud and the couch are nowhere mentioned, though the similarities to 
psychoanalytic practice are rather striking: the subject enters the room, lies 
down, and has his or her head examined by a largely silent clinician using 
an opaque technology as he or she thinks about ‘whatever comes to mind’ ... . 
But there is a sharp difference between the two fields. In psychoanalysis, 
exquisite attention is paid to each twist and turn of thought. ... This and any 
other content-laden chain of thinking is entirely hidden in resting-state 
studies, where the moment-to-moment cognitions and emotions are invis-
ible, unrecorded; all that is known is that the subject is ‘at rest’ or ‘in default 
mode.’ ... . Without a task to model in the data analysis, all that can be said of 
the period of free association is that the subject was ‘ruminating.’ Do we learn 
anything from this? (Freed 2008, 102)
A moment of conceptual clarity emerged for FC: this was the point – a 
moment of responding in her head to a short piece of writing that would 
likely be read by few and likely cited by even fewer – that she remem-
bers the stakes of her own interdisciplinary desires coming into focus. 
Freed’s intervention, on behalf of psychoanalysis, made it clear that it 
was, at that historical moment, by no means wholly settled how the 
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relationship between brain dynamics (the province largely of cognitive 
neuroscientists) and psychological processes (the province largely of 
those trained in the ‘psy disciplines’ (Rose 1996)) would be understood 
and consolidated in coming years. FC – through engaging extensively 
with her collaborator to understand more about how, at the heart of the 
resting state field lay the problem of relating brain dynamics to processes 
of thinking per se – realized, then, that there was a great deal at stake in 
terms of which psychological models, and which means of eliciting ‘inner 
experience’ would end up becoming embedded in an expanding field. It 
was not preordained, she realized, that neuroanatomical investigations 
of the brain’s connectivity should be sutured together with the working 
objects and current experimental paradigms of cognitive psychology.
Here, then, was an opening for the interpretive social sciences, 
humanities, and the arts practically to intervene in – i.e. to contribute 
to making – a sub-field, rather than remain an external adjudicator of 
its progress and insufficiencies. FC returned to late nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century philosophy, psychoanalysis, and psychology, so as 
to think how it might be possible to open up other paradigms through 
which to investigate mind-wandering and similar phenomena experi-
mentally. A fortuitous move to the city near where her collaborator was 
based provided favourable institutional conditions, as well as intimacy 
with researchers from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, to pursue 
those lines of investigation. Simultaneously, a new collaborator appeared 
on the scene, a psychologist ready to reach out as a scientific collabora-
tor to FC’s neuroscientific interlocutor. In time, all three of them started 
experimenting jointly, both on conceptual interventions within the rest-
ing state field, and on scientometric investigations of the emergence and 
organization of the various sub-fields exploring resting state research. 
Such a process involved FC’s collaborators generously introducing her to 
new methods and new ways of thinking, which significantly shifted her 
existing understandings of the history of daydreaming, mind-wandering 
and related phenomena. Through such joint experimentation, the famil-
iar landscape – one in which the social scientist or humanities scholar 
simply depicts and analyses the experimental work of her scientific 
colleagues – was decisively tilted, and a new, uneven topology of collabo-
ration and of epistemological exchange opened up. FC’s capture by, and 
fascination with, new modes of working and thinking together across 
the disciplines were, in turn, fundamental to how she approached the 
development of the Hubbub project.
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The origin story: version 2
Version 1 centred largely on persons and their interests, but was, in 
general, uninterested in material or institutional questions. The focus was 
on ideas, on conundrums, and on people figuring out new ways of work-
ing together to address those conundrums. (We nodded briefly towards 
the importance of temporal congruence for the writing of collaborative 
papers, and the serendipity of changes in geographical locations.) In 
placing centre stage a search for intellectual quarry, whose hue became 
clear only in the chasing, we have perhaps repeated a well-worn story 
about interdisciplinarity in which nothing much appears outside of 
the disciplinary and interdisciplinary passage of ideas. Let us try again, 
then, in thinking about what matters, by providing a more topologically 
sensitive account of some of the researchers, technologies, organizations, 
funders, and media that comprise the scene of Hubbub.
Many of the researchers who appear in this book (either explicitly, as 
characters, or unnamed, as delegates at the various workshops we have 
mentioned) were, at least at the start of the interdisciplinary projects 
described, precariously employed on fixed-term contracts, who were 
willing (or desperate) enough to move between cities and countries in 
Europe and North America. Such moves were not, we conjecture, simply 
to find the next intriguing disciplinary location (though we are aware of 
several disciplinary ‘transfers’ amongst our broad network of collabora-
tors, which include: from cognitive neuroscience to anthropology; from 
geography to the history of science; and from Continental philosophy 
to cognitive neuroscience). Of greater salience, we think, was their need 
to offer themselves up to a wide geography in which their labour power 
might be bought and sold. If interdisciplinarity demands the co-location 
of researchers with different sets of disciplinary expertise, then the stress-
ful nature of the academic labour market – characterized by frequent 
mobility and sequential fixed-term contracts – is no minor protagonist. 
Crossings – as the literatures on mobility and migration have for a 
long time made clear – involve the complex and ambivalent transfer of 
cultures, methods, techniques, fantasies, and habits. Affects are twisted 
and crushed – enfolding gratitude, ambivalence, and resentment within 
and between bodies. Indeed, a number of our papers that we have cited 
in this book were written in and through – at least for the two of us – 
varying states of distress: interdisciplinary co-authorship can function 
as an inadequate salve to various kinds of wounds, as well as a way of 
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extending and sustaining sociality. Many of our collaborations, too, have 
been facilitated by collaborators’ material and intellectual generosity in 
hosting one or both of us, or of enabling those geographical moves to 
happen in the first place. These larger stories of material and cultural 
inequalities, and of complex networks of hospitality, are perhaps far 
more significant, in anatomizing interdisciplinary collaborations, than 
the epistemological and disciplinary inequalities that we will discuss in 
Chapter 6. It is important to emphasize that neither material inequalities, 
nor host–guest relationships, line up neatly on disciplinary lines.
What of institutions and funders? The decision by the National 
Institute for Health Research (NIHR), which was created in the United 
Kingdom in 2006, to fund multi-disciplinary biomedical research 
centres for translational research (Snape, Trembath, and Lord 2008) is 
important, here. One of us (FC) was able to move from being largely 
external to the psychiatric and psychological enterprise (in an earlier 
research career as a historical geographer of psychiatry) to sitting at the 
heart of it, via the imperative not only to bring sociological perspectives 
to neuroscientific and genetic/genomic research, but to ensure that 
‘patient/service user’ perspectives were heard. We also emphasize the 
emergence of research centres challenging the decades-long standoff 
between large parts of the sociological and the biological. The BIOS 
centre at the London School of Economics (established and directed by 
Nikolas Rose, which has now become the Department of Social Science, 
Health & Medicine at King’s College London), and the Interacting Minds 
Centre at Aarhus University (directed by Andreas Roepstorff) have been 
foundational to the work that we and many of our collaborators have 
carried out.
A crowded and jostling international university environment, in 
which there are increasingly intense demands to acquire external grant 
funding, has also helped foment interest in establishing cross- and inter-
disciplinary projects that sit outside of particular departments and disci-
plines. This demand has dovetailed with the decision by major funders 
(e.g. The Wellcome Trust and the Volkswagen Foundation) to develop 
funding streams that would support research programmes bringing 
humanities scholars and interpretive social scientists into much closer 
proximity with life scientists. We also need to mention, at least for our 
own particular trajectories, the invigoration of the field and purpose of 
medical humanities within the United Kingdom, which is also, in part, a 
story about the reconfiguration of the favoured place of medical history 
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and of medical sociology in relation to biomedicine. For the emergence 
of Hubbub, the Centre for Medical Humanities at Durham University – 
where FC took up a permanent position in 2012 – is important as a node 
in an increasingly international network of interdisciplinary centres 
advancing collaborative work across the life sciences, health sciences, 
humanities, and social sciences (e.g. Atkinson et al. 2015; Viney, Callard, 
and Woods 2015).
Finally, it is no coincidence that the accounts of emerging interdisci-
plinarity that we have given in this chapter, and throughout this volume, 
move in lockstep with a rapidly changing and increasingly dense tech-
nological ecology for collaborative writing and thinking. Such an ecol-
ogy is characterized by divergent temporalities and purposes to which 
each part of it is put to use. The changing shape of this ecology has 
been central to helping open out possibilities for collaboration – across 
geographical and disciplinary terrains – whose trajectories we have 
described in this chapter. FC remembers the first time she completed a 
co-authored article with a scientific collaborator, in which Dropbox (a 
file hosting service, introduced to her by her collaborator, that provides 
cloud storage and file synchronization), to her, seemed almost like a 
third author; for her collaborator, on the other hand, she inferred that 
this was a technology that was already so assimilated that it was on the 
point of being old-fashioned. While scholars such as Ben Kafka have 
analysed the historical role and nature of paper as central to the opera-
tions of bureaucracy (Kafka 2012), it is not clear whether there is, yet, any 
adequate account of how intimately current practices of writing, talking, 
storing, tracing, joking, and fighting through and across platforms such 
as Google Hangouts and Google Docs, Skype, Slack, Dropbox, Twitter, 
Zotero, and so on are bound up with the changing shapes of collabora-
tion, non-collaboration and interdisciplinarity. It has been striking, in the 
trajectories that built towards Hubbub (as well as those ongoing dynam-
ics within it), to note how there is no straightforward way in which one 
can map ease and interest in the use of particular media on to particular 
disciplinary allegiances. Here, then, unexpected media topologies – in 
which collaborators from very different disciplines might come together 
around common commitments to particular ways of sharing, commu-
nicating, or keeping to oneself – are produced that run counter to usual 
stories of epistemological differences that require a ‘reaching across’ 
disciplinary boundaries. How both we and our collaborators have agreed 
(keenly or reluctantly), or not, to communicate via particular kinds of 
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media has told us a great deal, not only about the heterogeneity of intra- 
as well as interdisciplinary commitments and backgrounds, but about 
different visions of what collaboration, loss of control, exchange, shared 
labour, incorporation of ideas, and writing, itself, might mean.
‘We’ve now split  ...’
In presenting, here, particular narratives of how things emerge, we 
might have given the (false) impression that the hard work of establish-
ing, and persisting with, interdisciplinary collaborations was largely in 
the (pre-Hubbub) past. Let us emphasize, then, in closing, the ongo-
ing challenges that characterize any space in which collaborators with 
very different sets of expertise, as well as different understandings and 
practices of interdisciplinarity, work together. There is, we both believe, 
no singular direction of travel within Hubbub. Our collaborators do not 
have a shared vision of what the purpose or telos of interdisciplinarity 
might be, nor what the appropriate working methods are for engaging in 
such interdisciplinary collaboration. They – and we – are undoubtedly 
working with a variety of needs, logics, ontologies, and practices (Barry, 
Born, and Weszkalnys 2008). Consider this short note, taken by one of 
the present authors (DF) during an early project meeting (all errors of 
typography and syntax are from the original):
Kind of feels like the psychologists are having a conversation among  ?
themselves ... . – what happened to the larger questions we started 
with? This is how it tend to go; we start off with something high-level, 
then the psychologists start talking through what they imagine to be 
the pragmatics ... and suddenly we’re having a conversation about the 
parameters of having a psychological study.
The issue i have is that in rooms that are dominated by psychology/ ?
psychologists (> 50 in this room) i always feel obloged to represnet and 
then get fiured as representing – all the things that are not psychology. 
And that’s an impossible position, so you aways end up syang very broad 
& silly things.
We’ve now split [ ... ] [Person X] has said that what holds [out half of the  ?
split] together is the willingness to defer ontological commitments, which 
i thnk he’s basically right about – but this seems to have caused a little bit 
of confusion controversy.
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[ ... ] ?
afte lunch we;ve split – the psychologsts have all [gone] to work [on their  ?
own] – te rest of us have have stayed in the room to [ ... ] The thing is 
totally split at this point. [Person Y] asks (rightly) what does it mean for 
the project that we’ve all split off like this??
[Later, Person Z] interestingly insisting that if we force a top-dwon  ?
interdisicplinarity, it’ll be a total balls (and why we’ve been having 
this endless discussion [ ... ] going around in circles); the best thing 
is to let people just do what they’re good at, and then (a) trust ID 
[interdisciplinary] stuff to bubble up from the talented poeple we have; 
(b) have some curation at the top.
What to make of this? For a start, let’s notice how epistemological and 
ontological difference plays out spatially (some collaborators physically 
leave the room), affectively (note the documenter’s own irritation, as 
well as the implication that those moments of controversy have become 
fraught across the whole group), and through an unequal dynamics of 
epistemological power (i.e. psychology’s perceived chauvinism, which, 
on the documenter’s account, allows a rapid pull away from the ‘high-
level’ and a turn to the ‘parameters of [ ... ] a psychological study’). What 
rings out from the note is the author’s jaundiced account of what is at 
stake for psychologists – as well as his juvenile sense of frustration at 
being part of a conversation that felt as though it were dominated by the 
normative commitments of that discipline. But if the details are fuzzy 
(in fact, not all scientists left the room), the feelings expressed here are 
real enough. The point is not about ‘psychology’ or ‘psychologists’ (a 
category, in any event, poorly described in this note) but about some 
in-the-moment sensations through which logics of collaboration, even 
in as tight an assemblage as this one, are both produced and experienced. 
Needless to say, the collaborators positioned as ‘psychologists’ (they were 
not even all psychologists) have their own accounts of this episode. As 
one put it to us, on reading the above extract:
It was a very productive and interesting discussion, although I remember being 
powerfully reminded of some of the disciplinary differences. I like to think that we 
psychologists are aware of the endless possibilities for defining and critiquing terms, 
but it’s also true that our instinct is to get on and do stuff, even if the conceptual 
framework is not perfect. I remember thinking, My God, how does anything ever get 
done, if we’re going to argue at every step about whether everything we want to say 
is equally applicable to all strata of society? How do these (lovely, smart) people ever 
finish anything?!
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Another psychologist who was present on the day remembers it like 
this:
My recollection of the day is that after hours and hours of nothing getting decided, 
and this being our only chance all together to get the planning done that the whole 
group decided the only way to do it was to split into two groups, but that’s just my 
memory of it ... Of course I do see that the problem for interdisciplinarity here was 
that all the psychologists chose the practical planning group and everyone else chose 
the discussion group. So we all conformed to the various stereotypes. I do have to 
wonder whether the [project in question] would be at the advanced stage that it’s at 
today, if the group had stayed as one?
Here then, even as the three accounts diverge markedly in what 
happened, there is, at least to our eyes, a way in which the discipline of 
psychology, here, is positioned – or imagines itself to be – as more prag-
matic than the other disciplines. We are reminded that, even in Hubbub, 
which is an endeavour in many ways defined by its successes, disagree-
ment abounds. Feelings can run high. Very different ideas of the stakes 
of the project, as well as the modes of investigation appropriate to it, run 
headlong into one another. If the split in the above meeting was tempo-
rary, and indeed productive, we believe, for the research of Hubbub as 
a whole, we remind ourselves of the thin sutures that continue to hold 
interdisciplinary collaborative projects together. We remain deeply alive 
to our own capacity, at any moment, to come undone.
Notes and Queries: 4
Q: What is the most important element of an interdisciplinary project? 
The idea? The people? The funder? The level of institutional support? 
What should I be really looking for – an excellent proposal or a brilliant 
collaborator?
This is an area where our experience tends to run against the 
usual advice. Typically what people will say is that the problem 
should come first. And so, good interdisciplinarity happens when, 
for example, a philosopher has a conception of free will that can 
be empirically tested, and he (in analytic philosophy, it almost 
certainly is a he) runs into a neuroscientist who has methods that 
can perform that empirical test – and who, in turn, has some ideas 
about free will that could do with some conceptual refinement. This 
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is fine, of course – but like so much else in the interdisciplinary 
field, it is predicated on a potentially unrealistic idea of how intel-
lectual work actually happens. FC and her neuroscientific collabo-
rator started working on rest, for example, because they liked one 
another, and shared some basic intuitions. ‘Rest’ was also a point 
that FC loosely had in common with James Wilkes, the poet she 
met at a funding open day, and they liked each other too – so that 
started to become the topic of the project. Moreover, FC was only in 
that room because she had some support from Durham University 
to put something together for The Wellcome Trust Hub award – 
which is to say, the support, like the desire for collaboration, came 
before the question. DF assembled the urban brain project (see 
Chapter 3) with Nikolas Rose and Ilina Singh because the three of 
them were thinking through their shared intuitions on sociology 
and biology; again, the decision to collaborate on these intuitions 
came before the identification of the actual research question. The 
point is that there is no right way to develop an interdisciplinary 
collaboration, and no correct order that the different elements must 
come in – interdisciplinary projects, like all intellectual work, are 
always loose assemblages with strange temporalities. If you have a 
really good idea, and you need someone from another discipline to 
help you with it – that’s great. But don’t be anxious if you just want 
to collaborate because you like someone, or you might get some 
support from your university if you do. The problem will emerge: 
there’s no particular reason it has to emerge first.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Choreographing the 
Interdisciplinary
Abstract: Interdisciplinary works tends to have an inbuilt 
spatial logic, based, for example, on the model of the ‘layer 
cake’ – in which each layer encompasses a specific, tightly-
bounded domain. This chapter is about distributions of space 
and time in interdisciplinary projects, and a critique of the 
dominant spatial logics and metaphors that often prop up 
interdisciplinary endeavours. Against such imaginaries, the 
chapter sets out four alternatives for rethinking the space 
of interdisciplinarity: matrices, topologies, incorporations, 
laboratories. The chapter positions these alternatives as ways 
of imagining interdisciplinary space, beyond the logic of 
fiefdom that now predominates.
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Introduction
The distribution and use of space and time is a surprisingly potent – and 
fraught – topic in interdisciplinary projects. Funders, institutions, and 
researchers are increasingly paying attention to how physical buildings 
and centres might facilitate, or inhibit, interdisciplinary exchange (Dzeng 
2013). One of us (DF), for example, spent almost a year at the expressly 
interdisciplinary Interacting Minds Centre at Aarhus University 
(Interacting Minds Centre 2014), where doorless, all-glass offices 
fostered a sense of free movement and exchange. The Hub at Wellcome 
Collection, in which we have written this book, was explicitly designed 
to facilitate collaborative, interdisciplinary interaction. Similarly, people 
collaborating at a distance from one another will often place a premium 
on having tools and funds for getting themselves into a shared space, 
whether physically or virtually. These are important issues, of course. 
And yet, over the years that we have been moving through diverse 
interdisciplinary landscapes, we have come to realize that the spatial 
logic of interdisciplinarity isn’t only about the physical arrangement of 
offices and corridors: it’s also about the careful (though often unspoken) 
arrangement of people, objects, ideas, technologies, and media in rela-
tion to one another. It’s about the choreography – the ‘deftly balanced 
coming together of things that are generally considered parts of different 
ontological orders’ (Thompson 2005, 8) – through which those things 
are induced to relate to one another, as well as the habits and modes of 
comportment that, sometimes, prevent those people and things from 
getting too close.
In this chapter, we will be concerned with space in both senses (as 
physical entity and as choreography) – but we will pay closer attention 
to the second. Because it is precisely this tacit choreography, this highly 
elaborated dance of movement and fixture, we claim, that governs the 
distribution and use of time and space in interdisciplinary projects. Over 
the years that we have spent in interdisciplinary spaces that address the 
mind and the brain, we have become convinced, first, that the logic of the 
prefix ‘inter-’ tends to lie at the heart of those arrangements and chore-
ographies, and second, that that prefix acts as a serious hindrance to 
the kind of research that might be done across the neurosciences, social 
sciences, and humanities. Indeed, this deceptively harmless prefix tends 
to govern the suturing of discipline to discipline (often via a particular 
way of envisaging how experiment is best put into practice), and has 
Choreographing the Interdisciplinary
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0008
significantly constrained how interdisciplinary research in this area is 
both imagined and conducted. ‘Far from being opposed to disciplinar-
ity’, Thomas Osborne points out, ‘interdisciplinarity assumes a certain 
consciousness of disciplinarity as a condition for its accomplishment’ 
(Osborne 2013, 82; our emphasis). The problem for us with the prefix 
inter- is that it denotes both spatial and temporal ‘betweens’: it hence 
locates the point of interest between intervals of time, and between parts 
of things. The concept of interdisciplinarity, as it is currently practised, 
thus carries within it a very particular model of spatial and temporal 
relations – as if there were a chessboard of disciplines, weaving in and 
out of one another, but never occupying the same, uneven ground.
We want to break the spatial and temporal structure assumed by 
the inter- of interdisciplinarity. In its place, and drawing on our own 
experiences, we open other ways of imagining and unfolding the – in 
fact – much more tangled and patterned world of complex relations, 
and non-relations, between human and non-human entities, as well 
as between the various domains of knowledge that attempt to address 
them. For it is that tangled world – with its heterogeneous rhythms and 
mysterious arrangements – that is what those calling for interdisciplinary 
research involving the neurosciences and social sciences are attempting 
to understand and to intervene upon, even as they sometimes tend their 
own epistemologically bounded spaces. We are certainly not arguing 
that interdisciplinarity is found in just one form (for various examples of 
the heterogeneity of forms, see Schaffer 2013). As Barry and Born have 
noted, the question, rather, is: ‘How might one understand interdiscipli-
narity less as a unity and more as a field of differences, a multiplicity?’ 
(Barry and Born 2013, 5). Still, we argue that to understand the complex-
ity of brain–mind–body–environment relations, we need to jettison the 
spatial logics of the inter- if we are at all to make good on the promise 
that interdisciplinarity holds. In so doing, we work neither with a fantasy 
of pure, prior disciplines that the logic of the inter- attempts to make 
concrete (see also Osborne 2013), nor with an integrative vision in which 
different disciplines are tugged ever-closer to one another (see also 
Fitzgerald and Callard forthcoming). We ask our readers to join us on in 
departing from the temporal frameworks and spatial strictures to which 
so many of today’s practices of interdisciplinarity remain sadly tethered.
In this chapter, we are particularly preoccupied with the scales, rela-
tionalities, patterns, rhythms and voids that might be useful for under-
standing practices of interdisciplinarity, once we have abandoned spatial 
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logics that privilege either what happens ‘between’ disciplines, or that 
are premised on working towards their future integration. We reflect on 
the spaces, times, and rhythms – material and conceptual – that we have 
found most generative, in terms of fomenting epistemological excite-
ment and novel ways of practising collaboration. Here, as everywhere 
in this volume, one of our primary concerns is with developing new 
forms of experimental practice that also comprise, simultaneously, new 
forms for thinking around and with problems. Collaboration, is, for us, 
‘a distinctive and changeable set of practices, an object of enquiry, a field 
of dispositions, a relation of power, an intervention in a space, a set of 
affective and embodied comportments’ (Callard, Fitzgerald, and Woods 
2015, 4): how one envisages and organizes collaboration, then, is far from 
inconsequential in shaping how both experiment, and thinking with and 
through others’ concerns and models, might take place. But acknowledg-
ing and bringing to the foreground richer and less predictable accounts 
of the spaces and times in which collaboration across disciplines might 
take place is no easy task. Before rooting some of those accounts out, 
we first self-consciously divest ourselves of what we believe to be some 
of the more unhelpful assumptions about the ‘proper’ space and time 
of and for interdisciplinarity that we have – repeatedly – witnessed and 
experienced.
Have you got a neuroscientist yet?
Consider the vignette with which we started this book (see the 
Introduction), in which our group had not (yet) acquired the indispen-
sable neuroscientist. What does this vignette reveal? In retrospect, we 
realized that it exemplified the way in which a particular vision of inter-
disciplinarity involving the mind sciences, life sciences, social sciences, 
and humanities was being assumed – by funders, by institutions, and 
by many of those (including, at times, the two of us) who are gathering 
in this field. It carries strong prescriptions about what interdisciplinary 
research in this field is, how it should be carried out, whom it ought to 
enrol, what role each member of the team should perform in relation 
to the others, and what kinds of results should emerge from it. There 
ought to be a scientific experiment. The experiment should take place 
in a laboratory. It will, most likely, involve a scanner. (Increasingly, in 
our experience, fMRI is regarded as the default option, though positron 
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emission tomography (PET), electroencephalography (EEG), and other 
technologies are of course also possible.) The cognitive neuroscientist 
should be on hand to conduct the experiment and process the data; the 
psychologist should take charge of fine-tuning the protocol (sometimes 
the neuroscientist and the cognitive psychologist are subsumed within 
one person); the bioethicist should be there to soothe our consciences 
about any ethical implications of the study; the social scientist should be 
there to help assess the suitability of the sample and to comment on the 
generalizability of the findings; the philosopher should be there to ensure 
rigorous parsing and application of constructs (and to make the tea). The 
most important data to emerge are those produced through the coming 
together of the human experimental subject(s) and the scanner; these 
should be published in a neuroscientific journal (though ancillary publi-
cations that address other disciplines’ concerns are of course welcomed).
In short: what emerges here is a spatial imaginary centred on the model 
of a multi- (rather than inter-) disciplinary mix, a mix that will establish, 
it is hoped, a methodological and conceptual ‘layer cake’. (We are employ-
ing here the usual distinction between the multi-disciplinary, in which 
disciplines line up alongside one another, from the interdisciplinary, 
which usually carries some commitment towards creating emergent, and 
novel forms of knowledge different from those contained within any one 
discipline.) Within this layer cake, each disciplinary layer has dominion 
over a particular kind of expertise, particular methods, and particular 
objects of knowledge. You can see this play out in numerous published 
interdisciplinary books and studies that address the mind and brain (see 
e.g. Goldman 2006; Slaby and Gallagher 2015). Joseph Dumit, we should 
note, has provided a powerful analysis of how cognitive psychology was 
brought into contact with PET to produce the interdisciplinary layer 
cake that became the foundation of the interdisciplinary field of cogni-
tive neuroscience (Dumit 2004). We should not be unduly surprised, 
therefore, that the layer cake functions as the buttressing logic for other 
interdisciplinary endeavours involving the brain and mind.
There are a few examples that depart from the layer cake genre. 
Roepstorff and Frith, for example, in elaborating a model of experimen-
tal anthropology ‘as a method, as an object of study and as a research 
aesthetic’, argue that joint engagement (doing things together) in research 
projects across the disciplines leads to the need for researchers of all 
stripes then to ‘be sensitive both to the type of facts and the types of 
contexts produced by going experimental’ (Roepstorff and Frith 2012, 
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108). The dominance of the layer cake model, however, means that the 
methods and technologies of cognitive neuroscience tend to be endowed 
with a particular luminosity and generativity. And we emphasize that it 
is often social scientists and humanities scholars, rather than neuroscientists 
themselves, who manifest the greatest enthusiasm in doing so. In short, it is the 
brain scanning technology (of whatever kind) that ends up being granted 
the most substantial epistemological value (which nicely sits alongside its 
substantial economic weight). Experts from other disciplines can help to 
fine-tune, interpret, or contextualize what goes into it, and what comes 
out of it, but the work that the scanner does is where the real action is.
Such a model tends, at the same time, to embed a particular temporal-
ity at the heart of interdisciplinary labours in this arena. As soon as the 
cognitive neuroscientific fMRI study is installed as the groundwork of 
the collaboration, all are constrained by two particular timelines. First: 
when is the scanner available? (This is always a vexed question.) Second: 
how lengthy will the period of recruitment need to be to find people to 
insert into the scanner? The difficulty with this model is that its spatial 
and temporal characteristics occlude the multiple other modes through 
which collaborations might unfold, and through which interventions – 
into existing literatures, and into the worlds of experimentation and 
investigation – might take place. What would it mean to conduct an 
interdisciplinary experiment that did not orient itself around the tempo-
ral logic of scanner availability? What if the scanner had to wait, instead, 
on the very different – but no less fraught – timekeeping that is inherent 
to the ethnographic method? What if an interdisciplinary workshop, 
which had been initially planned so as to fine-tune the constructs 
under investigation in the forthcoming neuroimaging study, ended up 
determining that a neuroimaging experiment were not necessarily the 
most appropriate kind of experimental procedure to engage in? What 
if philosophers were freed up – and freed themselves up – to do more 
than maintain the conceptual rigour of psychological constructs? (For 
one example of this, see Haueis 2014.)
Good fences make good neighbours
“No: I don’t agree with your account of the permeability of disciplines, one 
to the other, at all. I do think that good fences make good neighbours.”
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Both of us were at the workshop at which a highly regarded interdisci-
plinary researcher conveyed this strong account of appropriate interdis-
ciplinary practice – one that defended disciplinary turfs and disciplinary 
expertise. The sentence above was spoken after one of us (FC) had coun-
tered what she interpreted as the academic’s territorialized landscape 
of interdisciplinarity with a question about the untoward relationalities 
unfurled by postcolonial studies – as well as by other interdisciplinary 
theoretical domains that have been committed to queering the pitch of 
orthodox histories and geographies. In many ways, we understood this 
researcher’s response. In calling for interdisciplinarity, no one wants to 
be misunderstood as championing sloppiness, and few, we imagine, want 
to be interpellated as the inevitable jack of all trades and master of none. 
We certainly would not want to find ourselves endorsing, say, an analyti-
cal philosopher who planned to get by in an interdisciplinary project, 
untrained, as a sociologist; we do not wish to champion an anthropolo-
gist who imagines she can, in a trice, become a conceptual artist. But 
in this chapter we want, nonetheless, to challenge the spatial logic of 
fences and neighbours – and the specific forms of territory it brings 
into being. Here is discipline thought through the figure of the happy 
householder – willing to reach over the fence, for sure, but still very keen 
to maintain a proper sense of where the boundaries lie. Indeed, there 
is an important claim embedded in this metaphor (and one hears it all 
the time) of good fences, insofar as it dramatizes what is still sometimes 
an unquestioned assumption about the primacy of the private space of 
disciplinary training.
Whatever our – and your – feelings about private property might be, 
it strikes us that there is a pernicious notion, embedded here, that maps 
intellectual inquiry on to the taken-for-granted boundaries of relation-
ships between public and private space. (In this regard, we find it intrigu-
ing that many writings that address cross-disciplinarity employ language 
that conjures private property relations. We might turn, for example, 
to the philosopher Brian Massumi, who discusses the ‘poaching’ of a 
scientific concept (which, moreover, on his account, does not result in 
‘prevent[ing] it from continuing to function in its home environment’, 
and who maintains that if he ‘were a concept, [he] could emigrate and 
stay behind in [his] home country’ [italics in original] (Massumi 2002, 
21)); or to Thomas Osborne, who describes interdisciplinary move-
ments via languages of poaching and trespass (Osborne 2013).) What 
would change, for the kinds of projects that we are trying to bring into 
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being, if we were to think though very different accounts of property, of 
home, of migration, of arrangement, and of distinction? What if we were 
to recall, for example, the commons that preceded those strong fences? 
What if we were to turn to forms of community relation, and of being-
in-common, that refused – for good and for ill – the always-assumed 
bourgeois propriety of neighbourliness?
After fiefdom
In her analysis of the intellectual terrain marked out by the term 
‘American Studies’, literary studies scholar Wai Chee Dimock demon-
strates how a ‘fiefdom’ has been drawn under the first half of that term, 
such that the founding adjective American comes to ‘[govern] the domain 
of inquiry we construct, the range of questions we entertain, the kind of 
evidence we take as significant’ (Dimock 2001, 755). Does not the adjec-
tive ‘interdisciplinary’ do the same kind of demarcation work? Consider 
how that term, for example, constitutes itself as a place of intensity and 
the site of boundary transgression; consider also how it sets out a specific 
range of allowable – and not allowable – modes of investigation; and 
how it, in so doing, in fact occludes the congealed, compacted ‘interdis-
ciplinary’ peregrinations of those ‘disciplines’ from which it apparently 
draws. For, as Philippe Fontaine reminds us, the dominance of the 
image of ‘two cultures’ (sciences and humanities), marked by fences and 
boundary-points, has tended to elide the distinctive history of the social 
sciences as a particular culture – and, in particular, the development of 
a post-war social scientific culture that was intensely ‘cross-disciplinary’ 
in both its intentions and its practices (2015, 2; see also other essays in 
that special issue of Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences). As 
Fitzgerald, Rose, and Singh (forthcoming) have argued elsewhere, there 
is a far more entangled palette of relationships between, say, psychiatry 
and sociology, or between psychology and political science, than those 
imagined in orthodox accounts of ordered interdisciplinary exchange. 
Andrew Pickering, similarly, has pointed out that cybernetics, far from 
simply combining existing disciplines, ‘amounted to the explosion of a 
nonmodern ontological stance across, and beyond, the disciplinary map’ 
(Pickering 2013, 217).
How might such insights help us to rethink the spatial and temporal 
commitments of interdisciplinarity (as well as those of ‘disciplinarity’ 
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on which they are founded)? Can we, as Dimock suggests in another 
context, ‘draw a different input map of the world’ (2008, 29)? Elsewhere, 
we have proposed a rethinking of the interdisciplinary scene through a 
logic of ‘experimental entanglement’ – in an attempt to gesture at our 
shared realization that working across the social sciences, neurosciences, 
and humanities was not at all about figuring out how to move fences, or 
how to work across them; instead it was about recognizing how tangled 
were the roots into which those stakes were driven into in the first place 
(Fitzgerald and Callard 2015). In advancing the spatial dimensions of 
that conceptual move, we offer, below, four additional terms that help 
us to think about the patterning and arrangements of interdisciplinary 
entanglements. What we hope is that these might move all of our imagi-
naries away from that of the layer cake, or that they might spark, in some 
readers, new and allied terms of their own.
Matrices
The spatial logics that underpin the management of interdisciplinary 
projects tend to fall, we believe, into two, not mutually exclusive, 
categories: (1) a dominant principal investigator, looking down upon all 
the disciplinary ranks; and (2) fantasized – and ever thwarted – parity 
across these ranks. Both logics envisage interdisciplinarity through the 
efficient arrangement of different-but-equal silos – to use the manage-
ment cliché. A matrix, by contrast, opens up a very different kind of 
spatial and temporal imaginary – one that attends more closely to the 
‘organizational physiology’ of the project, to use Bartlett and Ghoshal’s 
(1990) evocative term. The term matrix carries long histories. Alongside 
its use as a designator of the womb, it denotes the environment in which 
something is created or developed; it is also variously employed within 
biology, pharmacology, mathematics, business, sociology, and political 
theory. What draws us, then, to this term, is its history of promiscuous 
movement across terrains of expertise and interest, and the manner in 
which it draws attention to the multiple ways in which to understand the 
processes and pressures of connection, support, embedding, binding, 
and generation.
In the history of organizational design, matrix structures were cham-
pioned, against the bureaucratized hierarchy of the post-war years, as 
ways of putting things and people together, around specific questions, 
with an attention to the quality of lateral relations – pointing out that 
the unidirectional flow of information ‘up’ to a single manager of a 
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single department stymies both communication and creativity (see e.g. 
Sayles 1976). If we replace the ‘manager’ with the ‘disciplinary expert’, the 
power of the matrix for rethinking logics of collaboration becomes clear. 
And we need not seek inspiration only in the management literature: the 
complex and variable ‘meshwork’ of proteins that make up the extracel-
lular matrix of animal tissue was once thought to be an ‘inert scaffold’, 
but is now thought to play ‘a far more active and complex role in regulat-
ing the behaviour of the cells that contact it, influencing their survival, 
development, migration, proliferation, shape and function’ (Alberts 
et al. 2002). It is worth thinking further about how working with and 
through matrices might afford new means through which collaborative 
interdisciplinary projects and relations might be set into motion. One 
example, here, is Hubbub, though Hubbub is far from being the only 
place that we could turn. Hubbub’s Core Group (the principal investiga-
tor and co-investigators of the research project) have attempted precisely 
to attend to this pliable meshwork, much more than the cells – or silos – 
themselves. Collaborators, from whichever discipline, are encouraged to 
self-organize as they like, and communicate amongst themselves; disci-
plinary experts neither form teams around projects, nor tend to act as 
gateways to the joining of projects. We would certainly not want to imply 
that the project exists without checkpoints in some magical, frictionless 
space: we are sure that many collaborators could enumerate multiple 
ways in which they are baulked from moving, playing and binding. But 
we still contend that what is most at stake, around any individual project 
within Hubbub, is not the specific expertise a person ‘brings’, but rather 
her capacity to fold into, and expand, a matrix that is developing around 
a particular question.
Topologies
Across the sciences, social sciences, and humanities, the topological 
has become, in recent decades, a particularly resonant mode through 
which to map the enfolding relations that enjoin entities and constitute 
dynamics. Researchers in this mode draw upon topological theories, as 
they have emerged in the mathematics of continuous space, to think 
more broadly about the ways in which (as a series of events on ‘topol-
ogy’ as Tate Modern put it) ‘static ideas of space as a container [might 
be] replaced by understandings of movement-space, of multiplicity, 
differentiation and exclusive inclusion that in turn have led to new 
ideas of power, subjectivity, and creativity’ (Tate 2012). As Celia Lury 
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and colleagues have argued, ‘topology is now emergent in the practices 
of ordering, modelling, networking and mapping that co-constitute 
culture, technology and science’ (Lury, Parisi, and Terranova 2012, 5; our 
italics). The language of topology, as Martin and Secor have analysed, 
is one full of ‘flows, deformations, twists, folds, torsions, severations, 
and cuts’ – and thereby well positioned to be variously employed ‘as a 
metaphor, a heuristic device, an analytical approach, a figure, and an 
ontological relationship’ (Martin and Secor 2014, 421). We cannot but 
gesture here to the genealogies and theorizations of topology – which 
have dense histories in scientific, philosophical, social scientific, and 
psychoanalytic literatures.
We worry, then, that our invocation of the topological will function 
simply as yet more adulation for one of the terms du jour. But if we persist 
in mentioning topology, it is because the term points to the need to 
attend closely to how one registers, analyses, and represents the dynam-
ics, connections, breaks and transformations to which entities captured 
through a language of ‘the topological’ are subject. Those entities might 
be collaborative groups, experimental situations, or biosocial entities. 
What has been vital to this topological turn is attention to how nodes 
and edges are being defined: topological analyses are built around nodes 
and those connections that enjoin them. One way to think about this 
is to imagine how things might shift if different objects or technologies 
were set to fold into one another within interdisciplinary space – or if we 
brought to visibility often ignored nodes that might be present within 
the collaborative groups, experimental situations or biosocial entities 
under investigation. (One interesting example here is the ‘multispecies 
network analysis’ conducted by Michael Pettit and colleagues to under-
stand historical relations between scientists, their preferred experimental 
animals, and institutions during inter-war research on sexual behaviour, 
and hence to demonstrate the often unacknowledged importance of 
particular laboratory animals in the constitution of distinct discipli-
nary and institutional cultures (Pettit, Serykh, and Green 2015).) We 
are reminded, here, of some of the most imaginative interdisciplinary 
neuroscientific studies that have been conducted within the laboratory 
of Andreas Roepstorff at Aarhus University (a sometime collaborator 
of ours) – in which the edges of anthropological and neurobiological 
accounts of intersubjectivity are rendered continuous, with intellect 
and attention coming to rest on the forms of enjambment that might 
run them together (see e.g. Xygalatas et al. 2011). What distinguishes the 
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intensely interdisciplinary work of Roepstorff and his collaborators is 
precisely this attention to the space of continuity, and to the forms of 
nodularity and edgework (both inside and outside the scanner) through 
which those continuities are made empirically visible.
Incorporations
Psychoanalysis proposes very different accounts of relationality, social-
ity, and negativity from many of those found within social and cultural 
theory. We could not be further from a world of happy zones of neigh-
bourly exchange (or even from a world of carefully plotted poaching 
and trespass). What would it mean to think interdisciplinary spatialities 
and temporalities through, and with, the relationalities offered by Freud 
(or by many of those who followed him), instead of with the sanitized 
models of the ‘inter-’ that have colonized many formal and informal 
accounts of interdisciplinarity? For Freud, for example, incorporation 
marked the primitive wish to unite with, identify with, or cannibalisti-
cally annihilate an object. Within psychoanalysis more broadly, incor-
poration – theorized as a mode of ferocious identification – is one of the 
most foundational kinds of relationality (Laplanche and Pontalis 1968). 
It is this dynamic of ferocity and pleasure that distinguishes the spatial 
mode of incorporation. It is also a relational logic that is frequently at 
play within interdisciplinary projects, though its pleasures (and its 
dangers) are rarely acknowledged. Such a relational logic makes clear 
the indispensability of negativity in any account of relationality. Such 
indispensability has been perhaps made most clear by a dense braid of 
cultural-theoretical work in the humanities, which has been indebted 
both to Freud and to the foundational insights of queer theory (e.g. 
Edelman 2004). While much of this work has been quickly designated as 
‘anti-social’, we are more interested in how it deforms our usual under-
standings of social relations. As Elizabeth Wilson has argued:
negativity is intrinsic (rather than antagonistic) to sociality and subjectivity ... , 
and this makes a world of difference politically. This queer work isn’t antiso-
cial at all; rather, it wants to build theories that can stomach the fundamental 
involvement of negativity in sociality and subjectivity. (Wilson 2015, 6)
We have been keen in our research not to extrude negative, ferocious, 
and corrosive forms of relation and of sociality. (Outside of our empiri-
cal research within the interdisciplinary neuroscience–social science 
domain, one of us (FC) has been particularly interested in how these 
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problematics are recognized or ignored in the course of interdisciplinary 
‘transfers’ of terms and knowledges, for example: in the taming of psycho-
analysis within geography (Callard 2003); in the use of scientific models 
of affect within the humanities and social sciences (Papoulias and Callard 
2010); or in the strange disavowal of Freud’s uncanny relationalities in the 
nascent field of neuropsychoanalysis (Papoulias and Callard 2012).) We 
are also interested in our own desires for identification with the biologi-
cal – desires whose reasoned articulation (and we are sometimes not even 
capable of such articulation) always leaves us slightly unfulfilled.
Processes such as incorporation push us, in turn, to acknowledge how 
our collaborations do not bring us together as rational economic actors, 
across (what are thought to be) disciplinary lines, engaging in friendly 
exchange with our neighbours. We – and ‘we’ is employed broadly, here – 
are also propelled by preconscious and unconscious acts of ferocious 
identification with, ambivalence regarding, and envy of the other. The 
question then is: what kind of organizational and spatial logics might 
emerge from, or at least take account of, such unruly forms of relation? 
Or does this term remind us, rather, that there are (infantile, primitive) 
desires for proximity and ingestion that it might be as well to sate as to 
understand? How would our interactions with our collaborators change 
if we understood ourselves all to be variously constituted through and by 
ambivalence, envy, and ferocious acts of identification?
Laboratories
At least since the early work of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986), 
the laboratory – as a physical space, a set of procedures, and an arrange-
ment of people and things – has been the site of intense interest within 
the history of science, and science and technology studies. The labora-
tory, as Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer point out in their seminal 
account of the debate between Boyle and Hobbes (1989), emerged in the 
seventeenth century as a space of constrained tinkering, witnessing, and 
demonstrating; it has a specific history within the natural sciences that 
is not only much less obvious or necessary than is often imagined, but 
is a good deal less innocent too (Haraway 1997). Laboratory is a capa-
cious term, holding together not only a space of demonstration (e.g. 
the MRI suite) but also a norm of investigation (a laboratory science), 
as well as a highly contingent group (such as ‘my lab’) bound together 
around particular questions (see also Knorr Cetina 1992). But it is the 
choreography holding these different senses of laboratory together 
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that captures our attention here: a laboratory calls a group together; it 
directs attention to careful arrangements of humans and non-humans 
that make up a particular laboratory assemblage; and it sets out norms, 
within such an assemblage, for who must demonstrate, and who must 
witness, and from where they must do it in either case. Additionally, 
laboratories, as the historian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has 
argued, pose the question of how experimental knowledge is captured 
through various modes of writing, tracing, and recording: ‘[r]eduction 
to a surface facilitates exploration of new ways of ordering and arranging 
data: sequential events can be presented in synchronic form’. Rheinberger 
asks, furthermore, whether there might be ‘ “collective” equivalents of 
such individual forms of scientific note-taking and write-ups’, such that 
one might discern collaborative graphic traces that might tell us not only 
about the cultures of a particular laboratory, but might provoke new 
research questions (Rheinberger 2010, 251). What might this mean for 
practices of collaborative interdisciplinarity across the neurosciences, 
social sciences, and humanities? (We are particularly gripped by this 
question, given that we are currently collaborating with many research-
ers from the humanities and the arts, for whom graphic traces are central 
to their own experimental practices.)
Lately, such a choreography has been invoked by a range of interdis-
ciplinary centres, such as the MIT Media Lab, the Urban Laboratory at 
University College London, or the Culture Lab at Newcastle University. 
One of us (DF) worked on a project that calls itself an ‘urban brain lab’, 
where the word is invoked precisely to associate with a particular kind 
of, and normative commitment to, proximity with others and their 
work – viz. a cathexis of people, disciplines, and interests in which the 
arrangement of those elements is prioritized above each individual’s 
intellectual histories. One might see similar commitment in the various 
groupings that have described themselves as ‘collaboratories’ (see e.g. 
Collier n.d.). If ‘laboratory’ is a troubled term for many social scientists, 
it is not a ludicrous one. Spatially and temporally, one of its greatest 
advantages is that it moves us beyond many of the fantasies that many 
social scientists orient themselves towards (such as the ‘the interpretive 
and authorial virtuosity of an individual’, as Andrew Lakoff and his 
colleagues have argued (Lakoff, Collier, and Rabinow 2006, 5)). What 
would it meant to reimagine ourselves as co-workers experimenting 
and scribbling in a laboratory, rather than neighbours talking over a 
fence?
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Into the void
The atmosphere was one of a strained energetics: all of us, delegates at an inter-
disciplinary workshop, were wanting – in fact, longing – to find points of connec-
tion and reassurance across what might have been seen as yawning disciplinary 
divides. Our expertise stretched from early medieval history, to early modern 
history, to cognitive psychology, to medical humanities, to geography. Each of us, 
in the course of the workshop, had been plunged, during talks, into the strange 
alterity of worlds and modes of academic presentation very different from our 
own; many in the room had discerned wonderful and startling connections 
between accounts of people’s sensory perceptions in different time periods, and 
current models in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience to investigate 
those phenomena. Delegates frequently used phrases such as ‘this reminds me of 
something from my own field’; ‘this resonates with a concept from my discipline’; 
‘it seems to be the same formulation’. Felicity began to wonder if we weren’t all 
working rather too hard, and if there might not be something to be said, ulti-
mately, for sometimes not connecting.
In this chapter, we have worked with and through some of the spatio-
temporal imaginaries through which researchers might plot as well as 
practise interdisciplinary research. We have used four terms (which are 
also, and variously, phenomena, constructs, abstractions, and metaphori-
cal resources) to open up ways of conceptualizing the spatial organization 
of interdisciplinarity that push beyond those indebted to particular ways 
of carving territory and terrain, and that centre on producing connec-
tion, entanglement, and ingestion in the collaborative sphere.
Yet one important problem remains. In the current impetus towards 
collaboration, there is, we suggest, an implicit normative assumption of 
connection itself, and indeed of relationality as such. What happens to 
collaboration when connection is impossible to refuse? What becomes of 
those ontological and epistemological voids – which is to say, those spaces 
and temporalities that cannot be produced or even glimpsed within the 
current dispensation? Paul Harrison has argued, in response to the inter-
est across a number of disciplines in ‘relation’ and ‘relationality’ (and here 
our earlier invocations of matrices and topologies are two such instances), 
that the question of the non-relational is at threat of occlusion:
it seems to me that in the proliferation of biophilosophy, the unstoppable 
materialisation of actor networks and constructivist totalisations of the social 
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or the cultural, few have been asking about breaks and gaps, interruptions 
and intervals, caesuras and tears. (Harrison 2007, 592)
For Harrison, much more work is required to think through what is 
‘meant by the term “relation” ’ if we are not simply to produce a ‘quan-
titatively expanded sociospatial imaginary rather than a shift towards 
the appreciation of intervallic topologies, complex figures, and diverse 
phrases and regimens’ (Harrison 2007, 590). Consider, in this respect, 
the nascent interdisciplinary field of neuropsychoanalysis (Panksepp 
and Solms 2011). That field has founded itself on the conviction that it is 
possible to bring together psychoanalysis, (certain kinds of cognitive and 
affective) neuroscience, and evolutionary biology. But what gets missed, 
in such an insistence, are precisely the things that might not go together. 
Consider, for example, against that insistence, Jean Laplanche’s readings 
of Freud (e.g. Laplanche 1989), which force to the surface the impossibil-
ity of making Freud’s account ‘consonant with a model of the organism 
that is centred around adaptive need’ (Papoulias and Callard 2012, 211). 
We retain an anxiety that our focus on spatial logics of collaboration is 
already a refusal of this impossibility. We want to learn to collaborate in 
a world that is constituted as much through voids and non-relation as 
through contact and relation.
Notes & Queries: 5
Q: What kinds of people do I need for an interdisciplinary project involv-
ing the neurosciences, social sciences (and, perhaps, the humanities)? 
How do I arrange them?
A: This is a complex question – and one that opens in multiple 
directions, depending on the kind of phenomena you want to 
investigate, and the kinds of research you are interested in conduct-
ing. We wouldn’t for a moment want to imply that one can specify 
in advance the kinds of people one would need without attending 
to the particularities of a potential project. What we would say, 
however – and this is in the interests of departing from the ‘layer 
cake’ model we have described in this chapter – is that it’s worth 
thinking carefully before you decide you ‘need’ a psychologist, or 
an anthropologist, or a sociologist, or a cognitive neuroscientist, or 
a clinical researcher to make your interdisciplinary project work. It 
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might be helpful to explore the function that this initially perceived 
‘need’ is serving and to disarticulate expertise in particular methods 
(performing statistical regressions; translating medieval Latin texts) 
from expertise in a discipline. There is also the important question 
of how appropriate expertise to take part in an interdisciplinary 
project does not necessarily map neatly on to seniority.
In many of the interdisciplinary projects in which we have been 
involved, we have been struck by: (1) what emerges – what topologi-
cal relations unfold – from having people in the room with expertise 
in disciplines not commonly regarded as central to interdiscipli-
nary neuroscientific projects (e.g. a poet, a medieval historian, a 
composer); (2) the torqueing of various disciplinary or discursive 
assumptions when the project includes people with varied disci-
plinary trainings (e.g. we are thinking of one of our collaborators 
who has expertise in computer science, anthropology, science and 
technology studies, and the history of science).
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Against Reciprocity: 
Dynamics of Power in 
Interdisciplinary Spaces
Abstract: All too often, ‘reciprocity’ emerges as the (imagined) 
organizing logic of interdisciplinary collaboration – with 
collaborators invited to forms of mutuality, fair exchange, 
and so on. In this chapter, we show what is missing from 
this analysis, which is any account of power. The chapter 
thus takes up an analysis of how power works in an 
interdisciplinary space – setting out, in particular, some of 
the different financial, epistemic, and cultural resources that 
belong to different disciplines. But if the chapter sets itself 
against one fantasy (fair exchange), it also wants to dispel 
another – and this is the fantasy of power confronted by the 
frankly-spoken truth. The chapter argues instead for what 
it might mean to think interdisciplinary collaboration as a 
practice of subjugation, which different collaborators may just 
have to learn to live with.
Keywords: collaboration; interdisciplinarity; power; 
subjugation; trading zones
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Introduction
The familiar register of exhortations to interdisciplinarity – mutuality! 
reciprocity! exchange! – is one that assumes that differentials of power 
do not exist. And yet, for many people from the humanities and social 
sciences – and we are thinking quite beyond our own collaborations 
here – experiencing one’s role in a collaboration with life scientists as a 
relatively powerless one undercuts these kinds of exhortations. Go to the 
bar at any science and technology studies conference, and it won’t take 
too many drinks before social scientists start telling you about how their 
research is often understood as ‘public engagement’; how they consist-
ently have to justify their expertise to their collaborators; how they have 
to translate (or sometimes give up on) their conceptual language in a 
way that is not always reciprocated, and so on. This doesn’t mean that 
life scientists in collaborations are especially power-hungry; or that 
they behave badly (no doubt most would be surprised and taken aback 
to learn that their collaborators would narrate their experience in such 
ways). But it is to say that when a group of people collaborate within 
institutional structures that end up placing the more highly valued epis-
temological frameworks, as well as financial resources, largely on one 
side, then asymmetries result.
Even among – and perhaps especially among – the most well-meaning 
people, such asymmetries can produce some unlovely relations. It is 
important to note that such relations are rarely, if ever, explicitly endorsed 
by collaborating life scientists, and life scientists themselves often do not 
gain from them. Indeed, to the extent that interdisciplinary asymmetries 
of power can produce silences and absences, there is a significant risk that 
they reduce the space for the complex collaborative entanglements that 
motivate many scientific collaborators in the first place. Perhaps more 
importantly, and this is perhaps not always so visible to collaborators, 
even if natural scientists in particular collaborations may appear to hold 
all the power, those scientists themselves are subject to precisely the same 
asymmetries, when they reenter a larger prestige economy that might 
mark their collaborations with social scientists or humanities scholars 
as decidedly low-value contributions. And this is to say nothing of the 
way that natural scientists may experience a more subtle asymmetry, as 
they get pinioned by the philosopher’s or literary theorist’s rhetorical 
monopoly on, and their own explicit exclusion from, what it means to 
think ‘critically’. (Indeed, we have lost track of the number of times we 
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have heard humanities scholars and interpretive social scientists lament 
the naivety of scientists for having the temerity to proceed as if the world 
were real, or for going ahead with experiments that are patently ‘reduc-
tionistic’ of the phenomena they are studying, as though the scientists 
haven’t thought long and hard about which kinds of reduction might 
be most potent in the particular experimental situation in which they 
find themselves.) It is true that we are two social scientists who have, at 
times, found ourselves on the wrong end of such relations, and we will 
not deny that this chapter is significantly motivated by our own desires 
to understand and think those relations as we have felt them. Still, even 
as we emphasize the partiality of our account, we insist that such an 
interpretive labour is vital for the collaborating natural scientist too.
In what follows, then, we think through relations of power in inter-
disciplinary research projects that bring the biosciences and the social 
sciences into intimacy with one another. We will be concerned not so 
much with providing a rich sociological account of how power operates 
in collaborative projects, but, rather, with the ways in which significantly 
interdisciplinary research in those spaces is produced through structures 
of power that position different people, and objects, and ideas, in very 
specific ways. At the heart of the chapter is an attempt to show that 
interdisciplinarity is entangled in much thicker structures of power 
than either its promoters or its practitioners are willing to recognize. We 
hope that that it is clear, already, that what follows is not a screed about 
the fantastic power of neuroscience. (Nor do we want to be misread as 
wilfully ignoring the multiple and diverse instances of generosity, and 
laborious work on our behalf, that our collaborators have shown towards 
us.) Even as we work through our own, often fraught, relationship with 
what we experience as collaborative asymmetry (and we have only this to 
work through), the chapter remains motivated by a distinctly ambivalent 
relationship both to how power operates (we do not describe, here, a 
simple pinioning of one ‘side’ by another), and to what it might make 
possible. This final point guides the second half of the chapter: here, we 
are going to claim that interdisciplinary collaborators need to give up not 
only the official fantasy of ‘mutuality’, but also on that fantasy’s self-con-
sciously critical mirror-image, viz. the idea that relations of power need 
either to be overcome or at least faced up to through reinvigorated forms of 
transparent dialogue, mutual respect, frank talking, and manifestations 
of emotions appropriate to the situation, such as anger (e.g. see Rabinow 
2009). In what follows, we are going to reach towards a less comfortable 
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conclusion: oftentimes, we suggest, the labour of collaboration is less a 
task of learning to speak up for yourself – in the service, say, of ‘achieving 
a more just recognition [for one’s] substantial efforts and contributions’ 
as social scientists or humanities scholars (Rabinow 2009, 318) – and 
rather more a labour of adjusting to, precariously acquiescing to, and, on 
occasion, becoming curiously attached to, states of subjugation.
We offer one final disclaimer before proceeding: at least since the work 
of Michel Foucault (e.g. Foucault 1982), and probably indeed going back 
to the writing of Max Weber (see e.g. Wallimann, Tatsis, and Zito 1977), 
power has been a central concept – one might say a ‘master concept’ – of 
the interpretive social sciences (as well as significant parts of the humani-
ties). When we talk about power in this chapter, we commonly use it in 
the more commonsensical Weberian sense (i.e. as the ability ‘to secure 
one’s own ends’ in a social relationship (Wallimann, Tatsis, and Zito 1977, 
231)). But occasionally, too, we invoke the term in Foucault’s sense (i.e. as 
a technique that ‘categorizes the individual, marks him by his own indi-
viduality ... [and] imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize’ 
(Foucault 1982, 781)). The chapter is undoubtedly inflected, too, by other 
theoretical and philosophical interventions on power and subjugation 
that work to understand how it is that ‘the subject is the kind of being 
who can be exploited, who is, by virtue of its own formation, vulnerable 
to subjugation’ (Butler 1997, 20). Again: we are indebted to accounts of 
subjecthood and to relationality in which exposure to and entanglement 
with power is a deeply ambivalent process, one in which what is unbear-
able can also be the site of hope and strange attachments (see e.g. Berlant 
and Edelman 2014).
Such theoretical armature is, probably, of little concern to those read-
ers more preoccupied with our accounts of what it’s like to live in these 
interdisciplinary spaces. We mention these lineages, however, to alert 
those who are interested to the fact that we have thought long and hard 
about subjugation both inside and outside the interdisciplinary settings 
that are our specific focus here. We want to forestall a response that we 
commonly receive to our invocations of subjugation, viz. being lambasted 
for our political pusillanimity and/or for our unhappy turning away 
from ‘the demands of the day’ (e.g. Stavrianakis et al. 2014). By claim-
ing a space for subjugation, we are neither jettisoning the importance of 
anger, nor the need to acknowledge that social relations of collaboration 
are, on occasion, intolerable and irreparable. But we contest a logic in 
which social scientists and humanities scholars should, in the face of 
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such relations, remain tethered to a fantasied longing for recognition, or 
for an endorsement of their own value within those collaborations.
Mutual intellectual and professional respect
Rhetorics of reciprocation and mutuality suffuse the ‘grey’ literature 
on interdisciplinarity. Here, for example, is the description of an inter-
disciplinary funding programme, ‘Science in Culture’, run by the UK’s 
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC): the Science in Culture 
theme ‘aims to develop the reciprocal relationship between the sciences 
on the one hand, and arts and humanities on the other’; through such 
reciprocal relationships, the theme will ‘encourage mutual exchanges 
between the sciences and the arts and humanities that offer scope for 
developing new areas of research, methodologies, research frameworks 
styles of thinking and/or ways of working across the disciplines’ (Arts & 
Humanities Research Council 2015). Or consider this promotional mate-
rial for a conference on interdisciplinarity at Durham University: ‘By 
exchanging knowledges interdisciplinary collaboration has the potential 
to generate new thinking and transform the way that participants think 
about their own work. This can be tremendously exciting and reward-
ing’ (Durham University n.d.). Or take this statement from the ‘Vilnius 
Declaration’ on the role of the social sciences and humanities (‘SSH’) in 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research funding programme:
Solving the most pressing societal challenges requires the appropriate inclu-
sion of SSH. This can only succeed on a basis of mutual intellectual and profes-
sional respect and in genuine partnership. Efficient integration will require 
novel ways of defining research problems, aligned with an appropriate array 
of interdisciplinary methods and theoretical approaches. SSH approaches 
continue to foster practical applications that enhance the effectiveness of 
technical solutions. (Mayer, König, and Nowotny 2013, 26)
Integration. Mutuality. Reciprocation. Rewarding exchange. Shared 
solutions. Such is the terminology through which both the bureaucratic 
and intellectual imaginaries of interdisciplinary research take shape. 
There is a very particular idea of interdisciplinary exchange embedded in 
this language: one in which actors from different disciplines, if they are 
not exactly (or not quite yet) trading and exchanging their knowledge in 
settings characterized by mutual respect and reciprocation, then at least 
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this is something they’re aiming for. As the organizers of the Vilnius 
conference (the event that produced the ‘Vilnius Declaration’, cited 
above) put it:
the SSH community should be alerted to reflect on how to deal more actively 
with the opportunities that the shifting framework conditions of Horizon 
2020 offer to them, instead of complaining about losing their stakes. ... . Only 
through a mutual and open discussion how to shape and practically apply 
the ‘integrative approach’ could [this conference] be made to work in earnest. 
(Mayer, König, and Nowotny 2013, 16)
But there is surely more going on, here, than the optimism we might see 
undergirding this desire. The Vilnius Conference was organized precisely 
because the European Union, in putting together its eighth Framework 
Programme for research funding, favoured an ‘integrative’ interdisci-
plinary approach, which many saw as a diminution of the role of the 
social sciences and humanities. In other words, the conference came at 
the foot of a series of ‘interdisciplinary’ developments that served very 
precisely to demonstrate how marginal these disciplines sometimes are 
to the intentions of powerful actors. And yet still the hope – of a ‘mutual 
and open discussion’ – remains.
Fantasies of power
What is little mentioned across these bureaucratic and public-facing 
formulations is how interdisciplinary collaborations are structured 
through very different adjudications of epistemic authority (but see the 
contribution of Ulrike Felt in Mayer, Konig, and Nowotny 2013, 57) – or 
that, within and beyond particular projects, different actors have access 
to very different pots of money; that their practices of writing are differ-
ently legible, that they are differentially supported by governments and 
private foundations; that their views carry differential weights within 
policy communities, and so on.
Things look a little different if one turns to the scholarly literature. In 
an analysis of an emergent interdisciplinary field crossing economics and 
geography, for example, geographer Erica Schoenberger worries about 
how historically nuanced concepts and methods that are central to her 
own discipline are disregarded in a ‘disciplinary imperialism’: the new 
endeavour ‘exclude[s] social conflict and power relations, which are both 
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mathematically and ideologically inconvenient ... geography has been 
excised from an activity that nonetheless calls itself the new economic 
geography’ (Schoenberger 2001, 378). And it is forms of ‘social power’ – 
which is to say, in this case, powerful institutions (Harvard and MIT) 
and disciplines (economics) – that make the difference. Sharachchandra 
Lélé and Richard Norgaard, drawing on their work in interdisciplinary 
climate-change projects, put the situation even more starkly: ‘there are’, 
they point out, ‘significant differences in the manner in which society 
treats the social and natural sciences ... Naturally, the social sciences are 
seen as irrelevant, boring, and nonrigorous ... .’ They go on:
the social scientists, because they purportedly were not good enough to get 
into the ‘science stream’, are often in awe of the natural sciences. The belief of 
the superiority of the natural scientists is so deep-rooted that whenever social 
problems have the slightest technical dimension, politicians have tradition-
ally called on only technicians – the natural scientists – to help solve them. 
(Lélé and Norgaard 2005, 971–972)
Not only do social scientists get side-lined in such projects, on Lélé and 
Norgaard’s account, but natural scientists are asked to fill the breach: 
‘Charged with providing policy recommendations, [natural scientists] 
have to make judgments about how society works. They do not have 
adequate training to do this, but they are perhaps emboldened to do 
so by their position and are likely to adopt simplistic models of social 
dynamics’ (Lélé and Norgaard 2005, 970).
In one empirical analysis of an interdisciplinary sustainability project, 
Susan Gardner shows how attention to status and hierarchy ran through 
the project – with her social science interlocutors giving their answers 
through ‘nervous laughter’ versus what Gradner describes as the more 
self-confident responses of the natural scientists. ‘I have some difficulty 
seeing some of the value of some of the social sciences’, one of the natu-
ral scientists tells Gardner: ‘I have sat through a number of lectures that 
some of the social science people have given and walked away wondering 
what the point was’ (Gardner 2012, 248). Another tells Gardener that the 
social scientists on the project are pretty ‘squishy’ – ‘ “Where were the 
hypotheses? How much data were gathered? Where are the statistics?” ’ 
(Gardner 2012, 248).
To be sure, this is a one-sided account: even if it is not obvious in the 
literature we have presented above, we have no difficulty in believing 
(indeed, are assured by our scientist collaborators that it is the case) 
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that collaborating life scientists, too, experience such asymmetries. This 
occurs both within individual collaborations (one can well imagine the 
humanist’s equivalent of ‘Where were the hypotheses?’) and beyond 
them: to collaborate with people who might be a bit ‘squishy’, after all, 
is unlikely to represent much a grab for the garlands and esteem of your 
scientific peers. But rather than cataloguing this back and forth, what we 
want to do here is undercut the fantasy that might follow on from both 
sets of complaints. This is the fantasy of power confronted. For Lélé and 
Norgaard, for example, the key to high-quality interdisciplinary practice 
is researchers throwing into question the barriers that generate these 
biases: ‘contrary to their disciplinary training’, they argue,
participants [in interdisciplinary projects] need to be self-reflective about the 
value judgments embedded in their choice of variables and models, willing 
to give respect to and also learn more about the ‘other’, and able to work with 
new models and taxonomies used by others. (Lélé and Norgaard 2005, 975)
For Schoenberger, geography should revert to its own internal interdis-
ciplinarity (here geography is in a relatively unusual position, we would 
say), or it could go looking for more interesting economists to talk to 
(Schoenberger 2001, 379–380). For Bronislaw Szerszynski and Maialen 
Galarraga, who are especially interested in the case of geo-engineering, 
the task of social scientists in these situations is to ‘expose assumptions, 
bring out the multiplicity and incommensurability of different views and 
ontologies, and keep problem definitions open’ – thus producing ‘greater 
diversity and reflexivity in how different disciplines and approaches 
are brought together’ (Szerszynski and Galarraga 2013, 2818, 2822). For 
Dena MacMynowski, clear differentiation is the key to good synthesis: 
‘in order for interdisciplinary research to proceed more transparently in 
terms of the recombination of ideas and making the power associated 
with knowledge claims explicit, interdisciplinary environmental research 
needs to consciously embark on a process of differentiation and clarifica-
tion before, or while, moving toward synthesis’ (MacMynowski 2007).
From many years thinking about and living in interdisciplinary 
spaces, we have learnt that this account of power confronted – in which 
differentials are acknowledged and addressed, and even occasionally 
overcome; or in which, at least, a model of interdisciplinarity less riven 
by relations of power is thought to be imaginable – is no less fantastical 
than the dream of mutuality with which we began. You can have all the 
frank conversations in the world with collaborators about the conditions 
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under which your exchanges are taking place; you can agree on a clear 
distribution of resources and labour throughout the collaboration; you 
can put in agreed strategies to ensure, as far as possible, that this will 
work; you can remain as open, and transparent, and clear, and dialogic 
as possible; but the reality is that financial and epistemic power is not 
distributed equally within the collaboration. That irrevocable state of 
affairs carries many sequelae in its trail. And everyone in the collabora-
tion, in her heart of hearts, knows this.
After reciprocity
What is it, then, that is desired in subjection? Is it a simple love of the 
shackles, or is there a more complex scenario at work? (Butler 1997, 27)
What would happen if we gave up on mutuality altogether? What if we 
abandoned the ideal of ‘reciprocity’– not because it isn’t realistic, but 
because it may not actually be desirable? Lately, and instead of adding 
our own analysis of how ‘exchanges’ might take place in interdisciplinary 
spaces, we have begun to wonder if new conceptualizations of interdisci-
plinarity would come into view if this term were not subject to the velvet 
stranglehold of mutuality. All of us who have collaborated, after all, have 
experience of doing so without any expectation either that everyone is 
on the same footing, or that meaningful forms of process, dialogue, and 
so on, will actually produce parity. So what if we just accepted, in the 
most basic sense, that if you’re a humanities or social science person in 
an interdisciplinary neuroscientific project, then there is some likeli-
hood that you’re going to have to meet your interlocutors more than 
halfway, that the emotional labour of holding things together might well 
fall substantially to you, and that there’s a good chance that you’re going 
to have to take responsibility for much of the project ‘housework’? What 
if, as a natural science person, you made peace with the fact that your 
collaborators will assume you have never thought through your field’s 
problematic use of particular terms, that they will sometimes treat you 
as a kind of veil of rigour, granting them access to various pots of money, 
and then expect you, as one of the few scientists who can be bothered 
to attend ‘interdisciplinary’ meetings, to consistently represent all that is 
‘wrong’ with your discipline?
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These are, we are quite aware, not the happiest of counsels. But the 
point we make in this chapter is three-fold. First, the advice consistently 
given to would-be collaborators – Make your goals clear! Know what 
your expertise is! Begin a frank dialogue! – bears no relationship to our 
and, we think, our collaborators’ many experiences of working in inter-
disciplinary projects, and of making space for our own interests within 
forms of financial, epistemic, and bureaucratic power that consistently 
produce those interests as contingent on the scientific questions in which 
they are entangled. Our natural scientist colleagues, similarly, will tell 
you many stories of their research interests being figured as inherently 
crude, reductive, and simplistic – of being imagined as dependent on the 
nuances of the cultural-historical questions that bear down upon them, 
in their turn. If you are going to live in such spaces, better to learn to live 
in them as they are, and give up on an agentic fantasy in which you will 
be able substantively to transform imbalances, inequalities, and existing 
norms governing epistemic (and other kinds of) potency.
Second, as two social scientists caught in this space, we have learnt 
neither to lament, nor to spend energy resisting, this state of affairs: what 
we have learnt, instead, is sometimes to subjugate (or at least accept the 
subjugation of) our work and our interests to the neuroscientific interests 
in which we seek to entangle them. To the extent that we, in order for 
our research interests to move forward, need ‘the neuroscientists’, and 
they can get on perfectly well without us (in our estimation, anyway), we 
remain intensely aware that we need to narrate our own research interests 
in ways that make sense to our collaborators, without much expectation 
that they will do likewise. If we often know more about cognitive neuro-
science than any of our collaborators do about geography, sociology, 
the history of science, and so on – this is not because we find ourselves 
diligent, but because we find ourselves weak. (Again, we speak only from 
the social science perspective here; no doubt there is a mirror image of 
this point, from the point of view of neuroscientific collaborators, which 
we will not presume to ventriloquize.)
Third, what we are trying to emphasize here is that a good enough poli-
tics of collaboration is not, in fact, exhausted by exhortations to frank 
speech and/or by demanding the recognition of one’s epistemic and other 
contributions. One of the most important lessons we have learnt from 
our interdisciplinary work since 2008 (see especially Fitzgerald et al. 
2014a) is that parity is overrated as a platform for exchange – that is, the 
fantasy of two more-or-less equal actors, exchanging their intellectual 
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goods in a spirit of reciprocal esteem, might not only be, in a basic sense, 
and like most fantasies, not ‘true’, but that it might also be more politi-
cally and epistemologically inert than has often been assumed. Because 
what this prim fantasy excises is any sense of risk and play – any sense 
of the intensity of a pleasure that might come from giving one’s self up to 
something and taking the consequences (see e.g. Dean 2009). Indeed, the 
sociologist Andrew Balmer, in taking up this theme of subjugation, has 
analysed interdisciplinary relationships through the dynamics of playful 
sadomasochism, insisting, with Michel Foucault, that such scenes are not 
simple exercises in domination, but that they enact ‘way[s] of creatively 
playing with strategic power to constitute new pleasures, new modes for 
engagement with each other and with the world more generally’ (Balmer 
2013). Balmer thus reminds us that there are intensely affective ethical 
and political structures, as well as forms of action and pleasure, located 
in such relational practices – practices that are, we would add, quite 
invisible to genteel exhortations to dialogue.
Interdisciplinarity and the reproduction of 
social power
We have cast ourselves, at least a few times, in this chapter as marginal-
ized subordinates within spaces of great epistemological privilege. As we 
have stressed, we do not remain unaware of the ways in which ‘we’, and 
our disciplinary and epistemological preoccupations, are undoubtedly 
variously irritating to and undermining of the scientific and emotional 
labours of our collaborators; we are aware that, even if we too often feel 
ourselves to be under the scientific thumb, there are in fact many kinds 
of power – institutional, epistemic, managerial – that we can and do 
wield in interdisciplinary settings. But here is yet another objection to 
how we have positioned ourselves in this chapter – and another route 
through which we want to turn simplistic accounts of interdisciplinary 
power on their heads. We both have many colleagues, in our own disci-
plines (and in other disciplines from the humanities and the interpretive 
social sciences), who would gently point out that, from their perspective, 
our state of subjugation (such as it is) quite clearly has arisen from our 
having gotten ourselves into some very problematic spaces; that not only 
is it specious for us to cast ourselves as subjects of power, but that, in 
lending our support to, and expanding the reach of, scientific disciplines 
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(not least the neurosciences), we throw our lot in with those disciplines – 
that we are, in other words, co-producers of the very epistemic power 
from which we claim to distance ourselves (Cooter 2011, 2014). Worse 
(we caricature here): the sciences with which we are entangled have 
been the source of deleterious discourses on, for example, race, class, 
and gender; that scholars in the social sciences and humanities had long 
built up a conceptual armature to counteract such discourses; and that 
by mingling those concepts with the methods and theories of the neuro-
sciences, people like us actually evacuate the space for such critical work. 
To the extent that people become raced, gendered, and classed subjects 
through particular relations of power, and to the extent that scientific 
research has bolstered and solidified such relations (especially when it is 
increasingly licensed to talk about social life) – then our dirge for subju-
gation starts to look hollow indeed.
This is a vexed and serious critique that we cannot do justice to here. 
It is undeniably true that neuroscientific research has been mobilized in 
deeply problematic ways (we say ‘mobilized’ to gesture at the frequent 
distance between research in the laboratory and its diverse applications). 
There is now an extensive body of research on the effects of neuroscien-
tific discourses on policy, especially as that policy has been brought to 
bear on predominantly working-class and ethnic minority families (e.g. 
Edwards, Gillies and Horsley 2015; Lee, Macvarish and Lowe 2014; Pykett 
2015). There is an even more prominent discourse about neuroscience 
and gender, which is often self-consciously essentializing (e.g. Baron-
Cohen 2003) – resulting in popular claims that are, as the psychologist 
Cordelia Fine has pointed out, sometimes ‘spurious’ or ‘misinterpreted’ 
(Fine 2010, 283). ‘The imaginative reader’, Fine goes on,
will not have too much difficulty envisaging how, by reinforcing stereotypes, such 
claims may affect people’s social attitudes in ways that oppose progress toward 
greater gender equality, just as such claims did in the past. (Fine 2010, 283)
Against such invidious stereotypes, many will claim that the conceptual 
armature of the interpretive social sciences – culture, context, social-
ity, ideology, historical contingency, political decision-making, and so 
on – has helped to destabilize powerful scientific discourses, as they 
have been brought to bear (with or without the consent of their scien-
tific progenitors) on many different kinds of people. This, many of our 
colleagues would remind us, is where the conversation about power in 
interdisciplinary neuroscience needs to be.
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And yet, at the heart of our different projects in this area, there has 
always been an intuition that a potent, (potentially) emancipatory 
politics of race, gender, class, or sexuality might not have to be always 
independent of the biological sciences. In pursing that intuition, we 
have been inspired, for example, by the work of the NeuroGenderings 
research collective, and by the potent forms of neurofeminism that 
many of the scholars within that loose agglomeration have insisted on 
locating at the heart of empirical brain research (Bluhm, Jacobson and 
Maibon 2012; Schmitz and Höppner 2014a, 2014b). We have learnt a 
great deal from scholars such as Gillian Einstein and Margrit Shildrick, 
who, in their reinvigoration of the politics of women’s health, have 
always insisted on the complementarity of feminist theory and biologi-
cal research on women’s bodies (Einstein and Shildrick 2009). And 
we continue to be propelled by broader movements, within feminist 
theory, that are working to destabilize (to de-nature, we might say) 
the suturing of politics to critique, showing how feminist (and other 
social) theories might yet be traced through neurobiological histories 
and practices (Barad 2007; Rose and Abi-Rached 2013; Wilson 2004). If 
our own projects maintain a committed attention to the ways in which 
epistemic and cultural privileges can be put to work in the generation 
or sustenance of some deeply worrying relations of power, still, we 
have tried to show, in the empirical work that we have produced, that 
an interdisciplinary attention to brain and mind can also unsettle these 
relations in sometimes unexpected ways; that neuroimaging stud-
ies, themselves, can sometimes themselves be the bearers of critical 
practices.
Learning to live together
What are we to do, in the face of the unappetizing dynamics that have 
coursed through this chapter? One answer is: nothing. Donna Haraway, 
in her ‘Companion Species Manifesto’, surely the most compelling recent 
treatise on the complexity of relating through fraught boundaries, argues 
that ‘all ethical relating is knit from the ... thread of on-going alertness to 
otherness-in-relation. We are not one, and being depends on getting on 
together’ (2003, 50). Haraway’s not-oneness, of course, is not a fantasy of 
always satisfied affiliation and exchange: humans’ relationships with dogs 
are as filled with ‘waste, cruelty, indifference, ignorance and loss’, as much 
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as they are about ‘joy, invention, labor, intelligence, and play’ (2003, 12). 
Rather than simply seeking to resolve such a tension, Haraway, instead, 
makes an intellectual and ethical commitment to understanding, think-
ing, and working with and through the polyvalent realities of multispe-
cies relation – a commitment that she names elsewhere as ‘staying with 
the trouble’ (Haraway 2010) – that is, of continuing to work on and in a 
world that, in all its inter-species relatedness, is quite inseparable from 
complex intertwinements of killing, and breeding, and companioning, 
and nurturing.
We and our collaborators are not quite different species, nor have we 
yet started killing each other. Still, in understanding the often uncom-
fortable dynamics of our own collaborative relating, we want to take 
Donna Haraway’s injunction to heart. We want, in other words, as inter-
disciplinary scholars, not to seek mythical platforms for equal exchange, 
but to keep learning different ways of being unsettled together. In this 
sense, we want to abjure the fleeting comforts of frank-speaking, and the 
self-limiting, self-satisfying pleasure of confronting power; we want to 
say, in their place, that we are, in fact, willing to stay with the trouble of 
learning to live together.
Notes & Queries: 6
Q: In terms of inequalities, asymmetries, and lack of parity, where would 
you say the particular pressure points frequently lie? What should I be 
mindful of, if and when I enter interdisciplinary spaces?
A: While this is an important question, we should stress that we do 
not wish to paint interdisciplinary research as a kind of endlessly 
asymmetrical toiling – with the interdisciplinary researcher herself 
then only called upon either to manage, or live within, such 
unhappy relations of power. We do think that there is much more 
to be said about how power works in the interdisciplinary scene 
(certainly more than we have said here); more importantly, we 
want to suggest there is much to be gained from interdisciplinary 
collaborators at least becoming more alive to those dynamics, to 
how they work in their own right, but also to how they structure the 
emergence of the problem-space as such. To that end: there is a host 
of (usually) individually minor things that we (singly and together) 
have learnt to attend to, across a wide number of interdisciplinary 
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collaborations – but which, systemized, and understood as an 
accumulation, may help to bring the power dynamics of a particular 
collaboration into understanding. We are not saying that these are 
inevitable – nor do they invariably position the social scientists 
and/or humanities people in the so-called ‘weaker’ position. And 
nor (though we have not at all paid enough attention to this dimen-
sion here) can they be abstracted from much thicker dynamics of 
race, class, and gender – which may not be visible on the surface 
of particular collaborations, but of course are significant determi-
nants of the broader infrastructure from which those collaborations 
emerge (we need only think of the gendering of discipline at the 
university level, to see how such dynamics might become perti-
nent). An inexhaustive list of things to look out for would certainly 
include some of the following:
Interdisciplinary research projects are made possible by a vital,  ?
and yet often undervalued and invisible, labour of ‘housework’ – 
ranging from paperwork, to dealing with university and research 
administrations, to ensuring that everyone in the collaboration is 
okay, and so on. Who does this work, and what value is assigned 
to it? How – at all – is it compensated? Who can get away with a 
small contribution to the housework, and who cannot?
How – through which mechanisms, and drawing in which  ?
voices – is intellectual labour parcelled out in the project? Who is 
included in, or allowed to partake of, conceptual and ‘philosophi-
cal’ discussion – and who is expected to simply collect data?
Who writes and structures an interdisciplinary grant? Who  ?
brings the team together? Who does the tedious labour of work-
ing out everyone’s costs? Who is responsible (or makes them-
selves responsible) for getting it in on time?
What kinds of adjudications are made about what is and isn’t  ?
an important part of the project’s process – and through which 
mechanisms are those adjudications made explicit or not? For 
example, is spending time reflecting on how one organizes a work-
shop as valued as the substantive labour of the workshop itself?
Who does public engagement work – and how, and why?  ?
Sometimes public engagement can be seen as low status work; but 
sometimes, too, it can be a moment for the assertion of seniority. 
How is this kind of work positioned and distributed in a given 
Against Reciprocity
DOI: 10.1057/9781137407962.0009
collaboration? Which kinds of audiences are deemed worthy of 
cultivating? How – and where – does this cultivation take place?
Thinking through appropriate ‘outlets’ for publication can reveal  ?
all sorts of dynamics. On the one hand, the logic of impact factors 
and h-indices often determine where (and by whom) labour 
is placed in writing; one the other, the general orientation of a 
journal may make implicit decisions about whose contribution 
is and is not going to be valued (e.g. how does neuroscientific 
work get positioned in a decision to submit an interdisciplinary 
paper to a cultural theory journal?). How – and by whom – do 
such decisions get made within a collaboration?
Interdisciplinary, co-authored work of course (usually) needs  ?
to find some mid-range voice in which to articulate itself. But 
dynamics of power can sometimes structure both the relative 
claim that different disciplinary registers have on that middle 
range, as well as the pernicious maintenance of the fiction of a 
‘transparent language’ (in other words, that one’s one language 
represents the neutral position). How are registers of appropriate 
voice generated within the project? What do those voices sound 
like – and what legacies do they drawn upon?
Sometimes expertise is considered fungible, and sometimes it is  ?
not; sometimes it is regarded as easily understandable, and some 
it isn’t; some expertise is seen not as expertise but merely as 
‘common sense’. Focusing on such positioning and understand-
ings of different expertise can often be a salutary experience in 
interdisciplinary work.
When papers are co-authored, how and when do particular  ?
conventions from different disciplines get pulled in? Does the 
team follow the multi-authored conventions of the natural 
sciences (and the stratification of contribution that it implies), or 
does it follow the lone-muse humanities model (and the occlu-
sion of other voices that thus becomes inescapable)? If artists are 
part of the collaborating team, has anyone worked to rethink 
practices of creative production (in relation to curatorship)?
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Feeling Fuzzy: The Emotional 
Life of Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration
Abstract: Interdisciplinary collaboration is frequently 
considered hard intellectual and methodological labour. And it 
is that. But interdisciplinary work is emotional work too – and 
is riven by the presence of (and requirement to manage) many 
different kinds of feelings, not all of them joyful. This chapter 
takes up the analysis of emotion in interdisciplinary spaces – 
arguing that such spaces are deeply dependent on forms of 
emotional regulation. The chapter works through moments, 
from our own work, in which we have felt bad, confused, and 
irritated. Thinking through how we managed these moments, 
the chapter positions interdisciplinarity as an affectively fuzzy 
domain, and much of the work of collaboration as learning to 
live though that fuzz. The chapter is appended with an epilogue 
to the broader monograph, which focuses on the two authors’ 
own form of collaborative labour.
Keywords: affect; collaboration; emotion; emotional 
labour; emotional regulation; interdisciplinarity
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Quit your whining!
We are both participants in a carefully choreographed space that has been 
designed to elicit productive cross-disciplinary engagements between humanities 
scholars, life scientists, mind scientists, social scientists, artists, and engineers. 
The convenor uses the technique called ‘open space’, where a number of partici-
pants suggest topics for a discussion, and then each goes off somewhere and leads 
that discussion herself, with whomever else wants to participate.
Des suggests, to the larger group, the topic of ‘emotional labour in interdisci-
plinary spaces’: he wants to talk through some of the ways in which emotions 
(including disappointment, irritation, anxiety, upset, even the occasional bout of 
pleasure) press on, and thus shape, interdisciplinary spaces and research. There 
is a skipped beat – silence occupies the room for a short while, before several 
delegates (including the convenor, herself, who, by dint of her role qua convenor, 
certainly knows about emotional labour) gather to join Des.
One of our collaborators overhears someone nearby, from a discipline totally 
different from either of ours, say to her neighbour something along the lines of: 
“You go and have that session on emotions and emotional labour. But also, how 
about we quit whining and run a session on actually doing some work?”
This person was, of course, kidding. But her remark, like all the best put-
downs, provoked us to think through something important: sure, it can 
be a relief to get your resentments and disappointments off your chest, 
but what do emotional labour, and reflections on that labour, have to do 
with ‘actual work’? Why is it not simply whining? Leaving aside our suspi-
cion that whining might, in fact, be an under-valued and understudied 
genre, this chapter is an attempt to answer that question. We argue, 
here, that not only is emotion work heavily implicated in research work, 
but the labour of interdisciplinarity is emotional in ways that depart 
from the regular affective challenges that accompany all collaborative 
endeavours. We are convinced that understanding interdisciplinarity in 
practice means understanding how, why, and with what consequences, 
interdisciplinary research spaces are underscored by thick, deep currents 
of often subsumed, and yet profoundly felt, emotion – whose sources and 
objects are often difficult to discern. And yet they can, when attended 
to, tell us a great deal about points of epistemological, ontological and 
political blockage within any interdisciplinary configuration. Those 
blockages, in turn, help us to understand which kinds of interdisciplinary 
crossings and exchanges are more or less possible or likely within that 
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configuration – and hence why certain research questions, approaches 
and methodologies find fertile ground, while others sometimes run into 
the sand. In other words, emotional dynamics can have great power in 
enabling and closing down the pursuit of particular interdisciplinary 
research trajectories. To treat the emotional economy of interdisciplinary 
collaborative work as epiphenomenal to – rather than a significant shaper 
of – those cross-disciplinary research trajectories would be a mistake.
A second claim follows from such a diagnosis: collaborative work – and 
especially interdisciplinary work of the kind that we discuss in this book – is 
inseparable from particular forms of, methods for, strategies around, and 
investments in, emotional regulation. We have become convinced, in the 
course of the years that we have spent in these spaces, that when collabo-
rators from very different disciplines work together, most of them depend 
significantly upon practices of emotional regulation. Such practices help 
to ensure that interdisciplinary collaborations do not fall apart, and are 
able – oftentimes – to result in collaboratively produced research. Notably, 
instances of emotional dysregulation can be startling indicators of 
moments at which regulatory practices have broken down; or of collabo-
rators’ deliberate calling of attention to the affectively freighted landscape 
in which they all are working; or of instances of interdisciplinary contes-
tation that – for whatever reason – cannot be quickly subsumed back into 
the usual affective economy that characterizes any given interdisciplinary 
space. And when we think of this affective economy, we include not only 
researchers from all disciplines, but those such as project co-ordinators, 
convenors and facilitators. Their material and immaterial labour is indis-
pensable in allowing interdisciplinary projects to get off the ground and 
to persist, though it is often invisible precisely because such labour threat-
ens to be regarded as mere ‘infrastructure’. (How gender – and gendered 
assumptions – work here is particularly important to attend to.) We want 
the chapter to illustrate how typical – and often banal – such feelings are. 
But we also want to use these affectively marked instances, and our analy-
ses of them, to intervene in existing debates about what interdisciplinarity 
is like, and why it is often difficult to accomplish.
Affects and their regulation
There are two major theoretical preoccupations at the heart of this chap-
ter. The first centres on why it is not enough to focus on epistemological 
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differences between disciplines to understand the complications of inter-
disciplinary spaces. On our account, it is often difficult to determine the 
origin, quality, and after-effects of interdisciplinary moments of pique, 
disorientation, and friction. Such states work, frequently, to confound 
any possibility of speaking out or acting clearly and decisively (i.e. acting 
in straightforwardly agentic or political ways) in response to them. When 
the source of an emotion is unclear (as it frequently is with feelings of 
irritation or slight malaise or embarrassment), what is produced is often 
a sense of affective confusion or bewilderment – one that is very distinct 
from emotions with a clear origin and a distinct object (such as fury 
against a particular individual or a particular theory she holds). Such 
bewilderment does not necessarily lessen through a process of epistemo-
logical resolution. We are not simply describing, here, interdisciplinary 
situations in which a researcher feels confused because she does not 
have the knowledge base to understand the content of a collaborator’s 
communication. Interdisciplinary spaces cannot be summed up, in 
other words, as spaces characterized by the movement from epistemo-
logical confusion to reasoned – or at least momentary – clarity, in which 
researchers manage to overcome their initial epistemic differences and 
build shared knowledge together.
We linger over this point since it is so commonly the orienting 
framework used to understand interdisciplinary spaces. (Much of the 
existing literature on interdisciplinary teams, for example, focuses on 
how researchers with different epistemic commitments ‘share and inte-
grate their cognitive resources in order to produce new results that 
cut across disciplinary boundaries’ (Andersen and Wagenknecht 2012, 
1881).) Sianne Ngai, in her work on ‘minor and generally unprestig-
ious feelings’, distinguishes feeling ‘vaguely “unsettled” or “confused” ’, 
as an ‘affective sense of bewilderment’, from confusion that results 
from ‘the epistemological sense of indeterminacy’: such bewilder-
ment – ‘this feeling of confusion about what one is feeling’ – might 
well, she suggests, be ‘an affective state in its own right’ (Ngai 2005, 
14; italics in original). Our conjecture is that such kinds of ‘affective 
disorientation’ – to use Ngai’s potent phrase – or of ‘feeling fuzzy’ (to 
use our own coinage) have been particularly common in the interdis-
ciplinary spaces that we have inhabited. One of the purposes of this 
chapter is to begin to do justice to the important roles that these often 
ill-understood and often ignored affective states play in shaping the 
topologies and logics of interdisciplinary research.
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We realize that complex emotions are central to many, if not all, forms 
of practice – whether research based or otherwise. Historians of science 
and of emotion have compellingly demonstrated how potent scientists’ 
affective responses have been in the generation of scientific models, 
concepts and data – whether we are talking about scientists’ reactions 
in the face of animals’ emotions, Darwin’s flinching, or early theories 
of artificial intelligence (Dror 2011; Smith 2014; Wilson 2009). There is 
a growing body of sociological literature on how emotions move and 
coalesce within research laboratories (Fitzgerald 2013; Kerr and Garforth 
2015). But there is something distinct, we feel, about the contours of 
affect that have moved and passed through us in profoundly interdisci-
plinary (as opposed to more mono- or multi-disciplinary) spaces. Here, 
the methods that researchers use can be so heterogeneous; the discursive 
conventions that make certain elements of the scene unsayable or sayable 
are so often not shared across disciplinary differences; the epistemologies 
can be so various; researchers’ modes of bodily comportment so distinct 
from one another; and the settling on a shared object of investigation is, 
at times, impossible. The orienting ethos of an openness to alterity (the 
alterity of others’ methods, ontologies, and ways of ‘doing’ research) that 
tends to frame the normative horizons of interdisciplinary spaces (even 
if it often does not play out in practice) is also, we think, a terrain condu-
cive to the emergence of the kinds of complex affective states (including 
bewilderment) that we are interested in here. Bodily, psychological, 
affective – as well as more straightforwardly ‘epistemological’ – fuzziness 
and friction are, we believe, not so prevalent in more straightforward 
mono-disciplinary spaces (where researchers often have some sense of 
shared modes of conversing and comporting themselves, even if they 
profoundly disagree with one another), or multi-disciplinary spaces 
(where there is more commonly a shared sense that no one is really 
expected to open herself to the other’s methods or ontologies, and that 
each can return ‘home’ more or less unchanged by the encounter).
Second, there is value in recognizing the important role that the regu-
lation – and dysregulation – of affective states plays as emotions pass 
between and through members of an interdisciplinary team, as well as 
through artefacts and technologies (email and other writing technologies 
can be particularly vexed sites) that are central to the workings of any 
interdisciplinary research project. By using the term ‘regulation’ we want 
to capture the various ways in which individuals’ and groups’ affective 
states might be modulated: we are interested in how mental processes, 
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physiological processes, comportment, and gesture intertwine; we are 
especially interested in how the emergence of friction and fuzziness – as 
well as of more clearly contoured emotions – can easily produce, in turn, 
attempts to attenuate or sidestep such feelings and dispositions. This 
might be through consciously practised emotional ‘regulation’, or indeed, 
if those attempts fail, through states of individual and collective dysregu-
lation. Dwelling at greater length on the routes that affective responses 
can and do take in interdisciplinary projects might thus provide some 
markers for the interdisciplinary researcher to find her way through 
such projects, while retaining (most of) her sanity.
This is not the first time that either of us has written on this topic. 
We have elsewhere published more formal pieces on the role of affect 
in the psychological and brain sciences, on feelings of awkwardness in 
one interdisciplinary project, on how ‘affect’ itself has often been the 
theoretical and empirical ground upon which scholars have sought to 
‘become interdisciplinary’, and on the complex looping of blame (Callard 
et al. 2012b; Fitzgerald 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014a; Papoulias and Callard 
2010). We draw on some of that work here. Additionally, and in line 
with our broader goals for this volume, we mine some of our own fairly 
mundane encounters in the interdisciplinary scene. We draw out small 
moments – of fuzziness and of other affective dispositions – from our own 
immersion in interdisciplinary projects and places, to show how we have 
come to see emotions as variously diagnostic of the situations in which 
we – and, indeed, some of our collaborators – have found ourselves.
Telling lies
In Chapter 2, we described the outline of an experiment on neuroscien-
tific lie detection in which one of us (DF) was involved. Again, in brief, 
the basic intuition of this experiment was that if it is possible to intuit 
(from literary, historical, and sociological analysis) that untruth is not, 
in fact, a natural state that can be isolated to particular neurological 
functions, then what would happen if an experiment were conducted 
that induced participants to tell a particular kind of awkward truth in the 
brain scanner – a truth that would show brain activity broadly similar 
to that previously associated with the state of lying? Over three days, 
the collaborators tried to answer this question by recruiting a cohort 
of local choir singers, and formed them into two teams. They told the 
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participants that this was an experiment in team evaluation, and that 
they were to compete against one another in a series of tasks. Participants 
were told that events would culminate in a sing-off, in front of a famous 
local choir director – and they would then have individually to rate one 
another’s performance, while in the brain scanner. Crucially, they were 
told the accuracy of these ratings would go into the overall evaluation. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, each team contained two actors, who 
were given two simple instructions: be very likeable, and sing horribly. 
When the participants came in to be scanned, after a long day’s singing 
and competing, they thought they were evaluating other team members 
at random – but of course they all had to evaluate the nice-but-talentless 
actors. The research team hypothesized that telling the truth about those 
actors, in the scanner, would be really awkward, and socially potent, and 
cognitively taxing – exactly the cognitive functions, in other words, often 
associated with telling lies.
If this is a generic example of how a social-literary intuition (truth is 
a contextual phenomenon) might be threaded through a neuroscien-
tific method to produce – potentially – a new insight, there was also a 
significant amount of emotional regulation involved in its execution. 
Throughout the procedure, there was a great deal of ambivalence and 
awkwardness: several of the experimenters involved retained an anxi-
ety about whether this experiment was a good thing to be involved 
in; collaborators sometimes worried about what, precisely, they were 
contributing to the project and what, on the other hand, they were 
getting from it; people were occasionally irritated with one another (see 
Fitzgerald et al. 2014a from which this account partly draws). In one 
memorable early meeting where the project was presented to the wider 
laboratory hosting it, the lab members (as scientists will) got really stuck 
in to the specifics of the experiment, making several of the other experi-
menters worry about what this actually had to do with them anymore. 
And all of this is added, one can be sure, to the normal affective potency 
of doing an ecological experiment (the excitement of seeing actors move, 
unrumbled, through the participants; the tension of revealing the truth), 
as well as the kinds of bodily and emotional regulation necessitated by 
keeping up the pretence of the ‘game’ – and keeping the truth from the 
participants throughout.
But most significantly, perhaps, from DF’s perspective, what was at 
stake throughout the experiment was a particular kind of regulation – 
which is to say, the collaborators tacitly practised a kind of internal 
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management of their affective states vis-à-vis the project. DF would go 
so far as to say that the experiment worked out precisely because of the 
emotional regulation practised by the experimenters who were part of it. 
This was, on the one hand, an experiment that was pregnant with emotion 
(and in particular, with forms of awkwardness, taciturnity, sullenness, 
and so on). On the other hand, DF believes, from his own perspective, 
that the researchers, themselves, rarely addressed this with one another. 
While they kept up a lively critical dialogue, nonetheless, when research-
ers were frustrated with one another, they often kept it to themselves; 
when they thought the others were flat-out wrong, they sometimes swal-
lowed it; when they felt as though they were being talked-down-to, they 
frequently let it go; most significantly, when they weren’t sure whether 
this was a very good experiment, or whether it was especially something 
they wanted to be involved in, or whether it was ever going to work, and 
even if they cared either way, they of course thought and talked about 
it – but it also seemed to DF that they sometimes quelled these anxious, 
ambivalent feelings, or regulated them, and moved on.
This is what we intend to draw attention to when we talk about the 
importance of understanding and working with the manifold ways in 
which affects are modulated, inhibited, it and transformed in interdis-
ciplinary research projects. When we invoke matters of affective regula-
tion, we are not articulating a prim warning about the impropriety of 
emotional outbursts. Rather, we’re pointing to how intensely affectively 
weighted interdisciplinary spaces often are, and, also, to the fact that 
attention to – and management of – that weight, might have a significant 
bearing on the success, or otherwise, of an interdisciplinary encounter.
Playa hater
‘This room is filled with neuroscience playa haters.’ Felicity overhears this 
comment made at a workshop that is assessing the current state of neuroscientific 
evidence and models. It features a very small number of neuroscientists, a large 
number of social scientists and humanities scholars; amongst them are several 
very outspoken critics of neuroscience. 
The term ‘playa hater’ emerged in late 1990s rap to describe those who 
criticize the successful strivings of those (like rappers themselves) who 
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‘made it’ within a system not designed for them. (See, in particular, The 
Notorious B.I.G.’s ‘Playa Hater’, in which he sang about the two kinds 
of people in the world, today: the ‘players’ and the ‘playa haters’.) What 
is going on here? First, in the move from 1990s rap to this researcher’s 
diagnosing of the fractious – though, let’s face it, rarefied – space of an 
interdisciplinary workshop on neuroscience? Second, in our deciding to 
include this culturally and historically dense moment, one that invokes 
a specific linguistic terrain, often associated with a particular kind of 
black masculinity, and that then uses that terrain to complexify what 
regular commentary might simply have characterized as predictable 
cross-disciplinary critique of neuroscience on the part of the humanities 
and social sciences?
First, let us consider the sentence, ‘This room is filled with neuro-
science playa haters.’ FC believes this to be a moment of diagnosis, in 
which there was the identification (correct, FC believes) of some sense 
of grievance and envy on the part of at least some of those in the social 
sciences and humanities; as well as of a disparity in power between the 
neurosciences (strong) and those enviously attacking it (the weaker 
humanities and social sciences); as well as of the strangeness of running 
a conference about neuroscientific evidence that was filled with so 
many people ‘outside’ of the field and that contained so few practising 
neuroscientists. The sentence, on the one hand, can be interpreted as 
a powerful means both to gesture to a recent transformation in disci-
plinary hierarchies (the neurosciences were thrust into the limelight at 
the same time as the humanities were feeling increasingly anxious about 
their status) and a means to install (not wholly ironically) anyone issuing 
the sentence close to the heart of interdisciplinary power. But there is 
more going on here, too. The term ‘hater’, as it has emerged in the last 
couple of decades, conveys a complex mesh of affects: the ‘hater’ not only 
is unable to be happy about the success of the person she or he is ‘hating’, 
but rather wants to undermine that person by attempting to expose 
her flaws or inadequacies. Here, then, is an acute analysis of the shape 
that critique of ‘the neurosciences’, on the part of humanities and social 
science scholars, can sometimes take. FC remembers the atmosphere in 
the workshop as, indeed, at times, hostile against ‘neuroscience’ – and 
hostile in a way that refused any real engagement with the heterogene-
ous methods or epistemologies of the neurosciences, and that was force-
fully committed to trying to identify as many flaws in ‘neuroscience’ as 
possible. She surmised that the use of the term ‘hater’, to describe some 
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of those in the room, diagnosed the often disavowed affective underpin-
nings of a particular kind of critique that imagines itself as conducted 
on affectively neutral, reasoned, and deliberative grounds. The sentence, 
FC thinks, also expresses some bafflement that the neuroscientists in the 
room had been subject to such affectively intense critique, given that 
they were precisely those who had chosen to engage, in sustained ways, 
with those from other disciplines in order to interrogate neuroscientific 
models and evidence. But the affective dynamics of the workshop did 
not, FC believes, hold open the possibility of recognizing these kinds of 
‘entangled’ cross-disciplinary labours: instead, they lurched towards a 
bifurcated field of ‘haters’ and ‘playas’. 
This overheard sentence, then, which might well usually have been 
sloughed off as a casual interjection and one unimportant to the ‘work’ 
of interdisciplinarity, made clear to FC how any attempt to understand 
that work needs to attend to the fraught and deep affective channels 
that shape how individual researchers – and the arguments they make – 
retreat, advance, exchange, and disengage with fields different from 
their own. The sentence achieved this through a bold and unexpected 
importation of popular culture – specifically via the use of a term that 
emerged in African-American hip hop to anatomize the changing 
economic and social hierarchies of the street and the music industry. 
We want to stress that, in our experience, it has not been uncommon 
for this kind of ironic, multi-modal word-play – an informal register 
that can carry irritation, acuity, grandiosity, and hurt more openly than 
that of frequently strangulated academic exchange – to be the means 
through which we ourselves, as well as others we have heard comment-
ing on interdisciplinary scenes, bear witness to some of the most difficult 
elements of interdisciplinary working. 
A quick postscript: The term ‘playa hater’ began to travel, sometimes 
invoked by us and by some of the people with whom we collaborate; it 
become a way to track interdisciplinary power dynamics. One of us (FC) 
has herself, on a number of occasions, been described, good-naturedly, as 
a ‘neuroscience playa hater’. She certainly didn’t easily identify with being 
one (not least given the unhappy analysis we have just provided above), 
and she certainly didn’t see herself consciously wanting to endorse a 
bifurcated vision of the world in which there are simply the ‘playas’ and 
the ‘playa haters’. She did, however, reluctantly have to acknowledge that 
she did recognize certain aspects of herself, as well as of the affectively 
fraught field of interdisciplinary research on the mind and brain, that 
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the phrase ‘playa hater’ serves to conjure up. Let’s face it, she’d felt the 
envy of the hater. In her potent analysis of ‘ugly feelings’, Sianne Ngai 
argues that ‘envy lacks cultural recognition as a valid mode of publicly 
recognizing or responding to social disparities, even though it remains 
the only agonistic emotion defined as having a perceived inequality as 
its object’ (Ngai 2005, 128). The temptation is always to tell the envious 
person to ‘get over it’ – where ‘it’ is a designator of the inadequacy of 
that individual’s psyche – rather than to think through the imbrication 
of the psychological and the social so as to understand what it is that 
provokes the desire to inhabit (or to crush) the space of the other. It 
would be fair to say that FC hasn’t ‘got over it’; her envy is still strong. 
But the introduction – and then circulation – of the figure of the playa 
hater ended up, over time, having a significant effect on how she herself 
thought about, and indeed entered into, collaborations with those from 
other disciplines – as well as how she thought about the spatial logics of 
the interdisciplinary field in which she was a participant. The diagnostic 
precision of the phrase ‘playa hater’ perhaps allowed her, over time, to 
move from ‘feeling fuzzy’ about how such an appellation had ended up 
being attached to her, to being able to inhabit an interdisciplinary land-
scape that she was less likely to construe in such agonistic terms. 
Coming from the outside
Here is another example, not only of the density of emotions in inter-
disciplinary spaces, but of the ability of emotions both to unseat those 
experiencing them, as well as to orient the grooves down which inter-
disciplinary research might go in the first place. This time, we focus on 
annoyance (see also Ngai 2005 on irritation). Some years ago, one of us 
(DF) applied for funding for a research project, in which he proposed – 
among other things – to interview people with a neurodevelopmental 
diagnosis about prospects for treatment (which were then remote, but 
certainly under investigation). His project, although grounded in the 
social sciences, was intended to work, in an interdisciplinary manner, 
through a larger bioscientific research endeavour – and to offer to that 
project, in exchange for its imprimatur, a sense of how service users and 
their families thought through issues around biomedical intervention. In 
the event, he wasn’t funded, and the project never got off the ground – 
which is itself a banal and quotidian event. But what was interesting 
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was how the project proposal was reviewed – and, in particular, how at 
least one reviewer, through what DF read as a sense of frustration and 
irritation, positioned the proposal as a poorly-conceived, attempted 
intervention from the outside. ‘I was deeply disappointed by this project 
for several reasons’, the reviewer began: ‘...  the candidate appears to 
believe that scientists are on the verge of developing a possible biological 
therapeutic intervention ... But this is simply not the case.’ Indeed, DF’s 
project in general ‘display[ed] a shocking lack of familiarity with the state 
of biomedical science in this area.’ Worse, the topic that he proposed to 
interview people about had ‘no grounding in biomedical fact’, while he 
had failed to ‘familiarise himself with the literature’ around the diagnosis 
in question. Indeed, his proposal ‘illustrate[d] a degree of ignorance that 
is very disappointing’, while his ‘nonsensical framing’ of his questions 
‘(“garbage in”)’ would only produce ‘nonsensical data (“garbage out”)’. 
‘Coming to a topic from the “outside” can sometimes be highly valuable’, 
the review concluded, ‘but the demands of a topic such as this necessitate 
some understanding of the nature of [this diagnosis] and how it affects 
people and their families ... .’
There is a great deal that might be said here. The reviewer refers to DF 
as an ‘outsider’ to ‘the field’. They position him as someone who is not 
simply wrong but in fact ‘ignorant’. They locate his questions outside of 
the zone of respectable sense-making, position his failure as an absence 
of preparation, wonder if he has faced up to the ‘demands’ of the scientific 
material, and so on. But let us draw two things out in particular: first, the 
territorial dynamic of inside and outside, of expert and candidate, of seri-
ous research and garbage, within which these remarks are couched. We 
are not quibbling, here, over whether or not this project should have been 
funded: fine projects exhaust the limit of available research funds every 
day, and indeed we are quite willing to accept that the project in question 
did at least exhibit some of the deficiencies described. But what remains 
pertinent is the series of bifurcations in which the review was nonethe-
less couched – and, moreover, the proposal seems to have been read as 
a (poor) attempt to intervene in a bioscientific space, from the outside. 
Being adjudicated on such grounds – rightly or otherwise – is certainly 
one feature of trying to lead an interdisciplinary life. But we want to 
note, second, how affectively charged this exchange, conducted via the 
transfer of written materials, seems. We refer, here, not only to DF’s own 
sense of annoyance, embarrassment, and so on, at these remarks, but to 
the intensity of irritation that DF reads in the review. Perhaps, indeed, 
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he over-reads. But the language of disappointment, concern, and shock 
appears, at least initially to him, as otiose: the reviewer, after all, could 
have elaborated why he or she found the proposal deeply problematic 
without these affective supports. We want to raise the question, then, as 
this chapter progresses, of what we might conclude about the contempo-
rary landscape of interdisciplinary research if we pay close attention to 
the affective structure in which this exchange is suspended.
Anti-political
At the end of the lie detection study discussed above, one of us (DF) 
and his colleagues wrote a more formal auto-ethnographic account of 
how it felt to participate in a social science/neuroscience collabora-
tion. In coming to understand their project, the authors set themselves 
against a recent, high-profile account of collaboration (between natu-
ral scientists and social scientists) gone wrong, by Paul Rabinow and 
Gaymon Bennett (Rabinow and Bennett 2012). Whereas Rabinow and 
Bennett had argued for rather more frank speaking in highly-charged 
interdisciplinary spaces, DF and his colleagues suggested, in deliberate 
contrast, that:
[our] success might have come precisely because we did not speak frankly; we 
did not seek the truth; we totally failed to acknowledge – let alone discuss – 
the consequences of our experimental situation. What we did, instead, was to 
try to work and live within a zone that was just about ambiguous enough to 
keep everything together – that was sufficiently averse to frank-speaking to 
keep the worst of the resentments at bay. (Fitzgerald 2014a, 716)
That paper became part of a wider set of interventions in which DF and 
FC, both separately and together, had been trying to think beyond the 
usual encomia for truth and frankness. We focused, for example, on 
what it meant to become a ‘subject of collaboration’ – and we suggested 
that such a becoming might mean learning to find joy and insight 
within some more ambiguous and confusing ethical structures than 
those espoused by frank speakers of collaborative truth (Fitzgerald and 
Callard 2014). This last contribution, hosted on an interdisciplinary 
blog, produced (indeed, to be fair, literally invited) a response from a 
group of scholars, led by Anthony Stavrianakis, and including Rabinow 
and Bennett – the tone of which seemed, to us at least, somewhat irate. 
The ‘determined self-limitation’ described in our work marked, for these 
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authors, ‘a troubling turn in the practice of truth and ethics’ – suggesting 
a moment, indeed, in which researchers seemed willing to give up on:
exercises of critical self-formation that prepare one to take up truth-practices 
in the face of shifting power relations and the attendant need to speak frankly 
about both power and the truth as one finds it. (Stavrianakis et al. 2014)
Worse, our espousal of the importance – and complexity – of play, over 
the need to seek clarity, was interpreted not as ‘the uninhibited and 
spontaneous activity of scientific curiosity’ (Stavrianakis et al. 2014), but, 
rather, as representing ‘a species of ethically deformative bureaucratic 
administration’ – one marked by (here the authors draw on Robert 
Merton and John Dewey) an ‘ “occupational psychosis” ’ in which abili-
ties become blind spots, and one begins to internalize ‘the limitation of 
one’s authority and competence’. Collaboration conducted under such 
conditions, Stavrianakis and his colleagues argued, is determinedly ‘anti-
political – and not in the scientific sense of seeking objectivity, but rather 
in the self-delimiting sense of turning away from the demands of the 
day’ (Stavrianakis et al. 2014).
We were dismayed, on reading this text, to find our investment 
in the multiplication of ethical repertoires in the present, and our 
attention to the possible insights of play, to be subject to a rebuke 
that seemed so committed to analyses of function and bureaucracy, 
of truth and ethics, of art and critique, as these had been elaborated 
in mid-century (masculine) social theory. Might it not have not 
occurred to us – within our self-reported confusion – that complex 
questions of ethics, justice, and practice were at stake? Worse, the 
‘agonistic friendliness’ espoused by Stavrianakis and his colleagues, 
as a counterpoint to our enjoinment to play, seems only to reassert a 
rather obvious starting position, wrapped in a (surely) unsustainable 
model of collaborative subjectivity. In either event, it has nothing to 
say with regard to the object we are trying to understand, viz. the ethi-
cal and affective nuance of collaboration in practice. But what interests 
us more than these intellectual disagreements is the sense of – and 
here we are frank – patrician touchiness through which this rebuke 
took shape. When we talk about the need for emotional regulation 
in interdisciplinary spaces, we are referring to the requirement for 
the interdisciplinary researcher to habituate herself to such registers 
of critique – and not just stoically to withstand such a reproach, but 
to attempt to quell her own heartfelt desire to respond, in kind, in 
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her turn. The question that we have had, continually, to ask ourselves 
is: how are we going to make research happen, when the desire for 
(and our practice of) interdisciplinarity has introduced a state of 
such conceptual and normative suspension, that we find ourselves 
surrounded by colleagues who variously understand our work to be 
garbage, or see us as ethically deformed bureaucrats?
The feeling of what doesn’t happen
This book disturbs the tendency, in writings about interdisciplinarity, to 
cleave to the terrain of ideas, disagreements, and knowledge claims – and, 
in so doing, to disavow the complex ripples, wrinkles, and patternings of 
affect that course through what is all-too-often assumed to be an unruf-
fled plane of interdisciplinary interaction. We pay attention, here, to how 
those wrinkles get rubbed out, how they are sometimes smoothed over, 
and how, sometimes, they endure within and between the unsuspect-
ing bodies of interdisciplinary researchers themselves. We have tried in 
this chapter to bring to visibility some of the political, methodological, 
ontological, and epistemological work that those emotions perform. 
We hope to have shown: (1) how emotion can be influential in carving 
out the perimeters of an interdisciplinary space (as well as determin-
ing who is inside and outside of it); (2) how researchers can engage in 
various tactics to ensure that collaboration does not entirely fall apart; 
(3) how political and ontological differences can be experienced affec-
tively (and vice versa); (4) how the eruption of unexpected – and super-
ficially unimportant – moments of affect can be diagnostic of important 
lines of conjunction and contestation within interdisciplinary spaces; and 
(5) how acknowledgement of affective bewilderment while in interdisci-
plinary spaces is easily misconstrued as either a deliberate or unwitting 
removal from the terrain of the political.
We worry that our inclusion of instances of mostly negatively valenced 
emotion has been done, at least in part, through some desire to seek 
sympathy, to settle scores, or to parade, in the interests of exhibitionism, 
shameful episodes of our own making. But we also want to insist that 
to decide not to attend to the movements and textures of, and manifold 
responses (whether regulatory or dysregulatory) to such emotion in 
interdisciplinary spaces, is to miss much of what is happening in them. 
If the would-be collaborator hears a strong note of caution – even 
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warning – in this chapter, she has not misinterpreted our intent. We 
really do want these incidents – minor and anecdotal as all of them 
are – to begin a conversation about the range, shape, and effects of such 
intersectional and affective moments within interdisciplinary spaces, 
and how those moments might be encountered.
We have drawn particular attention to emotional regulation not 
only to attend to modes of self-management that the interdisciplinary 
researcher is called to (although we take these very seriously). Focusing 
on ‘regulation’ has also been a way for us to think against the grain of 
mastery and frankness in the interdisciplinary scene; it has, in particular, 
helped us to move beyond the stentorian banalities of ‘truth’ and ‘power’ 
in writings on collaboration – and thereby to think about how interdis-
ciplinary life might be lived through less conventional ethical and philo-
sophical practices. Most importantly, turning to the metaphor (although 
it is not only a metaphor) of regulation has helped us to understand 
much better what is going in the empirical projects that have captured 
our (interdisciplinary) attention. There is, for example, no cut between 
the subject of our lie-detection experiment, wondering how or whether 
to tell awkward but necessary truths, and the experimenters themselves, 
constantly unsure about how they might (if they might at all) voice 
their own anxieties about the experiment. What we have called in this 
chapter ‘feeling fuzzy’, and the affectively precarious responses that the 
interdisciplinary researcher makes in the face of this destabilizing bodily 
and mental state – is not incidental to the kinds of precarious, awkward, 
ambiguous, anxiety-inducing topics with which she is precisely trying to 
get her hands dirty.
Notes & Queries: 7
Q: I worry about tensions and emotions in my interdisciplinary work – 
what advice do you have for dealing with these?
A: Our answer is going to sound like advice that is appropriate 
to any group of people working collaboratively together: how do 
temperament and discipline combine and diverge within and across 
individuals? How might one regard an eruption of affect – or the 
collection of affect around a particular person – as diagnostic of 
some of the things that are going on in and across the wider collabo-
ration? Tracking a group’s interdisciplinary processes, here, might 
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be helpful – so as to bring to the surface how different and difficult 
these modes of working can be. There are bound to be rough spots 
in any such collaboration, and allowing all to acknowledge this 
might open up ways for things to move forward. It might also be 
helpful to acknowledge – across all members of the collaborative 
group – how psychologically, practically, and emotionally exhaust-
ing interdisciplinarity can be.
But perhaps it is worth staying with this feeling, rather than always 
labouring with the assumption that things need to be addressed or 
resolved (whether immediately or across the longer term). This is 
not to say that one cannot – or indeed, should not – speak up when 
experiencing this kind of exhaustion, or when otherwise pinioned 
by negative affect. Of course, sometimes relations are just uninter-
estingly bad, and people positioned in ways that are unacceptable: 
we do not advise, in such situations, simply to get over it, or to 
stay quiet. But what we are trying to say is: the affective weight of 
an interdisciplinary collaboration may be as much a datum to be 
considered as a situation to be managed. We have learnt so much 
about our own collaborations from such an attention – insight that 
would have been quite lost by insisting on, for example, clearing the 
air. The question then is: what might be learnt from the tensions 
and emotions that run through a particular project? What do they 
reveal about the broader intellectual and psychological structure 
in which the project is caught? What can they tell us about how 
interdisciplinary knowledge is produced? Might they ultimately 
help us – if, indeed, it is progress that we are after – to pin down the 
broader pressure points, and anxieties, and aches, that are ultimately 
blocking that progress?
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Epilogue
Coming clean
We have been rather tight-lipped, it’s fair to say, about 
the interdisciplinary collaboration whose contours we 
arguably have greatest access to – namely, the collabora-
tion between the two of us. This book marks a distinct 
moment in a collaboration that is, as we write these words, 
five years old. We have, during those years, developed, 
contributed to, and found ourselves caught up in many 
kinds of experiments. They include experiments of think-
ing, writing (articles, chapters, now this book), applying 
(for grant funding), visiting (other laboratories), present-
ing (at conferences, at workshops), collecting data (of very 
different kinds), organizing (of workshops, of panels), and 
vacationing (after those conferences and workshops). And 
through those experiments has come, additionally, the 
experiment of friendship. The interdisciplinary has been, 
throughout, an object of shared enquiry, a descriptor of 
our own collaboration, and the butt of many of our jokes 
and frustrations.
When we met, in the rain, at the residential workshop 
with which we opened the book, we shared two things. 
First, we were (and are) both interpretive social scientists, 
and that cross-disciplinary descriptor felt increasingly 
salient as we slowly worked out that we were the only two 
in a room filled, largely, by psychologists, philosophers, 
and neuroscientists. Second, we both felt alienated by – if 
unable, at that point, fully to understand – the dominant 
logic of interdisciplinarity that was consolidating around 
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us. So, we identified with one another both vis-à-vis our broad location 
within the academy, and vis-à-vis our shared unease with how we were 
being drawn into topologies that made us – though we knew not quite 
why, exactly – wary. It is tempting to imagine that the coming together 
of a geographer and sociologist is unremarkable as an interdisciplinary 
collaboration – not least given that each of us is an interpretive social 
scientist. But what has been one of the most surprising facets of our 
working with one another is coming to realize the enduring legacy of 
the overlapping, yet undoubtedly heterogeneous disciplinary histories, 
investments, and networks of citations that each of us brings to our 
conversations and our joint writing. The labour of understanding and 
working creatively with our differences from one another – in terms of 
epistemologies, politics, rhetorics, and the different texts, theoretical 
formulations, and arguments to which each of us tends to turn most 
readily – is arguably the foundation for much of the thinking that we 
have outlined here.
The words within this volume have been wiped clean of the profound 
moments of disorientation, of disagreement, of irritation, and of feeling 
fuzzy that each of us has experienced in attempting this joint work of 
theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic writing. We are aware of the tricki-
ness (if not tricksiness) of a first-person plural narrative voice – by turns 
distancing, intimate, heavily deliberate, strangely unsettling. The ‘we’ 
leaves opaque the nature of the ties between those elements that make 
up the ‘we’. The reader always already knows that ‘they’ can’t really think 
and feel the same. Our narrative ‘we’, then, as it covers over the friction 
of the elements that make that ‘we’ up, comes to perform much of what 
we have alluded to previously – tongue-biting and compromise. There is, 
then, just as much to say about subjugation and incorporation in relation 
to our own practices of working together as there has been to say about 
those other collaborations we have discussed. But there is, as we have 
insisted throughout this volume, simultaneously the pleasure that comes 
from giving one’s self up to something and taking the consequences. New 
things emerge in the world when one inhabits the other’s arguments, 
when one is led down the paths of the other’s preoccupations, and when 
one is absorbed by the other’s milieu.
Every paragraph of this book has been written with the two of us 
sitting, side by side, on a long table, looking out at several of our collabo-
rators who are sitting and standing and moving in front of us, in the large 
open-plan space that is the home of Hubbub. This strange geographical 
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intimacy – and the equally strange dynamics of exhibitionism and 
surveillance that characterized the scene that joins our dyad both to 
our collaborators and to members of staff employed by our funder (who 
have been able to watch the affectively fraught scene unfolding in front 
of them) – has made us more proficient and less anxious about finishing 
each other’s sentences and subjecting each other’s paragraphs to stringent 
revisions. If we have argued for a logic of experimental entanglement in 
our approach to the scene of interdisciplinary research surrounding the 
brain and mind, then such entanglement animates, too, our own experi-
mental scene of thinking and writing. Entanglement complicates – it can 
act as a snare, or embarrassment, or hindrance. We have experienced 
all of these. But these complications and obstructions have not simply 
stymied us but opened new paths, new plots, new modes of being in rela-
tion – with one another, and with the other people, entities, and objects 
with whom our interdisciplinary enquiries are concerned.
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